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SUMMARY
This dissertation reflects on strategies for utilizing networks to catalyze a low-carbon
energy transition. In particular, I focus on the role of networks for two policy strategies: (i)
switching to alternative, low-carbon energy technologies, and (ii) reducing consumption of
carbon-intensive, fossil fuel energy resources. Chapter 2 of this dissertation uses historical
energy transitions to argue networks complicate prescriptive policy design. In particular,
we illustrate the nature of the underlying technologies used to covert physical fuel inputs
into energy services structures interactions between markets. The interconnections between
markets, in turn, creates complex feedback loops that lead to simultaneous changes across
the entire economy. We explore how these feedback loops impact energy efficiency policy
in more detail in chapter 4. Chapter 3 investigates the role of networks in proliferating the
diffusion of low-carbon energy technologies. We provide evidence that network formation
is critical for the early success of emerging low-carbon innovations. When networks form
at this early stage of the technology life cycle, they provide a platform for information
exchange between early and future adopters, leading to lower search, transaction, and op-
erational costs for future adopters. Lastly, in chapter 4, we develop a theoretical model that
embeds industrial, energy efficiency improvements within a network setting to understand
how interconnections between markets affects the outcomes of sector-specific low-carbon
energy policy. Energy efficiency is often touted as a cure-all policy measure to reduce
dependence on carbon intensive, fossil fuel resources. However, when markets are con-
nected by the economy’s production network, the outcome of energy efficiency policy is
highly uncertain. Using a combination of theoretical and numerical analyses, we illustrate
the structure of the economy’s production network shapes the change in aggregate energy




Networks are the basis for a variety of social and economic activities within society. Social
networks, for instance, have important implications for the way information flows between
individuals, firms, and institutions. Economic networks, for example, shape the organiza-
tion of production and the transmission of shocks between firms and sectors in the economy.
Given the ubiquitous nature of networks, understanding how behavior changes within a net-
worked setting is critical for designing, implementing, and evaluating policies promoting
the transition to a low-carbon energy system.
Transitioning to a low-carbon energy system can be achieved through either the adop-
tion of low-carbon energy technologies or by reducing consumption of carbon-intensive
fossil fuel resources. In this dissertation, I explore how networks can be incorporated in
both of these strategies to facilitate the low-carbon energy transition. In chapter 2, my
coauthors and I synthesize the literature on energy system transitions to construct a styl-
ized framework for evaluating energy system transitions [1]. Our framework builds from
existing system-level perspectives on energy transitions to emphasize the role of markets
and rational choice. By doing so, we advance a new perspective for evaluating alternative
policy strategies promoting a low-carbon energy system transition.
Our energy-service system framework provides a simple scaffolding for constructing
low-carbon energy policy from the ground up. We show the technological configuration of
an energy system, namely the process by which raw fuel inputs are converted into useful
energy-services, structures the interactions of markets within the economy. Even though
fuel inputs, technologies, and energy services have evolved over time, the linear process of
producing energy services has remained unchanged and thus gives a baseline for evaluating
how energy system transitions unfold from a market perspective.
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Using historical energy transitions as a guide, we illustrate the networked nature of
markets create complex, feedback loops, rendering prescriptive policy design all the more
difficult. Markets interact both within and across prevailing technological configurations.
Hence, policy actions within a single market will cascade to other markets, either rein-
forcing or weakening prevailing technological configurations. Our energy-service system
framework provides policymakers with the necessary perspective to leverage existing in-
teractions between markets to tip the scales in favor of low-carbon energy sources and
technologies.
The transition to a low-carbon economy is hindered by market and institutional barriers
that limit the diffusion of low-carbon technologies. Traditional policy interventions either
rely on research subsidies or tax incentives to overcome barriers to commercialization and
spur investment in these areas. However, the uncertainty with respect to a technology’s
performance or reliability is not addressed by these traditional policy instruments. Chapter
3 of this dissertation explores how experimentation, learning, and social networks influence
the diffusion of breakthrough, low-carbon innovations.
In cases where uncertainty acts as a barrier, both public and private actors may imple-
ment pilot and demonstration (P&D) projects, deploying the technology at reduced scale,
to remediate this uncertainty. We investigate the impact of P&D projects on adoption of
green building technology and unpack the mechanisms driving the observed impacts. We
find P&D projects for a popular green building standard increased local green building
adoption rates between 5-12 percent. We find this effect is robust to alternative models and
assumptions.
We further explore whether the positive impact of P&D projects is driven by herding be-
havior or learning externalities. From a policy perspective, the objective of a P&D project
is to reveal new information about the performance and reliability of a given technology.
To the extent new information generated by experimentation might spillover to potential
adopters, the social benefits created by these information externalities may warrant addi-
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tional investments in P&D projects. This is particularly true in cases where information
dissemination is an objective. Because of this, we unpack the main results of our analysis
to determine whether information spillovers might be driving adoption.
Additional tests indicate adoption may be driven by learning externalities created by
P&D projects. First, we illustrate that adoption increases at a higher rate when P&D
projects utilize more refined technologies. When P&D projects undergo sequential iter-
ations, stakeholders can improve experimental outcomes by building on successes and re-
fining failures until a technology reaches a marketable stage [2]. This implies that later
P&D projects should have a more pronounced impact on adoption if information externali-
ties are the mechanism driving diffusion. Second, we demonstrate that projects exposed to
the construction of a P&D project have a 9-12 percent shorter implementation time. One
interpretation of this finding is that P&D projects contribute to the formation of supplier
and knowledge sharing networks. In particular, reduced project completion times after
exposure may indicate non-participating organizations connect with suppliers involved in
the P&D project and knowledge regarding best practices was transferred between P&D
stakeholders and non-participating organizations.
Another approach for transitioning to a low-carbon economy is to reduce consumption
of fossil fuel energy resources. However, many policies in this domain, such as carbon
taxes, receive substantial political backlash due to the possibility they might reduce eco-
nomic growth or drive unemployment within critical sectors in the economy. For these
reasons, energy efficiency policy is often touted as a cure-all policy strategy for reduc-
ing fossil fuel consumption, while simultaneously promoting economic growth through the
more productive use of scarce energy resources.
Over the past century, global energy productivity has increased by more than two-fold
over the past century. Breakthrough innovations in common energy services, such as light-
ing, heating, transportation, and power, have contributed to this increased productivity.
However, at the same time, global energy consumption has drastically increased, and the
3
impact of energy efficiency on global energy consumption remains an open question. In
chapter 4, we explore the underlying economic mechanisms that connect energy efficiency
improvements at a micro-scale, i.e. at the level of individual energy service technologies,
and changes in aggregate energy consumption.
The focus of chapter 4 is on the relationship between the economy’s aggregate energy
consumption and its production network. Production networks reflect the degree of in-
terdependence between sectors in the economy, and the structure of the interconnections
between sectors has important implications for how idiosyncratic, microeconomic shocks
transmit between sectors and affect aggregate economic outcomes. Because the structure
of the economy’s production network evolves over space and time, the economic impacts
of the same sectoral shocks may differ substantially across regions and over time, even
though economic fundamentals, such as gross output and employment, remain constant.
This paper is the first to study how variation in regional economic responses to tech-
nological productivity shocks relates to the structure of each economy’s underlying pro-
duction network. We study this phenomenon in the context of industrial, energy efficiency
shocks. Using a general equilibrium framework, we show how the structure of the econ-
omy’s production network shapes aggregate energy production following improvements
in the efficiency of energy service technologies. In particular, we illustrate that, for two
economies with the same attributes, differences in the systemic importance of the sector
experiencing the energy efficiency shock is sufficient to generate variation in aggregate,
equilibrium energy production across the two economies.
My analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we develop a general equilibrium model that
embeds energy efficiency within a production network to determine the theoretical eco-
nomic mechanisms that connect micro-scale energy efficiency improvements to aggregate
economic outcomes. From the comparative statics of the model, we find the change in
equilibrium energy production following the efficiency shock can be decomposed into a
price, growth, and composition channel.
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Second, I further distinguish each equilibrium channel into a network-driven and direct
component. Using this distinction, we construct a simple statistic for quantifying the impact
of the economys production network on the change in equilibrium energy production from
the energy efficiency shock, what we refer to as the energy savings multiplier.
Third, to provide initial estimates of the practical importance of the energy savings
multiplier, we calibrate the parameters of the theoretical model to simulate the change in
energy production from a 10% energy efficiency shock applied to each US state. The results
of the simulation suggest state-level, energy output elasticities are highly heterogeneous,
and re-allocation of intermediate inputs within the economys supply chains directly impact
the rebound effect from energy efficiency improvements.
Fourth, we illustrate the magnitude of the energy savings multiplier is directly related to
the network centrality of the sector experiencing the energy efficiency improvement. This
finding suggests that variations in the underlying structure of regional production networks




AN ENERGY-SERVICE SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
The following chapter is a reprint of a published paper:
Blackburn, C., Harding, A., Moreno-Cruz, J. (2017). Toward Deep-Decarbonization: an
Energy-Service System Framework. Current Sustainable/Renewable Energy Reports, 4(4),
181-190.
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2.1 Motivation
Despite contemporary efforts to mitigate risks posed by global climate change, emissions
of anthropogenic greenhouse gases have reached their highest levels in recorded history
and show no immediate indication of slowing down on a global scale [3]. From a pol-
icy perspective, reducing greenhouse gas emissions can be achieved by either switching to
low-carbon technologies or reducing the amount of fossil fuel energy consumed [4, 5, 6].
The scale of environmental risks, however, necessitates monumental changes in both social
and technological systems to avoid significant environmental degradation [7]. This encom-
passes changes in energy use, innovation and development of low-carbon technologies, and
broader changes in social, political, and economic institutions.
Relieving the environment of the stressors introduced by global reliance on fossil fu-
els requires the orchestration of a system-wide transition to a deep-decarbonized energy
system. Historically, energy transitions occur over several decades as key transformational
processes unfold and realign; a future transition to a decarbonized energy system is likely
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to be prolonged without additional assertive guidance and direction. Historical analyses
illustrate the complexity of energy system transitions using a comprehensive qualitative
framework, known as the multi-level perspective; however, the flexibility and comprehen-
siveness of this framework limits identification of the driving forces behind energy system
transitions, limiting any attempt for policy prescription.
Driven by the inherent complexity of energy systems, analysts and policy makers gen-
erally rely on historical evidence and quantitative techniques for evaluating the potential
impact of public policy on energy technology and fuel substitution, including the impact
on broader market processes. In recent years, advances in computing power, data avail-
ability, and algorithmic design have permitted use of increasingly complex simulation and
optimization techniques in the evaluation of energy system transitions. Specifically, a gen-
eral class of models known as energy-economy models augments existing historical energy
transitions studies by approaching energy transition analysis using quantitative models that
combine energy resource extraction, distribution, and consumption into a single frame-
work. While these models have evolved over time to account for more realistic scenarios,
quantitative approaches still fall short in capturing the full range of complex interactions
between modern energy and market systems [8, 9].
Fundamentally, an energy system is a complex web of relationships between natural
resources, physical infrastructure, production systems, scientific knowledge, and consumer
practices. Changes in one component can influence the entire system in highly non-linear
and unpredictable ways. Hence, steering the transition to a global, low-carbon energy
system will require better knowledge of the correct levers to pull and by how much to
pull them. The purpose of this review is to provide a unified framework that complements
both qualitative and quantitative approaches for studying energy transitions. Motivated
by this framework, we argue swift and expansive policy measures are needed to hasten
global decarbonization and current policy-oriented studies tend to miss the mark on the
importance of scale, complementarities, and feedbacks in energy systems [10, 11, 12, 13].
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces system-level analyses of en-
ergy transitions, primarily focusing on the multi-level perspective literature. Section 2.3
introduces the energy-service system framework using examples from the literature. We
illustrate in section 2.4 how government policy can guide low-carbon technological change
in an industrializing world. In section 2.5, we provide a brief overview of energy-economy
models and their benefits and limitations. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The System-Level Approach
A variety of system-level perspectives have been developed to understand and frame the
dynamic interrelationships between social, technological, and natural systems [14, 15, 16].
Arguably, the most commonly used framework in the historical energy transitions literature
is the multi-level perspective (MLP). The MLP has been applied to analyze several tech-
nological transitions, e.g., the transition to steam ships, automobiles, and renewable energy
technologies [14, 17, 18, 19, 20].
The MLP organizes social and technological institutions into hierarchical constructs
known as niches, regimes, and landscapes. Niches are the “protective spaces that insulate
entrant innovations from the competitive pressures of prevailing technological configura-
tions [21, 22, 23]. Radical innovations occurring at the niche level are the sources of
disruption that can potentially de-stabilize incumbent technologies. These protected niche
markets permit innovations to develop to a point of cost competitiveness with incumbent
technologies, increasing the possibility of a transition [14].
Regimes represent the purposeful alignment of physical and institutional configura-
tions to satisfy a particular societal function. The mutual interdependency that results from
alignment of these configurations tends to reinforce prevailing technological trajectories
via path-dependent processes, a key feature of the modern fossil-fuel-based energy system
[24, 25, 26]. For niche market innovations to lead to a regime-level shift, innovative forces
must be strong enough to push society to alternative pathways [27]. These regimes exert
8
pressure on the lower, niche levels that lead to the development of radical innovations [28].
Importantly, technological transitions are characterized by shifts occurring at the regime
level.
Landscapes are the macro-level, exogenous trends that exert pressures on prevailing
regimes and niches [28]. A couple examples of landscape forces are demographic trends
and environmental integrity. Changes at the landscape level can lead to pressure on regimes
and niches falling under the landscapes umbrella of influence. Due to their size, landscapes
take longer to transition than regimes or niches.
While the MLP is a flexible, comprehensive approach for studying energy transitions,
some researchers have criticized the MLP for neglecting the role of consumer choice, gov-
ernment action, and entrepreneurship in technological transitions [16, 29]. Even though
the MLP allows for the existence of markets as “rulemaking institutions, which guide and
reinforce prevailing regimes, rational decision making is underdeveloped in the MLP [28,
30, 31]. Thus, when market systems do not account for the environmental damages cre-
ated by a fossil-fuel intensive energy regime, the MLP is a particularly silent source for
understanding the appropriate pathways to achieve broader energy system transformations.
When it comes to managing the transition to the low- carbon economy, the failure of
free-market institutions to provide adequate incentives for low-carbon technology adop-
tion and consumption motivates the need for government intervention [32]. Consequently,
unlike previous transitions, disruption of the technological trajectory of the entrenched
fossil-fuel energy regime will require a beautifully orchestrat- ed symphony of market re-
form mechanisms. Given the MLP is silent on the issue of market failures, an important
question arises, what are the channels through which markets, policy institutions, and tech-
nology could drive the transition to a low-carbon energy system?
We address this shortcoming of the MLP approach by de- vising a framework that
not only considers the technological configuration of an energy system, but its interaction
with the prevailing market system. To differentiate this framework from the MLP, we
9
introduce the concept of an energy-service system. An energy-service system represents
the observed set of methods and designs that produce socially desirable forms of energy
and the market systems that influence them [16, 33]. This interpretation is useful because
the technological configuration of an energy system is independent of prevailing niches,
regimes, or landscapes and provides a constant stan- dard for comparison across time.
Additionally, this framework aligns with recent evidence that suggests energy transitions
have largely been catalyzed by novel combinations of energy sources and technologies to
provide cheaper energy services to society [34].
2.3 The Energy-Service System Model
The technological configuration of an energy system is comprised of the primary energy
sources and conversion technologies needed to produce a valued energy service, such as
heat, power, or lighting [35]. Although seemingly more complex systems have emerged
over time, this underlying structure has remained unchanged. By analyzing the techno-
logical configuration of an energy system together with the market systems in which trans-
actions take place, i.e., an energy-service system, the framework we present below has the
potential to inform on aspects of the low-carbon transition where the MLP approach is
silent.
The core logic of the energy-service system model is that decisions are costly, and thus
the source of change in this model is in the market systems ability to alter the relative cost
and benefits of a low-carbon energy system versus maintaining the status quo. A market
system (markets) is a complex network of buyers and sellers who trade goods and services
with each other. Like other markets, in the market system for energy, interactions between
the supply-side and the demand- side determine the pricing of goods and services and the
allocation of scarce resources among agents. Ultimately, market prices provide the incen-
tives that guide decision-making and give rise to the technological configurations found in
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Figure 2.1: The Energy-Service System
dation and are lower than a welfare-maximizing market institution would dictate. Hence,
without additional correction to these failures, only scarcity is priced by the markets, pro-
viding little incentive to de-carbonize the global energy system.
While most energy systems are comprised of multiple subsystems, the energy-service
system framework presented in this paper focuses on the relationship between energy tech-
nologies and market systems. These relationships are summarized in Figure 2.1. This
figure is adapted from the multi-level perspective hierarchy. The lowest level of the system
represents the technological configuration of an energy system. In this level, alternative
technological configurations combine primary energy sources, denoted as E1 and E2, with
conversion technologies, C1 and C2, to produce an energy service S1 and S2, respectively.
The boundaries of each technology are represented by the circles. Each component
of the configurations is linked with the respective markets in the top layer of the figure.
Markets for the components are denoted by M . Markets that are present within the bound-
aries of a technological configuration are linked based on complementary relationships.
11
However, the connections between markets can cross over these boundaries because of
the substitutable nature of the two technological configurations. Finally, supply-side and
demand-side pressures influence the outcomes of the markets for the technological compo-
nents.
The technological configuration of an energy system is made up of energy sources,
conversion technologies, and energy services. Energy sources are combined with conver-
sion technologies to provide useful energy services to consumers. The market system is
composed of a market for each component of a technological configuration. These mar-
kets interact directly with each other through social and technological institutions, as high-
lighted by the direct linkages between them. Most importantly, however, these markets
interact indirectly with each other through the structure of the technological system, where
markets within a configuration are complementary and markets across configurations are
substitutes.
At the top level of the system, supply-side and demand-side pressures are exerted on the
energy-service system. For example, on the supply-side, extraction costs and transporta-
tion costs exert pressures on existing markets by expanding the economic abundance of an
energy source [36]. On the demand-side, preferences for higher quality fuels and environ-
mentally friendly technologies introduce pressures for the development of new products
and technologies. Given the interlinked structure of the technological system, information
between markets flows either downstream from supply-side pressures or upstream from
demand-side pressures, such that a change in any one component, under the right condi-
tions, can alter the entire system state. In the next subsections, we introduce some examples
of these pressures and frame them in the energy-service system framework.
2.3.1 Examples of Supply-Side Pressures
At the turn of the eighteenth century, coal mining in Britain relied on animal and human
power to pump water from mines, where the latter was an expensive option given the high
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wage rates in Britain at the time [37, 38]. This likely incentivized coal producers to adopt
the Newcomen and Watt engines in the eighteenth century. Referring to Figure 2.1, the
introduction of steam engines represented a supply-side shock that allowed producers to
reach deeper reserves of coal (E1) at a lower cost [37]. This affected the coal market
(ME1) by reducing the relative cost of coal to alternative energy sources, such as wood
(E2). The new information about the relative price of coal to biomass then translated
to the market for conversion technologies, given the connections in 2.1. In the market for
conversion technologies (MC1), coal utilizing technologies (C1) gained an advantage over
competing technologies (C2) leading to higher adoption rates. Ultimately, these feedback
channels led to a larger market for a coal-based energy-service system after the supply-side
shock induced a lower price for coal-based energy services (S1).
Similarly, the current shale gas revolution, driven by innovations in horizontal drilling
and hydraulic fracturing techniques, has increased the natural gas supply in the USA to
nearly 3 trillion cubic feet. Referencing Figure 2.1, the shale gas revolution has essentially
followed a similar process as the coal revolution in the UK. Innovation occurring in the
supply-side of the market (ME1) has lowered the relative price of natural gas, which in
turn has reduced the price of generating electricity from natural gas sources (MC1), lead-
ing to more widespread adoption of natural gas generation technologies [39]. Another
supply-side pressure on the market system is variations in transportation costs. Tradi-
tionally, energy-service systems have relied on the natural resources readily available to
humankind. Where large-scale transportation systems are either non-existent or transporta-
tion is too costly, the energy sources used in energy-service systems are constrained by
the proximity of consumers to these sources [40]. In the early periods of human devel-
opment, fire-making techniques relied on local floral growth to provide valuable services
such as heating and lighting [41, 42]. In a modern context, impoverished households in
rural China with limited access to energy infrastructure rely on local energy sources, such
as wood, straw, and biogas, to satisfy a variety of household functions [43]. Hence, the cost
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of accessing energy sources weighs heavily on the choice of energy-service systems.
The role of transportation costs is also evident in the co- development of energy and
industry infrastructure. In the USA, when hydroelectric plants were developed, local in-
dustries benefited from access to cheaper, higher quality electricity. As long-distance trans-
mission lines and coal and natural gas plants spread throughout the USA, being near hydro-
electric plants was no longer needed; in other words, industries were no longer tied to the
location of power. This allowed industries to locate closer to other input sources, increasing
industrial productivity [44]. Similarly, in the sixteenth century, when coal was introduced
in England to replace wood, the location of economic activity moved north, closer to the
coal sources. However, as canals and railroads spread through the UK, industries were no
longer tied to the location of energy sources, and they began to locate in places that offered
comparative advantage in other dimensions, e.g., access to markets [45].
As shown in these examples, pressures originate in the energy source market and prop-
agate downstream to energy- service markets, lowering the energy service price. Be-
cause conversion technologies are tied to specific energy sources, the lower energy service
price encourages adoption of the conversion technology, creating positive feedback be-
tween complementary markets. As the examples above suggest, for deep de-carbonization,
supply-side innovations are necessary to make low-carbon technologies cost-competitive
with fossil fuel alternatives [46].
2.3.2 Examples of Demand-Side Pressures
In the energy-service system, demand for energy services translates into a demand for en-
ergy sources due to the techno- logical configuration of the system. Like the supply of en-
ergy sources discussed above, there are many factors that influence the demand for energy
services. One demand-side pressure highlighted in the literature is the quality of an energy
service. Historically, as global real income increased, both producers and consumers devel-
oped preferences for higher quality fuels, and these evolving preferences ultimately shaped
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the configuration of the energy-service systems in place in the modern world. Presently,
the environmental quality of an energy service is most relevant for a low-carbon transition.
If a service is of higher environmental quality, in that it produces less environmental exter-
nalities, ceteris paribus there will be a larger market for that good when consumers have a
higher willingness to pay for environmental quality.
Energy sources differ in their chemical composition and, subsequently, in their energy
and carbon densities. Historically, these differences have influenced the adoption of energy
sources in different ways. Starting with bread and beer making, the use of coal soon spread
to glass-making and eventually iron and steel. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century iron
and steel industries, coals displacement of bio- mass energy sources was, in part, driven by
coals advantages in production, storage, and transportation due to its higher volumetric
energy content [47, 48]. However, broad diffusion of coal in iron and steel production was
limited until the introduction of quality control techniques in the middle-to-late eighteenth
century.
The story is similar for urban coal consumption during Londons population boom in
the early-to-middle sixteenth century. Rapid population growth in the city strained the lo-
cal supply of wood fuel and necessitated transportation of wood from greater distances,
thus leading to a doubling of the price of wood per unit of energy [49, 50]. Coupled with
the relative advantages offered by coals energy content, which translated into lower trans-
portation costs, the relative price of coal was much cheaper than that of wood fuel in the
late sixteenth century. However, widespread diffusion was limited until significant innova-
tion in housing design, mainly after the introduction of chimneys and grates, took hold in
early the seventeenth century [37, 38]. Showing the long lasting effects of seemingly minor
modifications in society, inexpensive coal at the time encouraged expansion of inefficient
building designs based on coal, which still persist today [51].
Coals relative chemical advantage helped fuel the transition from biomass to coal in
the iron and steel industries during Britains energy transition, but with fossil fuels, higher
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chemical energy density is associated with a higher carbon density. In the case of coal,
high-carbon content acted as a limiting factor in its expansion and diffusion in some sec-
tors. For example, as coal gained prominence over wood fuel in London for residential
heating services, the city experienced a drastic decline in local air quality, which likely
increased mortality rates in the city [52, 53]. During this time, the market system provided
little incentives to switch to higher quality fuel sources, since cleaner energy sources, such
as anthracite coal, commanded a higher price in the market. It was not until anthracite
coal became cost effective that energy-service systems were designed to utilize this fuel
source. The urgency of the future energy transition toward a decarbonized system requires
swift, coordinated action to incorporate environmental considerations in the daily choices
of individuals in society.
By discussing the literature through the lens of the techno- logical configuration of the
energy system in congruence with the respective market system, an energy-service frame-
work emerges. Through this framework, overcoming market failures and de-carbonizing
energy-service systems requires assertive pressures to be applied to the market system.
When pressures are applied in one market, the technological configuration of the system
re-directs the flow to affect the whole system. Thus, by using the energy-service system
as shown in Figure 2.1, policymakers can identify where to apply pressure and, more ac-
curately, determine how much pressure is required to create positive feedbacks throughout
the system.
2.4 Designing Policy for the Future
Broadly, the future low-carbon energy transition will require two distinct regime shifts:
(i) a shift of post-industrialized, stable regimes in developed countries and (ii) a shift of
emerging, possibly more flexible, regimes in developing countries. These two broad cate-
gories of regimes have historically differed in both the availability and supply of energy, the
necessary supporting infrastructure to exploit energy sources, and their demand for energy
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services [54]. The barriers that must be overcome to establish a stable, deep-decarbonized
energy system depend on the state of the existing regime and exemplify the need for diverse
policy measures and international coordination.
2.4.1 Post-Industrialized Economies
Mature regimes in post-industrialized countries are based on the use of fossil fuels and
represent a legacy of large-scale investments in complementary energy infrastructure and
technology. Scale economies, knowledge spillovers, and network externalities have con-
tributed to mutually reinforcing economic, political, and technological barriers that lock-in
fossil-fuel systems [24, 25, 55, 56]. Further, incumbent fossil-fuel technologies may benefit
from new ideas introduced by entrant low-carbon technologies and push to remain compet-
itive by developing new business strategies to maintain market share [57, 58]. Hence, the
combined forces of lock-in and push-back necessitate a diverse array of policies to desta-
bilize the existing fossil-fuel regime [27].
In post-industrialized economies, if innovators are profit motivated, then innovation
activities are directed toward the larger, incumbent fossil-fuel energy-service system, caus-
ing further lock-in the fossil-fuel regime in the long run [59]. Additionally, if innovation
is the locus of change in the energy-service system model, then destabilizing locked-in,
existing fossil fuel regimes will require support for the development of novel, substitute
low-carbon technologies. From this perspective, when markets provide little incentives for
private research and development (R&D) in low-carbon technologies, governmental insti-
tutions can increase investment through policy initiatives that support development of low-
carbon technologies.
Considering technical change as an endogenous factor in models used to analyze opti-
mal policy intervention has the potential to greatly change the results of models that treat
technical change as an entirely exogenous factor [60]. While economists have begun to
analyze optimal policy intervention in a transition to clean technology in the presence of
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path dependency and directed technical change, this nascent and critically important liter-
ature has room to grow [59, 60, 61, 62]. So far, this research has found that a combination
of research and development and carbon taxes are critical factors of optimal policy de-
sign to overcome lock-in in developed countries and tip the scales in favor of adoption of
low-carbon technologies in developing countries. With the correct policy mixture, existing
regimes can be destabilized and a new, low-carbon regime can reach a point of positive
feedback and stability.
Climate change policy can include many different instruments that are designed to re-
duce environmental damage. These policies come in two flavors: command-and-control
regulations or market-based instruments. Command-and- control regulations mandate pro-
ducers to meet specific performance targets or invest in particular low-carbon technologies;
in contrast, market-based policies, such as cap-and-trade, carbon taxes, or R&D subsidies,
establish a specific market price for activities that either contribute to or avoid damaging
the environment [32]. Naturally, market-based instruments raise the price of high-carbon
sources relative to low-carbon counterparts, which leads to an increase in carbon inten-
sive energy prices. A variety of studies that examine the relationship be- tween climate
policy, prices, and innovation find more stringent environmental policy and higher energy
prices are followed by a non-trivial increase in low-carbon innovation activities [63, 64, 65,
66]. Additionally, when the outcomes of RD are highly uncertain, which is especially true
during the early stages of a technologys lifecycle, government sponsored research, devel-
opment, and demonstration projects can facilitate the transfer of niche products from basic
research to the commercialization phase [67, 68].
If new competition from low-carbon niche technologies forces incumbent fossil fuel
technologies to invest in strategies to remain competitive, and the consumer adoption deci-
sion is determined by the relative prices of two competing technologies, then diffusion of
low-carbon technologies is likely to be a gradual and slow process. Without additional pol-
icy support for uptake of low-carbon technologies, fossil fuel technologies may continue to
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enjoy their relative price advantage as producers seek new ways to improve performance
considering the new competition from low-carbon alternatives. Hence, taxes and subsidies
can be used to adjust these prices to favor low-carbon technologies and accelerate uptake
in the market.
2.4.2 Emerging Economies
World energy consumption is expected to rise by around 5% in the next 25 years, as large
countries like China, India, and Russia continue to industrialize and develop [69]. Largely
void of large scale, fossil fuel infrastructure, developing countries are not necessarily sub-
ject to the same lock-in and push-back forces experienced by countries with mature fossil-
fuel markets, infrastructures, and technologies. In contrast, industrializing and developing
countries can take advantage of their development status and learn from the successes and
failures of early adopters of low-carbon technology and policy to effectively “leap-frog”
fossil fuel-based energy systems [70, 71, 72]. However, additional impediments in devel-
oping countries, such as weak, or fledgling financial institutions or political corruption,
may introduce new frictions for financing of large-scale low-carbon development projects
and thus impede progress toward developing a low-carbon energy system [73].
The transfer of low-carbon, environmentally friendly technologies from developed to
developing economies is an important feature of international environmental agreements,
such as the Kyoto Protocol, but a fiercely debated topic in the recent Paris Climate Agree-
ment [74]. While technology transfer is a somewhat ambiguous terminology, the concept
encompasses the transfer of a range of knowledge and physical capital transfers between
developed and less developed countries. A few studies have examined the international
dif- fusion of environmental technologies. These studies suggest that international trans-
fer of best-practice environmental regulations is a pre-requisite for successful adoption of
environmental technologies from the world frontier [63, 75, 76]. For a global, low-carbon
energy transition to take hold, energy policy in the developing world must be designed to
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take advantage of the early stages of development and bypass the entrenchment stage of
large-scale, fossil-fuel dependent energy systems [26]. As nations advance in material wel-
fare, market and political institutions also tend to become more inclusive and participatory
in their structure; but, in theory, by introducing protectionist, anti-competitive, niche imi-
tation strategies in the early stages of growth, developing nations can exploit frontier tech-
nologies to establish new technological regimes and experience more rapid growth rates
in early development periods [77, 78]. This is commonly referred to as the “advantage of
backwardness” [79]. However, for this strategy to be viable, developing countries must
rely on international low-carbon technology transfer as a critical pathway for transitioning
emerging regimes to a primarily low-carbon composition.
2.5 Energy-Economy Modeling of Energy Transitions
Due to a dearth of data for historical energy transition analysis, policymakers turn to a vari-
ety of quantitative approaches to forecast the impacts of alternative energy policy scenarios
on energy resource consumption and technology choice. These approaches fall under a
collective classification of models known as energy-economy models. Energy-economy
models explicitly model the interactions between energy technologies and market systems
and are generally divided into three categories of models according to the detail by which
the interactions within the energy-service system are structured. The general classifica-
tions are typically divided into (i) bot- tom-up, (ii) top-down, and (iii) hybrid approaches.
Overall, these classifications are special cases of the energy-service system framework.
While energy-economy models have increased in detail and sophistication over time,
the oldest class of models is known as bottom-up approaches. The bottom-up approach
is a partial equilibrium representation of an energy-service sys- tem and features a wide-
range of technologies to capture the technological richness of the energy supply-side and
demand- side components. Technology and fuel choice is cast as a cost- minimizing opti-
mization programs, such as in the ETA, MARKAL, and MESSAGE models [80]. However,
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despite the technological richness of these modeling approaches, conventional bottom-up
modeling generally neglects finer details regarding consumer behavior and broader market
transformation [81, 82, 83]. Hence, application of these models has limited utility in de-
termining the set of optimal policy instruments that would be required for a system-wide
push to de-carbonization since, by design, they favor technology-based standards.
In contrast to conventional bottom-up approaches, top-down approaches represent en-
ergy market systems in a general equilibrium framework but lack explicit characteriza-
tion of technological configurations of an energy system found in conventional bottom-up
approaches. Top-down approaches tend to approach the energy-service system from an
economy-wide perspective, and thus feature a highly aggregated level of analysis at the
technological level. In most models, energy technology characteristics and technology
adoption decisions are governed by aggregate parameters that proxy substitution between
technologies and their characteristics. Governed by the choice of these parameters, aggre-
gate system-wide technological changes do not afford much detail in terms of the microe-
conomic processes that dictate consumer and firm-level technology choice [60]. Conse-
quently, the top-down approachs focus on aggregate system changes comes at the expense
of exploring the impact of alternative policies on substitution between alternative techno-
logical configurations of an energy system. Even more, the orientation of top-down models
to aggregate market-driven process- es limits policy analysis to market-based instruments
[8].
In recent years, many analysts have recognized the limitations of conventional bottom-
up and top-down approaches and have developed an alternative approach to bring energy-
economy modeling closer to a fully integrated energy-service system framework [84, 85].
This class of modeling known as the hybrid approach combines the technological richness
of bottom-up models with the market-oriented perspective of top-down approaches. The
result of this combination is a richer characterization of feedback channels between techno-
logical and market systems that permits analysis of a broader array of policy instruments,
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i.e., combinations of technology- push and demand-pull policies. However, due to the in-
tensive data requirements of the hybrid approach, most studies tend to narrowly focus on
single sector analysis, e.g., the electricity sector, and neglect heterogeneity across other
sectors technology choices [86, 87]. The hybrid energy-economy approach is arguably the
most comprehensive quantitative approach for analyzing the role of policy in catalyzing
energy transitions. However, most studies focus on single-policy scenarios or single sector
impacts. The energy-service system framework exemplifies the need for a broader set of
policy instruments to de-carbonize the global energy system. Given the complexity of ex-
isting, combined bottom-up and top-down approaches, the energy-service sys- tem frame-
work simplifies the dynamics at work so that policymakers and practitioners can glimpse
into the black box of hybrid energy-economy modeling [88].
2.6 Conclusion
The transition to a low-carbon energy system has already been set in motion [20]. Given
the urgency of the task, the set of questions for researchers is how to optimally guide the
transition, overcome any social and technological impediments, and influence the speed of
the transition using policy intervention. Unfortunately, policy analysis is usually narrowly
focused on individual sectors or technologies. As economists and policymakers analyze
the role of policy intervention in guiding a low-carbon energy system transition, it is im-
portant to consider the strong interdependencies established by the energy-service system
framework. For deep de-carbonization to occur, policy interventions need to be swift and
expansive. While there is a role for incremental efforts, overcoming carbon lock-in and
push-back requires a large shock to the system. For these shocks to be most effective, they
need to occur on both the supply-side,influencing the markets for energy sources (ME1),
and on the demand-side, influencing the market for energy services (MS1) to be most
effective. Subsidies for consumption are needed to pull for a cleaner energy system, but
an effective policy portfolio should include taxes and standards for the supply-side so that
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energy producers begin to push for a decarbonized energy system. Finally, subsidies for in-
novation need to be all encompassing, creating the incentives to invest in new technologies
that would facilitate the transition to a low-carbon energy system.
Going forward, the energy transitions literature must first take stock of where we are in
terms of active policies, the development and diffusion of existing low-carbon technologies,
as well as continue to study the role that markets play, especially in situations where path
dependency is present [89, 90, 91, 92, 93]. Research needs to further its understanding
of deep de-carbonization within an energy-service systems framework to hasten the future
transitions [94, 95]. In particular, we must identify which limitations are currently present




DO PILOT AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS WORK?
Pilot and demonstration (P&D) projects are commonly deployed to catalyze early adop-
tion of technology, but are poorly understood in terms of mechanism and impact. In this
Chapter, we conceptually distinguish unique functions of pilots and demonstrations, then
examine whether they accelerate green building adoption. To identify effects of P&Ds on
adoption, we develop a difference-in-difference-in-differences strategy, exploiting variation
in location, technologies, and timing of P&D projects. Results indicate a 12% increase in
adoption rates within markets affected by P&D projects. Further analyses examine mecha-
nisms driving this effect. Subsequent results suggest green building demonstration projects
create learning externalities, proliferating technology diffusion under certain conditions.
Taken together, our results suggest that P&D projects are most effective when they con-
tribute to the formation of collaborative, stakeholder networks where information on best
practices can be freely exchanged among network members.
3.1 Introduction
Investment in new technologies may have substantial benefits for firms, their stakeholders,
and the environment, but is hindered by uncertainty about the performance of the emergent
technology [98]. For durable technologies, resolving uncertainties may be an important
strategy to foster market uptake [99, 100, 101]. Traditional policy interventions to cat-
alyze adoption often leverage regulatory mandates or provide financial incentives [102].
Alternatively, policymakers may implement pilot and demonstration (P&D) programs, de-
ploying the technology at reduced scale to remediate uncertainty about the reliability and
performance of new technology [2].
P&D programs may serve a critical role in the successful early deployment of emerg-
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ing technologies. Technology pilots are experimental implementations designed to verify
feasibility and assess private benefits of adoption [103]. Demonstration projects are tech-
nology showcases that may create information or learning spillovers, mitigating uncertainty
about how well a technology aligns with private interests [104]. Despite the use of P&D
programs by a wide variety of private firms and public agencies, little work has verified and
evaluated their efficacy in increasing technology adoption.1 This gap is particularly promi-
nent in comparison to the breadth of analysis on research and development stages, where
analysis typically identifies conditions of innovation and outcomes of research programs.
We first seek to identify whether P&D programs work, using data from a suite of green
building PDs. We investigate the impacts of a suite of green building P&Ds on subsequent
local market adoption rates. Our primary identification strategy leverages a difference-in-
difference-in-differences (DDD) estimation framework to identify the average effect of a
green building P&D project on market uptake of green building technology by exploiting
quasi-experimental variation across time, location, and technology. Results suggest that, on
average, local green building adoption rates increase between 5% and 12% following the
completion of a P&D project. This finding is robust to a variety of alternative assumptions
and specifications.
Successful P&D programs remediate uncertainties about the performance or feasibility
of an emerging technology. While the results identified in the DDD model may be driven
1Agencies around the world operate demonstration programs explicitly linked to information-
based market failures. These include (i) the World Health Organization’s efforts to increase
adoption of public health technologies in developing countries (http://www.who.int/phi/
implementation/phi_cewg_meeting/en/); (ii) the US General Services Administrations
program to increase the use of efficient building technologies in government offices (https:
//www.gsa.gov/about-us/organization/office-of-governmentwide-policy/
office-of-federal-highperformance-buildings/projects-and-research/
demonstration-projects); and (iii) the European Space Agency’s initiative to increase ap-
plications of space technologies to broader markets (https://business.esa.int/funding/
direct-negotiation-call-for-proposals/demonstration-projects), to name a few.
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by social learning in which information spillovers resolve these uncertainties, herding be-
havior may also explain the uptick in adoption. Because herding may inadvertently create
lock-in around a technology chosen by policymakers, rather than market processes, learn-
ing is the preferred P&D outcome which generates the greatest social value. Moreover,
while the DDD estimates suggest effects of the project on surrounding markets, it does
not capture effects of participant firm experience that that may further drive adoption. We
perform subsequent analysis to explore how P&D projects work and unpack some of these
channels of effectiveness.
A series of empirical tests collectively informs our understanding of the roles that learn-
ing and herding play in the outcomes of P&D programs. First, projects occurring at a later
date and deploying more certain technology have a more significant effect on adoption rates
when compared to the effects of earlier, more experimental green building P&D projects.
This result suggests potential adopters may be updating their private beliefs in response to
the demonstrated performance of the new technology, rather than simply imitating the be-
havior of early adopters. Second, we find the required implementation time is 9-12% lower
for organizations local to a green building P&D project. As the construction industry is sen-
sitive to costly project delays, we interpret this reduced implementation time as evidence
that stakeholders learn from P&D participation, and may socially influence non-participant
neighbors.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in at least three ways. Foremost, we pro-
vide empirical strategies to evaluate the extent to which P&D programs foster technology
diffusion. Our DDD identification strategy compares variation in green building adoption
rates before and after market exposure to P&D projects to adoption trends in untreated
markets, and does so for a suite of building technologies. The results estimate the causal
effect of a P&D project on the diffusion of green building technologies. By comparison,
past P&D literature typically addresses this question qualitatively or evaluates the effects of
an individual project on the performance of a technology. For example, Mah, Wu, Ip, and
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Hills [105] describe the opportunities and challenges of smart grid P&D projects within
regulatory and business-oriented schemas in Japan. Hendry, Harborne, and Brown [106]
present dozens of case studies highlighting innovation lessons from solar photovoltaic and
wind energy P&D projects in the United States, Japan, and Europe. Hendry and Harborne
[107] examine qualitative evidence from wind developments in Denmark to show how P&D
projects enhance the overall innovation process. Rather than taking a qualitative approach
or assessing P&D effects on private performance, we investigate the role of P&D projects
on market adoption of emerging technologies.
Second, we contribute to an burgeoning dialogue on information spillovers from envi-
ronmental programs. Green technologies often have multiple positive externalities, leading
private costs to be less than social benefits and inhibiting optimal levels of adoption. For
durable technologies that provide returns over a long time horizon, discounting slows in-
vestments in emerging technologies [102]. Information provision appears to be an effective
policy intervention that generates positive regional learning externalities for these technolo-
gies, such as lighting [108] and garment cleaning [104]. Pollution prevention programs
have been shown to be effective when leveraging information spillovers, even absent strin-
gent regulatory measures [109, 110]. We complement these findings by examining how
well P&D programs impact adoption in the construction industry, drawing on evidence
suggesting an information spillovers mechanism.
Finally, our results give insight on the role of early adopters in the long-run diffusion of
a technology [111]. If the lead organization responsible for the P&D project has establish-
ments in multiple locations, organizational learning lowers costs of adoption in subsequent
locations [112]. Further, if P&D project stakeholders are highly visible and transparent
regarding their experiences with the project, adoption may be seeded in local and new mar-
kets through peer effects [113, 114, 115, 116] or social learning [117, 118]. Section 7
discusses opportunities to strategically manage this outcome of P&D programs based on
the evidence we provide.
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To evaluate whether P&D projects increase adoption of green building technologies
and practices, we organize the paper in 7 sections. In section 3.2, we distinguish the char-
acteristics of pilot and demonstration projects, and their roles in fostering market uptake
of emerging technologies. We identify potential mechanisms driving the success of P&D
projects. Section 3.3 describes the empirical context and data used in the analysis. We
utilize data on Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) green building
”Pilot” projects, and here introduce the institutional characteristics of LEED that are cru-
cial for our analysis. We present the main empirical strategy, including our identifying
assumptions, in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the main results of the study and presents
several robustness checks to test our estimates against alternative assumptions and model
specifications. Our main results suggest LEED-Pilots projects contribute to a 5-12% in-
crease in quarterly adoption rates of the LEED standard in regions with a completed P&D
project. In section 3.6, we explore whether this effect is driven by learning externalities
or herding behavior, and present evidence supporting the claim that learning externalities
drive adoption of the LEED standard. Lastly, we conclude and provide additional policy
implications in section 3.7.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
As new ideas and technologies emerge from basic and applied research, numerous un-
certainties inhibit new innovations from reaching market maturity. Unproven technical
reliability, uncertain market and institutional receptiveness, and limited organizational and
managerial expertise characterize this intermediate stage of the technology lifecycle. Be-
cause these uncertainties may limit early investment in emerging technologies [106], this
stage is sometimes referred to as the technological “valley of death,” in which socially ben-
eficial technologies fail to diffuse. In this stage, successful market deployment requires a
balance of periods of experimentation and market development [2]. Market interventions
designed to bridge the valley of death spark diffusion of new technologies by remediating
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these technical, organizational, market, and institutional uncertainties.
Common interventions promoting new technologies in this stage of development in-
clude P&D projects, which implement new technologies at small scale with the goal of
reaching broader implementation (market maturity). Pilot projects adopt new technology
in experimental fashion, with the intent to learn from the implementation process and refine
the technology or verify its best management practices [103]. Due to their experimental na-
ture, pilots often occur within narrow divisions of an organization, such as one department
or establishment. Demonstration projects, by contrast, showcase technical feasibility and
reliability to broad sets of market actors, often engaging numerous stakeholders to reduce
technical and management uncertainties [104, 119]. P&D programs often leverage ele-
ments of both pilots and demonstrations, because both interventions aim at inducing learn-
ing or reduce uncertainties that otherwise inhibit adoption. However, other mechanisms
may drive apparent outcomes, and few econometric evaluations of P&D performance have
been conducted. To frame our analysis, we first describe the mechanisms by which P&D
projects may increase adoption of emerging technology.
3.2.1 Demonstration projects and social learning
To conduct a demonstration project, a mix of private and public sector actors must coordi-
nate on key project features and execution. Managing the production and dissemination of
knowledge within this network is considered essential for the success of demonstrations [2]:
demonstrations that contribute to the formation of social and business relationships among
members of the project’s development team can subsume costs of learning-by-searching for
future adopters. The social and business ties established during the demonstration project
reduce search and matching frictions by brokering and screening interactions between fu-
ture adopters, project stakeholders, and input suppliers [120, 121, 122, 123]. The devel-
opment of a robust knowledge-sharing network facilitates the diffusion of information on
product reliability and performance [124], including diffusion to actors not participating in
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the demonstration.
3.2.2 Social learning versus herding
Even if P&Ds fail to induce learning, an effect on adoption is still plausible. When in-
formation fails to diffuse, or when the information is not meaningfully incorporated into
the decision making process, herd behavior drives investment in the emerging technol-
ogy if managers assume that those promoting or involved in the demonstration have better
information guiding the decision to adopt [125, 126].This is especially viable when demon-
strations actively seek to engage key stakeholders such as market leaders and high-status
firms [2]. Importantly, while mimicry drives the diffusion of the technology, herding may
lead to lock-in on underperforming technologies. Technology diffusion via learning is the
preferred policy outcome as it reveals information that otherwise hinders deployment, thus
reducing market barriers for the most efficient available technologies.
3.2.3 Pilot projects and organizational learning
From the outset of a pilot project, those implementing the new technology engage with
learning-by-searching and learning-by-doing [127]. As early adopters, organizations ac-
tively search for resources useful for technical implementation, and for information re-
garding likely performance that will later guide project evaluation. This evaluation primes
learning-by-doing that enables efficient deployment for later adoption [128]. Thus, organi-
zations learning from participation in a pilot program may have fewer barriers to adoption
in other parts of the organization.
At this point, learning-by-interacting may enable additional organizations and stake-
holders sharing feedback to diffuse the practice [127, 129, 130], amplifying the effect of
the original project through networks of users and stakeholders [131]. After learning from
a pilot, a repeat adopter implementing the piloted technology at a different establishment
may effectively demonstrate that technology to a new set of stakeholders. In this sense,
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pilots and demonstrations are conceptually and pragmatically distinct, but are not mutually
exclusive when iterated. Our analysis presents evidence from P&Ds in one industry, in
terms of social learning, social herding, and organizational learning.
3.3 Empirical Context
The United States Green Building Council (USGBC) certifies buildings that meet its stan-
dard for Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED). The LEED certification
system identifies baseline design and performance norms in the construction and real es-
tate industry, and recognizes achievement beyond those norms. Certification is based on
improvements to the entire building footprint (including energy, water, materials, land use,
and indoor environment) rather than a single characteristic. To attain certification, builders
must register, implement high environmental performance technologies, and provide suffi-
cient evidence of these improvements. The certification standard may be flexibly adapted
to the particular needs of specific buildings. Though the technologies and practices im-
plemented may vary across buildings, all buildings meet the minimum baseline for each
monitored category of environmental technology, and most use advanced planning pro-
cesses recommended by the USGBC. These best practices are reinforced by a community
of professionals trained on the LEED certification process and familiar with how it may be
implemented.
3.3.1 LEED Building Standards and Pilot Programs
The USGBC offers separate certification standards for major building categories to recog-
nize the heterogeneous technology demands of different building typologies. For example,
the USGBC distinguishes the functional design and practices required by newly constructed
buildings from renovations to existing building structures. Standards are further distin-
guished for several major building uses, namely commercial office, retail, schools, and
residential dwellings. These distinct standards are designed to meet the particular needs of
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each sector of the real estate market and are periodically updated as advances are made in
green building technology and practices.
Before introducing a new building standard, the USGBC experiments with different
forms of the standard to determine the standard’s market viability and to demonstrate the
value of the technologies and practices embedded in the standard. After gaining stakeholder
support for a version of the standard that appears feasible, the USGBC recruits a limited
number of real estate developers, private organizations, and public agencies that volun-
teer as early adopters. While an organization’s decision to volunteer for the pilot program
is not random, the location of the eventual LEED-Pilot is independent of the USGBC’s
recruitment process, as the location decision is determined by the participating organiza-
tion rather than the USGBC. The LEED-Pilot program constitutes a set of demonstration
projects, in that they are conducted by the initial adopters of the new building technology,
and the USGBC provides coordination assistance to engage stakeholders in completing the
project, with the aim of spreading the standard to others in the building market. These
experimental standards are also pilots for the participating firms, who are often interested
in adopting the standard at larger scale. Moreover, the name “LEED-Pilot” refers to the
USGBCs experimentation with the standard itself, with the final form of the new LEED
standard informed by feedback from early adopters of the piloted standard. In this paper,
we leverage data on LEED-Pilots, and subsequent LEED registrations in the United States
to evaluate the effect of P&D projects fostering adoption of emerging technologies and
practices for greener buildings.
3.3.2 Location and Timing of LEED Pilots and Certifications
Adoption of the LEED standard varies over space and time. In Figure 3.1 we show the
spatial distribution of LEED certified buildings and LEED-Pilot projects in the contiguous
United States. The distribution of registered buildings (black circles) and, notably, LEED-
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Regular Projects Pilot Projects
Figure 3.1: Spatial distribution of LEED buildings in the contiguous United States.
location of green building activity with environmental preferences and natural resource
demands [132, 133]. Additionally, the frequency and location of green building adoption
may closely track regional trends in population growth and urbanization, as illustrated by
the clustering of registrations in densely populated areas.
Temporal variation in LEED registrations and LEED-Pilot projects are displayed in
Figure 3.2, where we plot the frequency of registrations across years. Examining the figure
reveals a close correlation between the completion of LEED-Pilots and registrations for the
corresponding building standard. The initial LEED-Pilot program (for New Construction)
ran just 8 projects to test and verify the standard. However, subsequent standards have
been tested and verified more extensively, with more recent programs (Retail-Commercial
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Total Registrations Total Pilot Projects
Data corresponds to the year in which pilot projects became certified.
(a) New Construction
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Data corresponds to the year in which pilot projects became certified.
(b) Existing Buildings
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Data corresponds to the year in which pilot projects became certified.
(c) Commercial Interiors
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Data corresponds to the year in which pilot projects became certified.
(d) Core-and-Shell
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Data corresponds to the year in which pilot projects became certified.
(e) Retail-New Construction
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Total Registrations Total Pilot Projects
Data corresponds to the year in which pilot projects became certified.
(f) Retail-Commercial Interior
Figure 3.2: Total LEED-Pilot projects and registrations over time
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Table 3.1: Adoption statistics for ZIP Codes with and without LEED-Pilot projects

















































































Observations (ZIP Codes x Standards x Quarters) 55,104 3,071,040 3,126,144 3,126,144
Panel B: Cumulative Summary Statistics (by 2015)








































































Observations (ZIP Codes) 805 7,336 8,141 8,141
Notes: Summary statistics are reported for registrations and building stock aggregated to the 5-Digit ZIP code level. Columns (I) – (III)
present means in the top row and standard deviation in parentheses. Column (IV) presents the results of Welch’s unequal variance t-test for
difference in means between Columns (I) and (II). A local firm corresponds to a firm or organization with buildings registered in a single
ZIP code. A multiregional firm corresponds to a firm or organization with buildings registered in multiple ZIP codes. Publicly-owned
buildings account for municipal, state, and federal buildings.
3.3.3 Data and Summary Statistics
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The primary source of data used in this analysis is collected, maintained, and pub-
licly distributed by the USGBC’s Green Building Information Gateway. This database
contains information on all buildings registered since 2000. The time horizon of our
study covers the period 2000-2015, after which the majority of certifications occur in the
more recent versions of the standards. Our analysis covers the 44,330 buildings registered
within the United States and the six building standards for which pilot program data is
available. These ratings systems are Existing Buildings (EB), Commercial Interiors (CI),
Core and Shell (CS), New Construction (NC), Retail-New Construction (RNC), and Retail-
Commercial Interiors (RCI).
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for the central data used in the analysis. Panel
A presents the panel summary statistics, corresponding to the typical LEED standard, local
markets (measured as 5-digit ZIP code), and quarter. Panel B aggregates the data to present
cumulative adoption statistics for the typical LEED standard and local market. Columns (I)
and (II) present summary statistics for registrations and building stocks for local markets
with and without LEED-Pilot projects, respectively. Column (III) summarizes the key
adoption statistics for the entire dataset. Lastly, Column (IV) presents the results of an
unequal variances t-test for difference-in-means between Column (I) and Column (II).
A quick inspection of Column (IV) reveals registrations are typically higher in lo-
cal markets with LEED-Pilots. A naı̈ve interpretation of Column (IV) in Table 3.1 may
note the statistically significant increase of green building adoption in local markets with
LEED-Pilots as a sign that learning externalities from P&D projects induce greater adop-
tion. However, this correlation may arise from various mechanisms, including location-
or technology-specific characteristics, or exogenous trends within markets impacted by a
LEED-Pilot. As seen in Figure 3.1, both LEED-Pilots and LEED registrations cluster in
major cities, where private organizations may face greater competitive pressures to differ-
entiate. As early market leaders, LEED-Pilot participants may self-select based on unob-
servable, organizational characteristics, internal motivations, or external recruitment from
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the USGBC to gain first-mover advantages. Moreover, the selection of particular orga-
nizations into the LEED-Pilot program may impact feedback that informs the USGBC’s
refinement of LEED standards, and may shape adoption trends [111, 134, 113]. Thus, the
participant selection plays critical roles for both the pilot and demonstration goals of the
LEED-Pilot program. The USGBC actively recruited public and private actors into the
LEED-Pilot program, consistent with best practices in the implementation of PDs [2]. Our
analysis acknowledges this selection as a critical strategy for successful implementation of
P&D programs.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
To investigate average effects of a well-designed P&D program across regional markets,
market sectors, and time periods, we develop a reduced-form empirical model to measure
the impact of a LEED-Pilot on adoption of the LEED standard.
3.4.1 Identifying Assumption
A simple strategy to estimate the effects of a LEED-Pilot on green building adoption could
be to measure the change in adoption rates in markets before and after the completion of a
LEED-Pilot, and compare these changes with the change in adoption rates in markets with-
out a LEED-Pilot. This comparison yields the well-known difference-in-differences (DD)
estimator [135]. Define R as the number of private sector LEED building registrations. In
a simplified, conceptual model with two regions (z, z′), and two time periods (pre, post),
consider the treated region (the region with a LEED-Pilot project) to be z and the control











This estimator does not account for the possibility that changes in adoption rates may be
driven by idiosyncratic shocks to local markets for green building technologies rather than
completion of a LEED-Pilot. For example, Simcoe and Toffel [136] provide evidence
that municipal green building policies increase private-sector demand for green building
technologies. Specifically, they show that cities with municipal green building policies
experience an overall increase in LEED registrations than cities without these procurement
policies. If municipal green building policies are implemented around the same time a
LEED-Pilot is completed, then the DD estimate erroneously attributes variation in adoption
rates to the LEED-Pilot and is biased.
We account for this possibility, as well as any other idiosyncratic shock that raises over-
all demand for green building technologies, by introducing a third source of variation in the
model. Because LEED-Pilot projects constitute the first application of a set of technologies
and practices to a particular building typology, we exploit variation in adoption rates within
a particular LEED standard (s) as a third source of variation. Our identifying assumption
is that, for one particular standard, market location, and time, only a LEED-Pilot project
within a particular standard, location, and time is affecting the rate of adoption of a LEED
standard. Under this assumption, only mechanisms occuring on the interaction of location,
building standards, and time can be interpreted as plausibly exogenous. Given this as-
sumption holds, we can thus exploit quasi-experimental variation in the location, building
standard, and timing of LEED-Pilot projects to estimate a causal effect of P&D projects on
adoption.
Our empirical strategy boils down to a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD)
estimation that controls for a variety of confounding factors that would otherwise limit our
ability to interpret our estimates as causal. For instance, we control for all time-invariant
heterogeneity across both geography and building standards, including interactions be-
tween them. Additionally, our approach controls for the impact of real estate trends across
the United States, within building typologies, and within regional markets that may have
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affected demand for green building technologies and practices. As a result, the selection of
LEED-Pilot participants does not bias our estimates where selection is related to location,
time, or market sector. Unobservable characteristics of these early adopters may influence
our estimates if participants vary systematically by internal motivations, status, or network
relationships. These characteristics are an essential part of all PD programs.
Using the notation from equation 3.1, consider a LEED-Pilot project is conducted in
region z for some standard s. We denote untreated standards as s′, and, as before, untreated

















= β̂DDs − β̂DDs′ (3.2)
where the parameter β̂DDs′ represents the DD estimator given in equation 3.1 for untreated
(existing) standards. Equation 3.2 measures the extent to which changes in local adoption
rates differ from adoption rates in existing standards, following the completion of a LEED-
Pilot, relative to the same change in untreated regions. If contemporaneous shocks drove
adoption of green building technologies and practices across all building types, then the
DDD estimator β̂ in equation 3.2 would net-out the impact of these shocks. Our identifica-
tion strategy rests on the assumption that the remaining variation in adoption rates is thus
attributable to the effects of the LEED-Pilot project itself. This produces an estimate of the
total effect of a LEED-Pilot on local adoption rates, and leaves the mechanisms driving the
effect to our later analysis.
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3.4.2 Estimating Equation
We estimate the effect of LEED-Pilots on local adoption of the LEED standard using the
reduced-form equation
R̃zsq = Vzsq + βPzsq + εzsq (3.3)
where the index z corresponds to the 5-digit ZIP codes with at least one LEED registered
building to date. The subscript s indexes the LEED standard. Lastly, the index q corre-
sponds to the quarter and year of registrations.
The behavioral outcome of interest in equation 3.3 is adoption of a LEED standard
within a 5-digit ZIP code Rzsq. For the analysis, we use the number of privately-owned
registrations of a LEED standard as a proxy for building adoption. This regional measure
is independent of the selection process by which a LEED-Pilot is assigned to an individual
firm within the region. Due to a preponderance of zero registrations in the data, the LHS
variable R̃zsq corresponds to the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) transformation of quarterly
registrations [137, 138].2






0 if q < τ certzs
1 if q ≥ τ certzs
(3.4)
where τ certzs represents the date a pilot project achieved certification. In locations with
multiple LEED-Pilots in the same standard, the variable Pzsq represents the completion
date of the first LEED-Pilot to be certified in a 5-digit ZIP code.








We use Vzsq = λq + δz + γs + ξsq + αzs + πzq as shorthand to represent the fixed
effects terms in the model. We include a full set of fixed effect and interaction terms
to control for potential confounding factors in the analysis. Time period fixed effects λq
control for time-varying secular patterns in the United States that may have influenced
private sector investment in green building technologies, such as fluctuations in real interest
rates or federal building standards. We include ZIP code fixed effects δz to control for
unobserved, time invariant factors that may have influenced adoption of the LEED standard
in a particular location, such as local geographic conditions. LEED standard fixed effects
γ control for time-invariant heterogeneity across standards or building types.
A full set of dummy variables are included to capture interactions between these three
sets of fixed effects. Time-varying shocks within LEED standards are controlled for by
ξsq in equation 3.3. These account for the impact of variations within a LEED standard
on adoption across the United States, such as price variations in underlying technologies,
aggregate learning-by-doing, or broader awareness of the standard that is exogenous to the
LEED Pilots. The term αzs accounts for time-invariant interactions between regional mar-
kets and standards. For instance, regional markets with an initial building stock mainly
comprised of old, commercial buildings may naturally experience more registrations in the
Existing Building standard given the larger initial stock of this building type. We account
for time-varying shocks within regional markets with the term πzq in equation 3.3. These
interacting dummies control for time-varying factors that influence the propensity for green
building adoption within a particular regional market. These time-varying factors include
but are not limited to changes in municipal green building policy, variations in environ-
mental preferences, or fluctuations in local real estate market conditions. The parameter
of interest in equation 3.3 is β, which measures the average effect of LEED-Pilots on lo-
cal adoption of a LEED building standard. Our identification of this effect relies on the
assumption that, other than what we have already controlled for in equation 3.3, there are
no other idiosyncratic shocks occurring around the completion of a LEED-Pilot project
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that influence local demand for a particular LEED building standard. The parameter β
is equivalent to the DDD estimator β̂ given in equation 3.2, if our identifying assumption
holds, and is identified from within ZIP-standard comparisons over time. For P&D projects
to successfully induce widespread adoption in local green building markets, LEED-Pilots
must have positive and significant effect on registrations within a LEED building standard
(β̂ > 0 after estimation).
Self selection of organizations into the LEED-Pilot program may also pose a threat to
the validity of our identification strategy. LEED-Pilot participant’s decision to volunteer for
the program is likely driven by unobserved organizational-level heterogeneity not captured
by the fixed effects in the model. This unobserved heterogeneity could bias our estimate of
the treatment effect if the location of LEED-Pilot projects is non-random and confounded
with adoption propensity. To avoid the selection bias introduced by the voluntary nature of
the program, our analysis investigates the impact of LEED-Pilot projects on local adoption
of the LEED standard by non-participating organizations of the LEED-Pilot program.
By studying the impact of LEED-Pilot projects on non-participant adoption, we mit-
igate the selection bias introduced by voluntary participation in the pilot program. The
assignment of LEED-Pilot projects across locations by a participating organization is inde-
pendent of the propensity for non-participating organizations to adopt the LEED standard
in the same location and building standard. If the USGBC had selected the location of
LEED-Pilot projects, for example, they would have selected the most favorable locations
for diffusion of the new standard, i.e. where non-participating organizations have stronger
incentives to adopt the piloted LEED standard. Under this scenario, our estimate of the
effect of LEED-Pilots on adoption would be biased upward.
However, the USGBC does not select the location of LEED-Pilot projects. Instead,
the LEED-Pilot program is conducted on a voluntary basis, and the assignment of LEED-
Pilot projects across locations is delegated to the volunteering organization. Because of
this feature of the program, location decisions are determined by the idiosyncrasies of the
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participating organizations, and thus the location of LEED-Pilot projects reflects what is




We estimate equation 3.3 using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS); the estimates of the impact
of LEED-Pilots on local registrations are reported in Table 3.2. The results are reported
for 5-digit ZIP codes. Table 3.2 presents the results from estimating a pooled regression, a
difference-in-differences (DD) model, and a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD)
model. Each estimation accounts for different sources of variation to delineate the contri-
butions of each source of variations impact on adoption.
Table 3.2: Local impact of LEED-Pilot on adoption
Pooled DD DDD
LEED-Pilot Project (β) 0.0367 0.0219 0.00747
(0.00867) (0.00498) (0.00303)
Observations 3,125,760 3,125,760 3,125,760
Adj. R2 0.001 0.066 0.082
No. of Clusters 1,567 1,567 1,567
Notes: The dependent variable is the IHS transformation of quarterly,
privately-owned building registrations. Clustered standard errors reported in
parentheses. Standard errors for 5-Digit ZIP code estimates are clustered by
county. Estimated coefficients are rounded to the third significant digit for
comparison across models.
To measure the impact of LEED-Pilot projects on adoption of green building technol-
ogy, we compare the point estimates given in Table 3.2 to the change in average LEED
adoption rates in treated areas. The average change in adoption rates is calculated by
comparing the average number of registrations in treated ZIP codes after a LEED-Pilot
project is certified to the average number of registrations before the LEED-Pilot project is
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completed. For 5-digit ZIP codes, we calculate this change without accounting for within-
standard variation as 0.052 and accounting for within-standard variation as 0.062.3
We compare the point estimates from the pooled and DD regressions to the average
change in adoption rates without accounting for within-standard variation, i.e. 0.052. From
the pooled estimation results, we estimate that LEED-Pilots account for 70.6% (=100% ×
0.0367/0.052) of the change in adoption rates. The pooled estimate is statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level. These results, however, cannot be interpreted as causal as they can be
driven by location and standard characteristics that can be confounded with the location and
timing of the LEED project. Because LEED-Pilot locations where not chosen randomly,
we need to account for location-specific time-invariant characteristics. After accounting
for within ZIP-standard and quarterly variation in the DD estimation, we find LEED-Pilots
account for 42.1% of the change in adoption rates. This implies that 28% of the change
in adoption rates is statistically indistinguishable from time-invariant heterogeneity within
ZIP code and standards and aggregate trends.
There is still variation in the location and timing of LEED-Pilots that can be attributed to
standard-specific characteristics. Hence, in our next step, we exploit within-standard vari-
ation to control for contemporaneous shocks that raise demand for green buildings across
each building standard. Exploiting this variation in the DDD estimation, we find LEED-
Pilot projects account for a smaller percentage of the change in adoption rates within treated
ZIP codes. Specifically, we estimate LEED-Pilot projects account for 12.0% (=100% ×
0.00747/0.062) of the change in adoption rates in treated areas. The point estimate is sig-
nificant at the 5% level.
Altogether, our results suggest that the LEED-Pilot program is an example of P&D
projects leading to increased adoption of the technology, in this case an increase in LEED
building registrations. We next present additional results to relax our identifying assump-
3These averages are calculated using the IHS transformed dependent variable to ensure these averages are
in the same units as the coefficients in the estimated regression models.
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tion, while providing initial evidence that learning drives the observed effect. We examine
the role of market size and firm experience in inducing changes in adoption rates before
presenting other robustness checks to illustrate the validity of our specifications and re-
sults.
Market size and firm experience
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that no other factors affect adoption for
a given standard, in a given ZIP code, at a particular time. To further test the validity of our
identifying assumption, we account for two other factors that could affect adoption within
a LEED standard. Specifically, we extend the DDD model in equation 3.3 to account for
market size and firm experience. The new estimating equation is given by
R̃zsq = Vzsq + βPzsq + θMzsq + ψBzsq + εzsq (3.5)
where, as before, Vzsq is shorthand for the fixed effect terms and Pzsq is the binary treat-
ment indicator for when a LEED-Pilot was completed. The variable Mzsq measures the
size of the local green building market for a particular standard. We measure this as the
installed-base of LEED certified buildings within a building standard. The installed-base
of a technology is often used to approximate peer effects in models of technology diffu-
sion, e.g., see Bollinger and Gillingham [114]. In our setting, the installed-base of LEED
buildings may also capture the maturity of a local green building market. Because of this,
we interpret the coefficient θ on the market size term as measuring the extent to which
green buildings act as strategic substitutes or complements. The variable Bzsq measures
the installed-base of certified buildings owned by firms (or organizations) that register a
building in a ZIP code, standard, and quarter. In this sense, we are measuring the impact
of certified buildings in other markets on local registrations. The coefficient ψ on the firm
experience term measures how organizational learning affects adoption. We expect firm
experience to have a positive effect on adoption, i.e. we hypothesize that ψ̂ > 0.
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Table 3.3: Impact of LEED-Pilot projects, market size, and firm experience on LEED
adoption
(I) (I) (III) (IV)
LEED-Pilot Project (β) 0.00747 0.00786 0.00701 0.00735
(0.00303) (0.00285) (0.00304) (0.00287)
Local Market Size (θ) 0.00550 0.00480
(0.00186) (0.00185)
Firm Experience (ψ) 0.00496 0.00495
(0.000122) (0.000120)
Observations 3,125,760 3,125,760 3,125,760 3,125,760
Adj. R2 0.082 0.083 0.120 0.121
No. of Clusters 1,567 1,567 1,567 1,567
Notes: Reported coefficients are estimated using the DDD model. The dependent variable in
each model is the IHS transformation of quarterly, privately-owned registrations. Clustered
standard errors reported in parentheses and are clustered by counties. Estimated coefficients
are rounded to the third significant digit for comparison across models.
Table 3.3 reports the results of estimating equation 3.5 using OLS. The results are re-
ported in different columns to illustrate the impact of omitting market size and firm expe-
rience on the point estimate for LEED-Pilot projects. For ease of comparison, Column (I)
reports the results of the baseline DDD estimate from Table 3.2.
Column (II) reports the estimates for the effect of demonstration projects and market
size on green building adoption. By including market size, we find our estimate of the
treatment effect β̂ = 0.00786 is statistically indistinguishable from the baseline model
without market size, implying investment responses to LEED-Pilots are independent of
market size. Yet, the point estimate does increase slightly in magnitude, and this increase
suggests an underlying negative association between market size and LEED-Pilots.
We estimate an additional, certified green building in a local market contributes to a
0.55% increase in local adoption rates. This effect is significant at the 1% level. The
positive, reduced-form parameter on market size θ̂ = 0.0055 indicates green buildings
may serve as strategic complements, indicating additional buildings might reduce overall
investment costs in local markets. This effect could be driven by peer-to-peer interactions
46
or general equilibrium effects, e.g. reduced input prices driven by entry of input-suppliers
or specialized contractors in local markets.
We also estimate the model including firm experience Bzsq in Column (III). Again,
we find the estimated parameter for a LEED-Pilot project β̂ = 0.00701 is not changed
by including additional covariates in the model. Conforming with our expectations, we
find that as firms gain more experience with green building construction, local adoption
rates increase. Specifically, we estimate that an additional certified building in another ZIP
code increases local adoption rates by 0.50%. Additionally, the estimated parameter on
firm experience ψ̂ = 0.00496 suggests organizational learning is an important driver of
adoption.
Lastly, in Column (IV), we report the estimates including all covariates in the model.
Importantly, we find the estimated effect of LEED-Pilot projects on adoption rates β̂ =
0.00735 is robust to the addition of both market size and firm experience in the model.
The positive, statistically coefficients θ̂ and ψ̂ may suggest both social and organizational
learning, respectively. While consistent with our conceptualization of LEED-Pilots and
other P&D programs as dual demonstration and pilot initiatives, we caution against inter-




For the DD estimates and DDD estimates presented in Table 3.2 to be valid estimates of
the causal effect of LEED-Pilot projects on adoption, the trend in adoption rates between
treated and control groups must be similar before LEED-Pilot projects were introduced,
conditional on observable characteristics. This parallel trend assumption ensures the con-
trol group represents a valid counterfactual baseline to evaluate the outcomes of the treat-
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Figure 3.3: Lead-lag plots for DD and DDD estimation
We evaluate the validity of this assumption in the context of our estimation framework.
To do this, we estimate the following specification:
R̃zsq = Vzsq +
∑
k
βkPzsq + εzsq (3.6)
In the specification above, we center the time period a LEED-Pilot is completed at k = 0
and evaluate the impact of LEED-Pilots from k = −6 quarters before and k = 12 quarters
following this certification date. We then compare the trend across treated and control
groups, before and after completion. Figure 3.3 plots the coefficients β̂k for the DD and
DDD model. The horizontal axis measures the number of quarters preceding and following
the certification date of a LEED-Pilot. The vertical line centered at k = 0 corresponds to
the normalized time period a LEED-Pilot was completed. The vertical axis is the value of
the estimated parameter. The solid line corresponds to the point estimates for β̂kk and the
dotted lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of these estimates.
Figure 3.3a plots the estimates from the DD model. For k ≤ 0, the estimates are not
statistically distinguishable from 0. The panel suggests that there is not a statistical dif-
ference in pre-treatment adoption trends between treated and control regions under a 95%
confidence level. Further, in the step from k = 0 to k = 1, we find a statistically signifi-
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cant increase in adoption rates in treated regions, suggesting the completion of LEED-Pilot
projects do have a positive impact on adoption decisions. Similarly, Figure 3.3b shows
for the DDD model that adoption rates were not statistically different between treated and
control groups in the pre-treatment period. At k = 0, we observe a statistically signif-
icant increase in adoption rates in the treated group, again suggesting the presence of a
LEED-Pilot project increases local adoption.
3-digit ZIP code analysis
We have so far assumed the appropriate boundaries of regional real estate markets are best
approximated by 5-digit ZIP codes. In this section, we test the robustness of our main
results by re-defining the boundary of a regional real estate market. This robustness test
also helps us to re-examine the geographic scope of spillovers from LEED-Pilots. To this
end, we estimate the DDD model using 3-digit ZIP codes to approximate the boundaries
of regional real estate markets. We find re-defining geographic boundaries changes the
estimated impact of LEED-Pilots, in terms of the contribution of a LEED-Pilot project to
the change in local adoption rates, but the overall effect is still positive and statistically
significant.
Similar to the presentation of the main results in section 5.1, we compare the point
estimates for the treatment effect to the change in average adoption rates when a LEED-
Pilot is introduced in treated locations. After accounting for within-standard variation, the
average change in adoption rates is 0.326. Column (I) presents the results from the DDD
estimation using only the LEED-Pilot indicator. We estimate LEED-Pilots account for
around 5% (=100% × 0.0163/0.326) of the average change in adoption rates in treated
3-digit ZIP codes.
Column (II) reports the results of the estimation when including only market size. By
including market size, we find the point estimate for the treatment effect approximately
doubles from the estimate presented in Column (I), again indicating a negative association
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Table 3.4: Impact of LEED-Pilot projects in 3-Digit ZIP Codes
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
LEED-Pilot Project (β) 0.0163 0.0303 0.0165 0.0298
(0.00919) (0.00927) (0.00905) (0.00906)
Market Size (θ) 0.00622 0.00590
(0.000892) (0.000889)
Firm Experience (ψ) 0.00384 0.00382
(0.000196) (0.000196)
Observations 319,104 319,104 319,104 319,104
Adj. R2 0.374 0.378 0.402 0.406
No. of Clusters 831 831 831 831
Notes: The dependent variable is the IHS transformation of quarterly, privately-owned build-
ing registrations. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Standard errors for 3-Digit
ZIP code estimates are clustered by 3-Digit ZIP codes. Estimated coefficients are rounded to
the third significant digit for comparison across models.
between market size and P&D projects; however, the estimate is statistically indistinguish-
able from the estimate in Column (I) at the 5% level. We estimate market size has a pos-
itive, statistically significant impact θ̂ = 0.00622 on adoption rates, suggesting as before
that green building investments are complementary. All else constant, we find an additional
certified building is expected to increase local adoption rates by 0.6%.
Column (III) reports the estimation results when including firm experience. The esti-
mated treatment effect β̂ = 0.0165 is unaffected by including firm experience, and, again,
we estimate firm experience ψ̂ = 0.00384 is expected to increase adoption rates. Lastly,
Column (IV) reports the results of the full-specification. After including market size and
firm experience, we estimate LEED-Pilot projects account for approximately 9.1% of the
increase in adoption rates in treated areas. Further, the point estimates for market size and
firm experience remain positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Continuous Treatment
The main results of this paper are presented as a step change in adoption rates because the
treatment covariate is coded as a binary variable. In contrast, we can also account for trend
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Table 3.5: Robustness check using the quarters after a LEED-Pilot is certified
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Quarters After (β) 0.000636 0.000529 0.000594 0.000501
(0.000240) (0.000205) (0.000236) (0.000203)
Market Size (θ) 0.00544 0.00474
(0.00185) (0.00184)
Firm Experience (ψ) 0.00496 0.00495
(0.000122) (0.000120)
Observations 3,125,760 3,125,760 3,125,760 3,125,7604
Adj. R2 0.082 0.083 0.120 0.121
No. of Clusters 1,567 1,567 1,567 1,567
Notes: The dependent variable is the IHS transformation of quarterly, privately-owned build-
ing registrations. The treatment variable measures the number of quarters since a pilot project
received certification. All specifications are estimated using the DDD model. Clustered stan-
dard errors reported in parentheses. The average number of quarters after a pilot project re-
ceives certification is 14.34 for 5-Digit ZIP codes. Standard errors for 5-Digit ZIP code esti-
mates are clustered by county. Estimated coefficients are rounded to the third significant digit
for comparison across models.
changes in adoption rates using a continuous measure of treatment. In this subsection,
we test for trend changes in the rate of adoption by measuring the treatment variable as
the number of quarters since a completion of a LEED-Pilot. Formally, we estimate the
following model
R̃zsq = Vzsq + β
∑
τ≤q
Pzsτ + θMzsq + ψBzsq + εzsq (3.7)
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 3.5. As before, we present the results
in different columns, where each column includes a different set of covariates. Further, the
results are only reported for 5-digit ZIP codes. Column (I) presents the results using only
the continuous measure of treatment. Subsequent columns introduce additional covariates
in the model, namely market size and firm experience. Point estimates related to these
covariates are nearly identical to the estimates presented in section 5.2.2; we focus our
discussion of this robustness test exclusively on the treatment effect.
The estimates of the treatment effect ranges from β̂ = 0.000501 to β̂ = 0.000636,
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implying adoption rates increase by these magnitudes at a quarterly frequency. The aver-
age number of quarters since a completion of a LEED-Pilot is approximately 14 quarters.
Evaluating the treatment effect at this average, implies the effect of LEED-Pilots projects on
local adoption ranges from 0.00701 to 0.00890. Again, by comparing these point estimates
to the average change in adoption rates (0.062), we find LEED-Pilot projects contribute to
an additional 11-14% in adoption rates. Overall, these estimates are consistent with the
12% baseline effect from the main specification.
Alternative transformations of dependent variable
The baseline specification uses the IHS transformation of privately-owned building regis-
trations. In this section, we test for the impact of LEED-Pilot projects using alternative
transformations of the dependent variable. Table 3.6 presents the results of estimating the
DDD model using different transformations of the dependent variable.
Table 3.6: Estimated impact of LEED-Pilot projects with alternative transformations
IHS(Rzsq) Rzsq ln (Rzsq + 1)
LEED-Pilot Project (β) 0.00735 0.00891 0.00573
(0.00287) (0.00398) (0.00222)
Observations 3,125,760 3,125,760 3,125,760
Adj. R2 0.121 0.1103 0.121
No. of Clusters 1,567 1,567 1,567
Notes: Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Standard errors for
5-Digit ZIP code estimates are clustered by county. Estimated coefficients are
rounded to the third significant digit for comparison across models. Each model
includes the market size and firm experience covariates.
Each estimation includes the market sizeMzsq and firm experienceBzsq covariates, and
the estimated coefficients for these variables are consistent with the results presented in
3.3. Hence, we only present the results for the treatment effect. We estimate two additional
models using the level of privately-owned building registrationsRzsq and an alternative log-
transformation. These estimates are presented in the second and third columns of Table 3.6,
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respectively. We follow the same procedure from earlier sections and compare the point
estimates to the average change in adoption rates for treated markets. We calculate the
average change in adoption rates as 0.080 for the level variable and 0.048 for alternative
log-transformed variable.
We find the point estimates for the effect of LEED-Pilot projects on adoption using
alternative transformations of privately-owned builindg registrations are consistent with the
main results. Specifically, comparing the point estimates to the average change in adoption
rates in treated markets, we find LEED-Pilot projects are estimated to increase adoption
rates by 11.1% using the level of building registrations. Similarly, we find adoption rates
increase by 12.0% using the alternative log-transformation in the third column. Overall,
both results are consistent with the baseline treatment effect of 12% discussed in section
5.1.
3.6 Is adoption driven by learning or herding?
The main results presented in Table 3.2 suggest LEED-Pilots have the effect of increas-
ing adoption of green building technologies and practices. In this sense, the results are
consistent with our hypothesis that P&D projects affect local demand for green building
technologies and practices. Though we show this effect is not endogenous to particular
technologies, markets, or trends over time, we do not provide evidence for the mechanism
driving this effect. Following the conceptual framework presented in Section 2, we inves-
tigate the possibility that observed effects are due to herding, rather than learning. The
analyses that follow attempt to disentangle the mechanisms driving our main results, and
collectively inform our understanding of the effectiveness of P&D programs.
Consider the possibility that the estimated increase in adoption may be driven by herd-
ing behavior rather than learning or knowledge spillovers. If observed increased uptake
is due to herding, building owners may determine that P&D project stakeholders know
more about the performance value of green building adoption and, consequently, imitate or
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conform to the actions taken by P&D stakeholders [126, 139].
In the herding model, subsequent adopters react to the presence of new certifications
and mimic this behavior, regardless of the performance characteristics of the P&D project.
An extreme case may result in lock-in on sub-optimal technologies, rather than the iterative
improvement of practices, as would be achieved through learning. By comparison, if the
project generates knowledge spillovers, impacted market players integrate new informa-
tion in the decision to invest in the new technology [103], and in some cases are able to
adopt at lower costs. Reductions in costs may arise from, for example, the creation of new
value chains in local markets, where new social and business ties between building owners,
developers, and contractors reduce transaction costs for subsequent adopters.
3.6.1 Evidence of Iterative Learning
During the deployment phase, dozens of P&D projects may be built. Nemet, Zipperer,
and Kraus [2] suggests that sequentially executing P&D projects allows innovators to build
from the successes and failures of previous projects, and thus improving the technology’s
value in each iteration. Consistent with this perspective, we assume that later LEED-Pilot
projects are more refined than the earlier projects and have improved performance char-
acteristics. Leveraging the difference between the registrations of the early versus later
LEED-Pilots, we attempt to identify a learning effect that drives the subsequent uptake of
LEED buildings. We use the sequential timing of LEED-Pilots to determine if adoption is
driven by herding or learning about performance. If adoption is driven by herding behav-
ior, then the value or performance characteristics of later projects should have very little
impact on adoption. Herding would produce no difference between the effect of earlier
versus later LEED-Pilots on adoption rates. In contrast, if adoption is driven by knowledge
spillovers and learning about the performance of the technology, we should observe that
later LEED-Pilots increase adoption rates more than earlier projects. In both cases, we
assume that the performance of technologies and practices used in LEED-Pilots improves
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with each iteration. We argue that rival interpretations of trends are addressed through our
DDD framework in the interpretation of these results. To test these hypotheses, we divide
the LEED-Pilots into 5 bins based on the day the project registered with the USGBC. The
registration date of the LEED-Pilot project corresponds to when a project registered with
the USGBC and is the appropriate measure to use when trying to measure the time when
a LEED-Pilot enters the program. The first bin corresponds to the first 20% of registered
LEED-Pilots, with each subsequent bin representing the next quintile. We segment the bins
based on percentages instead of total projects to make estimates comparable across stan-
dards that have different numbers of projects. Utilizing the empirical strategy as before, we
examine differences in the trajectory of uptake of a particular LEED standard at the ZIP
code level, based on the timing of the LEED-Pilots. We then estimate the following model
using both the DD and DDD framework
R̃zsq = Vzsq +
5∑
i=1
βiPizsq + εzsq (3.8)
where the subscript i corresponds to the bins used for segmenting the timing of the LEED-
Pilot projects, and Pizsq is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a LEED- Pilot project is in the
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Figure 3.4: Effect of LEED-Pilot timing on adoption
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Figure 3.4 presents the estimated coefficients from the model using the registration date
of the LEED-Pilot projects. We present the estimated coefficients for each of the bins with
their respective 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence intervals. For the purpose of comparison,
we also estimate the same model using the DD framework. In both the DD and DDD esti-
mations, there appears to be an increase in the point estimates for each iteration of LEED-
Pilot projects. For the DDD estimation, we estimate that regions with the earliest registered
LEED-Pilot projects experienced a statistically significant decline β̂ = −0.00926 in adop-
tion rates relative to control regions, significant at the 5% level.
However, in subsequent iterations, we estimate a positive and statistically significant
effect of LEED-Pilots on adoption. Notably, for the third and fourth bins, we estimate
regions with these projects experienced an increase in adoption rates β̂3 = 0.00748 and
β̂4 = 0.00921, both estimates being significant at the 10% level. The largest estimated
impact, however, is associated with the final 20% of LEED-Pilot projects registering within
a standard. We estimate these projects have the largest effect on adoption β̂5 = 0.0296,
significant at the 1% level.
Although we cannot conclude that these estimates are statistically different from each
other, the results of this estimation seem to suggest a process where building owners are
learning about the performance characteristics of the LEED standard from LEED-Pilots.
Later LEED-Pilot projects appear to have more impact on local adoption of new standards
than do earlier projects. The strongest evidence in support of this conclusion comes from
the estimated effects of the earliest β̂1 = −0.00926 and the latest β̂5 = 0.0296 projects. The
negative point estimate for the first iteration of projects suggests these projects had little ef-
fect on resolving the technical uncertainty of LEED certification and may have actually
stalled diffusion of the standard in these areas. That is, the earliest LEED-Pilot projects
(which may face implementation challenges) have the smallest effect on subsequent adop-
tion and may have inhibited future uptake of the new standard. In contrast, the large point
estimate for the last quintile of projects suggests that the iterative improvements within the
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LEED-Pilot program led to technical improvements to the new LEED standards. These
more refined projects with improved performance characteristics increased local adoption
by the largest magnitudes.
An alternative explanation for these results may be that market momentum is driving the
increasing impact of LEED-Pilot projects rather than learning externalities. Recall that our
DDD estimation controls for time-varying fluctuations within standards, such as changes
in the prices of component technologies or general advertising and promotion of the new
standard by the USGBC. To the extent market momentum is driven by these effects, the
DDD estimation should control for these changes. On the other hand, momentum may
vary at the regional level (i.e., at the interaction of time, technology, and location), and the
estimates from the DDD model would be picking up these effects. However, this would
require that the momentum behind a new standard differs substantially between treated
and control regions. Because of this, we conduct additional tests to determine whether the
change in adoption is driven by herding or learning externalities.
3.6.2 Evidence of Reduced Adoption Costs
In this section, we provide additional evidence supporting the claim that the change in lo-
cal adoption rates following the completion of a P&D project is driven by learning rather
than herding behavior. Specifically, we evaluate the impact of LEED-Pilots on the costs of
achieving LEED certification to directly test this claim. If adoption is the direct result of
herding behavior, and public opinion is valued more than private beliefs, then we would ex-
pect LEED-Pilots to have no effect on the costs of LEED certification. In contrast, if P&D
projects increase adoption through a learning process, then we should observe a reduction
in the costs of achieving LEED certification following the completion of a LEED-Pilot
project.
However, because we do not directly observe the financial costs of certification, we
need a suitable proxy for these costs to test our claim above. To this end, we use the
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number of days D elapsed between the day a building is registered with the USGBC and
the day the building is awarded certification. Longer project completion times may proxy
higher rental costs of capital equipment, labor costs of workers and contractors, as well as
construction permitting costs.
Conducting this analysis requires a change in the unit of observation. Rather than eval-
uating the aggregate adoption rates in a geographic region, we observe a building b man-
aged by an organization o. As before, we differentiate buildings by LEED standard s and
the quarter-year q the building was registered with the USGBC. To measure project im-
plementation time, we must limit the sample to projects that reach certification, and then
calculate the number of days between registration, or intent to implement the new tech-
nology, and certification, or completed adoption. We also restrict the sample to include
organizations which have at least 5 buildings that have achieved certification. Lastly, we
only consider organizations that have at least 1 project before exposure to treatment. That
is, if an organization does not register buildings over the “pre” period, adoption times for
those organizations cannot be compared before and after the treatment. Overall, there are
329 organizations and 5,272 buildings in the restricted sample.
We estimate the following model using OLS
Dbosq = Ψosq + βEosq + ηBoq + X
′
bθ + υbosq (3.9)
where Ψosq = ζo + κs + τq + ωos + ρsq is shorthand notation for the fixed effect terms
in the model. The treatment dummy Eosq measures whether an organization o is exposed
to a LEED-Pilot by time q. We assume an organization is exposed to a LEED-Pilot project
if the organization registers a building in the same 5-digit ZIP code in which a LEED-Pilot
project is completed. As before, we differentiate this exposure at the level of a particular
LEED standard s, meaning exposure (treatment) is defined within a standard. The treatment
dummyEosq is equal to 0 if an organization has not registered a building in the same 5-digit
ZIP code as a LEED-Pilot and equal to 1 after a building is registered in the same 5-digit
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ZIP code of a completed LEED-Pilot.
Equation 3.9 also controls for other factors that may have influenced the costs of the
LEED certification process. For instance, organizational learning may have contributed
to reduced certification costs if organizations are capable of utilizing previous building
experience into new projects. We measure a firm’s previous building experience using the
installed-base Boq of an organization’s buildings that have achieved LEED certification.
The parameter η captures the effect of this experience on the costs of achieving LEED
certification. We also include building level controls X′b to account for building-specific
heterogeneity that may impact project delays. The vector X′b includes controls for the
number of credits (Points Achieved) awarded to a building based on how certification is
obtained, and the building size (Square Footage) of the building. Based on the specification
in equation 3.9, the main parameter of interest β corresponds to the DD estimator, similar
to the estimator described in equation 3.1.4 Table 3.7 codifies the results of the estimation.
Column (I) corresponds to the estimation that only includes the treatment dummy, Column
(II) includes building level controls, Column (III) includes organizational experience, and
Column (IV) includes variation from all controls.
In Column (I), we estimate a negative and statistically significant effect of exposure to
a LEED-Pilot project. We estimate that exposure induces an 11% reduction in the number
of days required to certify a building with the USGBC. This estimate is robust to inclusion
of building level controls in Column (II). We find the point estimate for exposure decreases
slightly but remains negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. Further, we find
the amount of technologies and practices implemented in a building, as measured by the
4Using the same notation as before, where o is a treated organization and o′ is a control organization, the











Table 3.7: Effect of LEED-Pilot on Building Construction Time
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Exposed to LEED-Pilot -0.117 -0.0995 -0.112 -0.0942
(0.0492) (0.0502) (0.0499) (0.0504)
Points Achieved 0.00613 0.00575
(0.00250) (0.00232)
Square Footage (Log) 0.0526 0.0553
(0.0208) (0.0206)
Firm Experience -0.00391 -0.00383
(0.00186) (0.00179)
No. of Observations 5,272 5,265 5,272 5,265
Adjusted R2 0.714 0.719 0.715 0.721
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered on organizations with 329 clusters. The dependent variable is the natural loga-
rithm of project completion time. Project completion times are measured as the number
of days between the registration and certification date of an individual building. The av-
erage project completion time in the sample is 596.85 days and the median completion
time is 477 days. In Column (II) and (IV), 7 observations are dropped because of missing
building size data.
number of credits, increases the time to achieve certification. Specifically, an additional
10 credits is associated with an increase of 6% in the certification timeframe. Lastly, we
find that larger buildings require more time, on average, to achieve certification. Column
(III) controls for organizational experience. We find organizational experience plays an
important role in driving adoption, particularly through the cost channel. In particular, we
estimate an additional certified building reduces the number of days to achieve certification
by around 0.3%. Column (IV) includes all covariates in the model. We find the estimated
effect of exposure to P&D projects retains its sign and is statistically significant at the 10%
level.
These results suggest that LEED-Pilots reduce local costs of adoption, consistent with
the expectation that demonstrations foster formation of supplier and knowledge sharing
networks. This, combined with results in Section 6.1, suggest learning occurred, and the
observed effect is not purely the result of herding behavior. Notably, these estimates are
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conservative with respect to a key assumption: that effects are highly localized. Though
there is some evidence that this is true (see Section 5.2.3), organizational learning from
participating in LEED-Pilots may facilitate adoption at other (non-local) establishments.
3.7 Conclusion
Pilot and demonstration (P&D) programs aim to catalyze early diffusion of new technolo-
gies. In this paper, we define pilot projects as those seeking to stoke learning within adopt-
ing firms, while demonstration projects diffuse knowledge outwards to external parties. Us-
ing data on adoption of green building technologies provided by the USGBC’s LEED-Pilot
program, we empirically test for the impact of P&D projects in the process of technology
deployment. Using a difference-in-differences-in-differences empirical strategy that ex-
ploits quasi-experimental variation across time, geography, and certification typologies, we
find that local adoption rates of the LEED green building standard increases between 5%
and 12% following the completion of a LEED-Pilot project, controlling for other temporal,
spatial, and industry trends.
These findings are important in understanding the promotion of beneficial technologies
and market transformation. Due to a variety of market failures and barriers, the adoption
of potentially effective and efficient technologies is not guaranteed. P&D projects can help
lower search costs, procurement costs, and other transaction costs associated with the adop-
tion of new technologies, as well as help promote improved understanding of the benefits
and costs of new technologies. Using a quasi-experimental design, our evidence identifies
an aggregate causal effect of LEED-Pilots on the adoption of innovative energy and envi-
ronmental technologies. By extending this research, we are able to examine evidence of
mechanisms driving these effects to deduce lessons for policy design.
We find support for several mechanisms driving the adoption of energy and environ-
mental technologies. First, and most prominently, we find evidence for learning driving
the observed increase uptake of green building strategies and technologies. This evidence
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comes from several sources: we find evidence for increased adoption based on past firm
experience with green building technologies; we find evidence for decreased construction
times if a firm has been exposed to a LEED-Pilot. Together, these findings provide strong
support for learning outcomes. These findings, in addition to evidence that exposure to
a LEED-Pilot project increases adoption in local markets, do not preclude the possibility
that some increased uptake is due to herding behavior or mimicry. Rather, elements of
our results suggest that firms differentiate successful experiments from unsuccessful ones,
learning from those more effectively implemented. We find that earlier, more experimental
LEED-Pilots have less impact than later, more mature, projects. Moreover, as the num-
ber of LEED-Pilot projects increases in a market, the faster the completion time is between
registration and certification of a building; suggesting a mechanism in which learning spills
over to non-participant developers. We also identify a within-firm learning channel, where
firms with establishments exposed to LEED-Pilot projects, later implement projects in dif-
ferent locations, expanding the reach of LEED-Pilots beyond localized markets.
Our estimates are robust to a large number of threats to validity. The DDD estimates
provide a robust causal identification strategy that controls for multiple sources of exoge-
nous variation, including secular trends, geographic and market trends, and unobservable
differences in geographic suitability for different certification vintages. Our DDD strategy
addresses a challenge of identification that is persistent through much of the literature on in-
formation, technology, and policy spillovers, where adoption decisions cannot be distinctly
or separately identified from other concurrent trends or influences. The finely grained data
that involved individual building locations, as well as rich information about building con-
struction date, construction duration, and certification vintages allowed for a sophisticated
identification strategy and unique research context that lent itself to a robust identification
strategy and a variety of research extensions that help shed light on the causal pathways for
our findings.
The success of P&D programs may rely on best practices, as reflected in the LEED-
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Pilot program. First, USGBC identifies and works with market leaders willing to under-
take financial risks in exchange for marketing benefits. The market premium provided by
being an early adopter of LEED exceeds the risks for some companies. This market pre-
mium accrues by signaling employees, customers, investors, and the community that the
firm is innovative and embodies values of sustainability. The USGBC coordinates with
firms engaging in LEED-Pilot projects throughout the process, essentially providing tech-
nical assistance in exchange for undertaking a risky pilot project. By pursuing numerous
LEED-Pilots, the USGBC ensures the adequate development of new standards and spurs
the dissemination of the new standard across industry. Together, these efforts highlight
ways to incentivize the voluntary undertaking of risky P&D projects to help seed market
transformation.
The LEED-Pilot program highlights a set of best practices that lead to increased up-
take of energy and environmental technologies, and suggests a set of principles that can
be leveraged to help disseminate the adoption of advanced technology. By providing some
technical assistance and a marketing benefit in exchange for taking on a risky P&D project,
USGBC encourages the early adoption of technologies and the sharing of knowledge as-
sociated with these experiments. Together, these reduce the costs for future adopters to
pursue advanced energy and environmental technologies by promoting learning about the
costs and benefits of emergent technologies and reducing the costs associated with procur-
ing and implementing new energy and environmental technologies. Moreover, the USGBC
may be able to strategically select or recruit early adopters, favoring those with high market
status or visibility, in order to facilitate the broadest impact on subsequent adoption. In a
world where the rapid diffusion of advanced technologies may be vital to reducing environ-
mental impact, this study highlights the potential role of information programs in spurring
investment that can promote broader market transformation.
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CHAPTER 4
ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTION NETWORKS
Industrial activity periodically undergoes breakthrough innovations in energy efficiency.
However, the structure and complexity of industrial supply chain networks can signifi-
cantly impact the realized aggregate benefits of such innovations. I show the existence of
a supply chain network creates a channel through which micro-scale energy efficiency im-
provements generate aggregate energy savings, which I refer to as an energy savings mul-
tiplier. This multiplier effect arises only under specific network configurations in which
producers source intermediate inputs through direct and indirect upstream supply chains.
My main results show aggregate energy savings are largely determined by these indirect
interconnections, and highlight how similar energy efficiency improvements can result in
drastically different aggregate energy savings outcomes. As production processes are be-
coming increasingly dependent on globalized supply chain networks, my findings have
important implications for designing and managing industrial energy efficiency policy in
an interconnected world.
4.1 Introduction
Economic growth is fueled by access to more productive energy resources. Earlier periods
of growth were driven by the discovery and use of previously unavailable energy resources.
Within the past century, however, continued economic growth can be partially attributed to
the more productive use of scarce energy resources. The proliferation of more efficient
energy service technologies, such as heating, lighting, and transport technologies, have
led to reductions in global energy intensiveness, but these reductions are far smaller than
anticipated. Since the late 19th century, global energy intensiveness has declined by only
62 percent, despite a twofold increase in the efficiency of energy service technologies.
64
Moreover, this observed asymmetry appears to have widened throughout the past century.
In this paper, I argue the widening gap between micro-scale efficiency gains and re-
ductions in global energy intensiveness may be driven by a global shift in the nature of
industrial activity. Production of many goods and services now require a broader range
of inputs than in the past. Over the past century, this feature of production is engendered
by the increased organization of industrial activity into complex, global supply chain net-
works. These production networks reflect the intricate web of connectivity between firms
and sectors in the economy. The structure of these interconnections has important implica-
tions for how energy efficiency shocks transmit throughout the economy, and may explain
why the magnitude of micro-scale energy efficiency improvements may not be reflected at
the aggregate level.
I propose a model that embeds energy efficiency within a production network to study
how micro-scale, industrial energy efficiency improvements translate into aggregate eco-
nomic outcomes. I model energy efficiency improvements as an increase in the capacity
of a sector to transform primary energy resources into useful energy services. Producers
combine energy services with other intermediate inputs to produce output, and this output
is then distributed as an intermediate input to other sectors or as a final good for consump-
tion. Production networks collect all the intermediate input transactions between producers
in the economy. In a production network, two sectors will be connected if there is interme-
diate input trade between them. The strength of the connection between them is determined
by the importance of the other sector’s intermediate in their own production process. In the
model, I assume that energy efficiency improvements alter the input relationships between
the energy sector and the other sectors in the economy. Producers adjust to this new input
relationship by re-allocating the inputs used in their production process. The extent of their
adjustment depends, not only on how their suppliers respond to the efficiency shock, but
also how their suppliers’ suppliers respond to it. Thus, the overall response to an efficiency
improvement and the resulting aggregate energy savings are determined by the structure of
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the production network.
Using this framework, I find the direct and indirect input transactions between sectors in
the economy’s production network determines the magnitude of aggregate energy savings.
Specifically, I show the existence and nature of input linkages within the production net-
work creates a new pathway for aggregate energy savings from industrial energy efficiency
improvements, an energy savings multiplier. For sectors with similar observable attributes,
such as energy intensiveness or the elasticity of substitution between inputs, heterogeneity
in upstream and downstream supply chains translate into different factor and commodity
market adjustments following the efficiency improvement. Price adjustments in these mar-
kets cause producers to re-allocate the inputs used in their production process, leading to
potentially drastic differences in aggregate energy savings arising from the same energy
efficiency improvement.
I demonstrate how the production network shapes factor and commodity market adjust-
ments by decomposing aggregate energy savings into three channels—a price channel, a
growth channel, and a composition channel. First, I show economy-wide energy savings
from the price channel can be positive or negative depending on the nature of price adjust-
ments in energy and factor markets. If factor prices rise to a sufficiently high level, energy
production becomes more costly, and the quantity of energy produced in the economy de-
clines. Second, I show the energy service efficiency improvement spurs growth in the
economy, raising household income. I find that aggregate energy consumption increases
through this growth channel when households spend this additional income on goods or
services that directly or indirect rely on energy as an input to production. Third, I show
efficiency improvements alter the embodied energy requirements of goods and services
produced in the economy through a composition channel. As product supply chains be-
come more or less energy-intensive, the structural importance of the energy sector adjusts,
leading to a change in aggregate energy consumption.
For each channel, I show that re-allocation within energy supply and distribution chains
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creates a multiplier effect for energy savings. Formally, I decompose each channel into a di-
rect and network-driven component. The direct component of energy savings corresponds
to the change in energy production in the absence of intermediate input trade between
non-energy sectors in the economy. The network-driven component of energy savings cap-
tures the impact of re-allocation of inputs within intermediate supply chains on total energy
savings. To quantify the relative contribution of network-driven energy savings to overall
energy savings, I introduce the energy savings multiplier (ESM). The ESM captures the ad-
ditional energy savings or losses generated by re-allocation of energy resources within the
economy’s production network. In a less formal sense, the ESM compares aggregate en-
ergy savings in a world with production networks to what aggregate energy savings would
be in a world without production networks. I show the measure is derived from the the-
oretical model and is independent of the energy-intensity of the sector experiencing the
efficiency improvement. This feature of the ESM makes the measure ideal for delineating
the impact of production networks on overall energy savings.
To complement the theoretical contributions of the paper, I conduct a simulation exer-
cise using detailed state-level, input-output tables. Specifically, I calibrate the economic
model for each U.S. state, introduce a 10% energy efficiency improvement to energy-
intensive sectors, and compute the ESM for each efficiency shock. The results of the sim-
ulation show heterogeneity in energy supply and distribution chains can lead to drastically
different results for the same efficiency shock. For some states, the ESM exceeds unity, im-
plying supply chain re-allocation amplifies the original efficiency improvement. For other
states and sectors, the ESM is less than unity, suggesting re-allocation in supply chains
reduces total energy savings. I connect the magnitude of the ESM with a well-known
network centrality concept to show heterogeneity across production networks drives the
heterogeneity in outcomes of energy efficiency improvements.
Energy efficiency improvements can improve the productivity of fossil fuel resources
while simultaneously reducing the environmental impact of their usage. However, the net
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benefits of energy efficiency improvements are not easily identified a priori and have been a
subject of interest among resource and environmental economists for more than a century.
The earliest insight on the subject is generally attributed to Jevons [140], who observed that
potential energy savings from energy efficiency improvements may be partially offset by
behavioral responses to changing market conditions. Since this early contribution, numer-
ous studies have sought to identify the meaningful economic drivers that affect aggregate
energy consumption following energy efficiency improvements.
Prior studies tend to focus on the partial equilibrium responses to energy efficiency im-
provements [141, 142]. However, in a variety of more general settings, a singular focus
on partial equilibrium channels is inadequate for pinning down the net benefits of energy
efficiency increases. For example, when evaluating the efficacy of large-scale, industrial
energy efficiency improvements, partial equilibrium methods should be deployed with cau-
tion because these methods ignore how additional adjustments in commodity and factor
prices might affect aggregate energy consumption. By accounting for interactions be-
tween commodity and factor markets in general equilibrium, many studies recognize that
economy-wide market adjustments may substantially alter aggregate energy savings [143,
144]. However, less attention has been given to how the structure of industrial activity
affects the transmission of energy efficiency shocks throughout the economy, shapes the
nature of adjustments in commodity and factor markets, and ultimately determines aggre-
gate energy savings.
The key insight delivered by this study is that general equilibrium energy savings are
either amplified or curtailed depending on the structure of the economy’s production net-
work. Improving on recent contributions, I connect previously identified general equi-
librium channels for energy savings with production networks to show industrial supply
and distribution chains determine the magnitude of these channels. Böhringer and Rivers
[145] show aggregate energy savings emerge from a composition effect, a growth effect,
a price effect, and a labor supply effect. Lemoine [146], in contrast, focuses only on the
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composition channel. I advance this literature by showing the composition, growth, and
price channels are the consequence of re-allocation within upstream and downstream sup-
ply chains throughout the economy. Consequently, I am able to emphasize the role of the
economy’s production network for mapping adjustments in commodity and factor markets
following an efficiency shock to aggregate energy savings.
The main contributions of this paper are closely aligned with the tradition of theoretical
general equilibrium models of economy-wide energy savings. Early contributions in this
area only consider single-sector models and emphasize the growth effects created by energy
efficiency improvements [147, 148, 149]. Recent contributions, however, relax the single-
sector assumption and extend the analysis to a static, multi-sector framework and identify
additional drivers of general equilibrium savings [145, 146, 150]. Although they account
for inter-sectoral impacts from energy efficiency improvements in a multi-sector frame-
work, these studies do not explicitly consider supply chain relationships between sectors in
the economy. Notably, the input-output relationships between sectors are commonly used
in numerical assessments of economy-wide energy savings. For instance, input-output ta-
bles are used to calibrate computable general equilibrium models [151, 152, 153, 154] and
to calculate the multipliers in demand-driven input-output analysis of energy efficiency im-
provements [155, 156, 157]. In this paper, I introduce a multi-sector theoretical framework
of general equilibrium energy savings that accounts for these input-output relationships.
Consequently, I bring the tradition of theoretical general equilibrium models and numeri-
cal assessments of economy-wide energy savings to closer alignment.
The idea that input-output relationships affect the transmission of economic shocks
dates back to the seminal contribution of Leontief [157] and Hirschman [158]. On the
theoretical side, Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi [159] study whether
idiosyncratic sectoral productivity shocks can meaningfully impact aggregate output in
the economy. They find that, in the presence of input-output linkages, the propagation
of sectoral productivity shocks may drive output volatility if significant asymmetries exist
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between supply chains in the economy. However, the Cobb-Douglas, perfectly compet-
itive framework constrains shocks to only transmit to downstream industries and do not
stimulate upstream adjustments. Recognizing this limitation, Baqaee [160] extends the
analysis to a Dixit and Stiglitz [161] monopolistic competition framework. He shows ad-
justments along the extensive margin, catalyzed by endogenous entry and exit of firms,
cause adjustments in both upstream and downstream industries. The model in this paper
most closely resembles the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) setup of Baqaee [160]
but with perfect competition. Further, I depart from these studies by considering exogenous
technological progress, as represented by variations in the economy’s production network
[162, 163, 164], as the locus of change. By doing so, I show efficiency improvements can
translate into both upstream and downstream adjustments even in a perfectly competitive
framework.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the economic en-
vironment and conveys the results for the first order conditions. In this section, I sketch
out the basic economic framework that guides the rest of the paper. In Section 4.3, I in-
troduce general equilibrium in the model, and I show two well-known centrality concepts
directly map to equilibrium prices and output levels in the economy. Section 4.4 provides
a discussion on how shocks propagate in the model and provides an important proposition
for characterizing this propagation process. Section 4.5 provides formal, closed-form char-
acterizations of economy-wide energy savings. Moreover, I decompose aggregate energy
savings into different channels and provide interpretations of the results. Following the
decomposition, I take the model to the data and simulate energy efficiency improvements
in Section 4.6. Lastly, Section 4.7 concludes the paper.
4.2 The Model
I consider a static model with two types of agents, a representative consumer and industrial
producers. The representative consumer is assumed to maximize utility over an exogenous,
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discrete set of consumption goods and services. This consumption set is divided into an
energy commodity ce and N − 1 non-energy commodities ci. The representative consumer
inelastically supplies a fixed labor endowment of L̄ and collects income C = wL̄, where w
is the economy-wide wage rate.
Each producer in the model corresponds to a sector. Producers are assumed to choose
input bundles to minimize the total cost of a given level of production. Producers in the N
sectors allocate goods and services for both intermediate use in other sectors and final-use
consumption by the representative household. I assume markets for goods and services are
perfectly competitive, and each sector production technology uses labor supplied by the
representative consumer and intermediate inputs sourced from other sectors in the econ-
omy.
4.2.1 Preferences
The representative consumer’s preferences are modeled using a constant-elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) utility function U defined over i ∈ {e, 2, . . . , N} industrial products. In the
remainder of the paper, I modify the index of products such that the energy commodity e is





























where σ > 0 is the household’s elasticity of substitution, the parameters αi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈
{e, 2, . . . , N} capture the representative consumer’s tastes for goods and services produced
in the economy, pi is the price of sector i’s product, and C is the income of the consumer.
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First-order conditions
I choose the consumer price index, which measures the cost of purchasing one unit of
utility, as the numeraire of the economy so that all prices are expressed in real terms. The














Consumers choose a consumption plan c to maximize utility U according to the con-
strained maximization problem in (4.1). The maximization routine takes the economy-wide
wage rate w, exogenous taste parameters α, and labor endowment L̄ as given. In equilib-
rium, household demand for goods and services is determined by consumer preferences,
product prices, and household income. The first-order conditions from the consumer’s




Equation (4.3) implies household demand for good i will increase when product prices
decline and household incomes rise. These standard results will be useful when interpreting
the price and growth channels of aggregate energy savings.
4.2.2 Production
Producers in the economy utilize a constant returns-to-scale CES production technology
to produce goods or services. Each sector i (the purchasing sector) combines intermediate
inputs xji from other industries j (the supplying sector) with labor Li provided by the




























I assume each sector combines a raw energy input xei with an energy conversion technol-
ogy φei to produce an energy-service. The parameter φei directly measures the productivity
of a sector’s energy conversion technology and variations in this parameter are the source
of energy efficiency improvements in the model. Let φ be an N × N matrix of these pro-
ductivity parameters. By construction, the first row corresponds to the energy productivity
parameters of each sector and the remainder of entries in the matrix are equal to 1.1
The parameters ωei and ωji for i ∈ {e, 2, . . . , N} are the technical (input-output) co-
efficients of sector i and are exogenously determined. I normalize the coefficients in the
production function for simplicity. Collectively, these coefficients define the structure of
the intermediate production network of the economy [159, 160]. The input-output network
of the economy is represented by the N ×N matrix Ω of these input-output coefficients.2
Lastly, the parameter γi is a distribution parameter measuring the labor intensiveness of
sector i.
I assume that firms in each industry minimize the costs of production subject to the
available production technology given in equation (4.4). Given exogenous labor share
parameter γi and the input-output coefficients ωji, firms in sector i choose labor Li and
intermediate inputs {xei, x2i, . . . , xNi} to solve the following minimization problem
min
Li,{xei,x2i,...,xNi}





























where w is the economy’s wage rate and pi is the market price for sector i’s output.
1This can be extended to any other technological improvement in the economy that reduces the direct
requirements between industries.
2This is also sometimes referred to as the direct requirements matrix.
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First-order conditions
Producer’s choose labor inputs Li and intermediate demand xji to minimize total produc-
tion costs given the production technology in equation (4.4), exogenous energy conversion
productivity parameters φei, and the exogenous input-output network Ω. After solving the
producer’s minimization problem, sector i’s demand for energy and non-energy intermedi-
















Sector i’s demand for energy xei depends on several quantities of interest. First, inter-
mediate demand for energy will be proportional to sector i’s energy intensiveness. Second,
demand for energy inputs will depend on the price of energy services psi = pe/φei and the
marginal cost of a production µi. Third, intermediate demand for energy will vary with
production levels yi.
4.3 Equilibrium Prices and Quantities
In this section, I relate equilibrium prices P and production levels y to two well-known
network centrality concepts. Notably, the production technology in equation (4.4) permits
derivation of closed-form analytical solutions to the economic environment introduced in
Section 4.2. Using Definition 1, I illustrate how equilibrium prices in the economy are
determined by a sector’s consumer centrality. Taking this a step further, I show that sector
output levels are determined by a combination of consumer and supplier centrality.
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4.3.1 Equilibrium
An equilibrium of the model is met when household’s maximize utility subject to their
income constraint, producers minimize costs within a perfectly competitive environment,
and commodity and factor prices clear the markets. Formally,
definition
Definition 1 (General Equilibrium) A general equilibrium in this economy E = (P, w,X,y, c,L)
is characterized by an N × 1 vector of output prices P, an economy-wide wage rate w, an
N×N matrix of intermediate demand X, anN×1 vector of total output y, anN×1 final-
use consumption plan c, and an N × 1 vector of labor demand L, such that the following
conditions are met:
1. Given the exogenously determined N×1 vector of taste parametersα, the consump-
tion plan c maximizes utility U subject to the consumer’s budget constraint C = wL̄
2. The production plan given by the vector of total output y, the matrix of intermediate
demand X, and the vector of labor demand L minimize the total costs of produc-
tion for each sector and are technologically feasible given exogenously determined
productivity parameters φ, the input-output network Ω, and labor intensities γ
3. Markets for each good and the labor market clear. In other words, the conditions
y = Xι+ c and L̄ = Lι, where ι is an N × 1 vector of ones, must be satisfied.
4.3.2 Equilibrium Prices
In this section, I connect the price adjustment process to underlying changes in intermediate
and factor input costs and relate equilibrium market prices to the economy’s production
network. Under perfect competition, firms in each sector will price their output at their
marginal cost of production. Assuming firms operate in perfectly competitive markets, a
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firm’s output price is given by














Equation (4.7) shows the market price for a sector’s product is determined by other factor
and commodity prices in the economy. The direct relationship between market prices is
governed by the columns of the input-output matrix Ω of the economy.
Before characterizing equilibrium prices, I introduce the following proposition that al-
lows for technological changes in the economy to be expressed as changes in the direct
requirements of physical units of input
Proposition 1 (Productivity-Adjusted Input-Output Network) The productivity-adjusted
input-output network relates the production technologies given in (4.4) to physical inputs
and thus variations in the intensity of input usage are expressed as changes in physical




and the productivity-adjusted input-output network is given by Ω∗ = φσ−1 Ω, where the
exponent represents is element-wise exponentiation and the character  is the Hadamard
product. An expression for the input-output coefficient can be derived by re-arranging
equation (4.6a). Formally, I find the exogenous input-output coefficient for energy ωei is









where sei is the energy-service and psi is the energy-service price. By multiplying ωei by
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φσ−1ei , I adjust the input-output coefficient by the productivity of the conversion technology.







For the remainder of the paper, I will use Ω∗ to denote the productivity-adjusted input-
output matrix and make the following assumption regarding the entries in the matrix
Assumption 1 The productivity of a sector’s energy conversion technology φ is sufficiently
small so that the entries of Ω∗ satisfy |ω∗ij| < 1 , ∀ij
Assumption 1 is innocuous in the context of energy efficiency. In this case, I can scale the
units of the energy conversion technology to ensure φei is sufficiently small for all sectors.
The assumption is necessary for convergence.
The system of output prices given in equation (4.7) can be written as
P1−σ = γw1−σ + Ω∗
′
P1−σ (4.9)
The appearance of the term Ω∗′ in equation(4.7) captures the idea that technological im-
provements leads to structural changes in the economy’s production network, and these
changes will translate into fluctuations in commodity prices.
The following definition provides the foundation for connecting commodity prices with
the structure of the economy’s production network.
definition
Definition 2 (Multiplier Matrix) Given Assumption 1 holds, then the multiplier matrix M
is an N ×N matrix given by
M = [I−Ω∗]−1 (4.10)
and is non-singular.
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The multiplier matrix M has a similar interpretation to the Leontief inverse matrix in input-
output analysis [157, 165]. The multiplier matrix accounts for direct and indirect interac-
tions between sectors in the economy.










The term M′γ is an N ×1 vector of Bonacich [166] centralities of each sector. Larger cen-
trality values imply a sector occupies a more “central” position in the economy’s production
network as a purchaser of intermediate inputs and factors of production. In heterogeneous
production networks, some sectors may be more susceptible to price shocks because of
their more central role as a purchaser in the economy. In traditional input-output analysis,
the systemic importance of a particular sector as purchaser of intermediate and factor inputs
is captured by the consumer centrality indicator [160]. In my model, I define the consumer
centrality indicator as:
definition




The consumer centrality of a sector measures the systemic importance of a sector as a
direct or indirect purchaser of intermediate and factor inputs in the economy.
Combining Definition 3 with the expression for prices in equation (4.11) yields closed-










The expression for prices in (4.13a) and (4.13b) illustrates the relationship between
equilibrium prices and intermediate supply chains. Specifically, the model predicts that
consumer centrality play an important role in determining prices in equilibrium, and this
relationship depends on the elasticity of substitution in the economy. When production
processes approach the Leontief limit (σ → 0), the expression predicts that prices will be
higher in sectors with higher consumer centrality.
The intuition underlying this prediction follows from the theory of cost pass-through
([167]). In vertical supply chains, an upstream producer’s prices are a downstream pro-
ducer’s costs, and price shocks in upstream markets will propagate throughout the supply
chain only to the extent these price variations are passed on to downstream industries in the
supply chain. The rate at which these price variations are passed through to downstream
buyers is proportional to the price elasticity of demand for the upstream producer’s prod-
ucts. When there is less scope for substitution, then sectors with a more central role as
intermediate and factor input purchasers will be more exposed to the price shock than less
central sectors.
4.3.3 Equilibrium Output
Combining the market clearing condition for goods and services, y = Xι + c, with the
results from (4.3), (4.6a), (4.6b), and (4.7) yields the following system of equations
(Pσ  y) = αC + Ω∗ (Pσ  y) (4.14)
where the exponents on the matrices represent element-wise exponentiation and y is an
N × 1 vector of total output. Solving this equation for (Pσ  y) yields the equilibrium
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sales vector. Formally, the equilibrium sales vector is expressed as
(Pσ  y) = [I−Ω∗]−1αC
= MαC (4.15)
Similar to equation (4.11), the entries in the vector Mα correspond to Bonacich [166]
centralities. These centralities capture a sector’s direct and indirect role as a supplier of final
goods to the household. Larger values suggest these sectors are influential in the supply
of intermediate inputs in the economy. While the consumer centrality indicator measures
the systemic influence of a sector as a purchaser in the economy, the supplier centrality
indicator measures the systemic influence of a sector as a supplier of intermediate goods
and services [160]. I define the supplier centrality indicator in the model as follows:
definition
Definition 4 (Supplier Centrality) The vector of supplier centralities is defined as
Υ = Mα (4.16)
The supplier centrality of a sector measures the systemic importance of a sector as a direct
or indirect supplier of intermediate goods in the economy.
To solve for total production in the energy and non-energy sectors, I substitute the ex-
pressions household demand (4.3), intermediate demand for energy (4.6a) and non-energy
(4.6b) commodities, and the sales vector in (4.15) into the market clearing condition. Equi-
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librium production in the energy and non-energy sectors, respectively, is characterized as






















The expressions for equilibrium output in (4.17a) and (4.17b) contain three useful for
predictions evaluating how energy efficiency shocks generate aggregate energy savings.
First, the model predicts how higher output prices reduce sector output levels in equilib-
rium. The intuition for this result is straightforward and follows from the law of demand,
where higher output prices reduce the quantity demanded for a sector’s product. The sec-
ond prediction of the expression for equilibrium output levels implies production levels in
the economy are positively related with the income-level in the economy. Because there is
no saving in the model, consumer exhaust their income on purchasing goods and services
in the economy. When incomes increase, consumer will increase demand for final goods
and services. The final prediction relates to a sector’s upstream position in the economy’s
production network. If a sector is more essential for supplying final goods to the house-
hold, i.e. has a higher supplier centrality, the model predicts production will be higher in
this sector.
4.3.4 Equilibrium Wages
Applying Shephard’s lemma to the expression for prices in (4.7) implies the conditional
demand for labor is given as
Li = γiw
−σpσi yi (4.18)
Equilibrium wage rates in the economy are solved for by combining the expression for
labor demand with the full employment condition L̄ =
∑
i Li and (4.15). The economy’s
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The expression above implies that equilibrium wage rate is determined by the distribu-
tion of supplier centrality in the economy.3 When labor-intensive sectors occupy a more
central position as a supplier of intermediate goods in the economy, the expression pre-
dicts wage rates will be higher. In this sense, the expression in (4.19) can be viewed as
a network-adjusted labor-intensiveness of the economy. As illustrated in Section 4, when
energy efficiency shocks induce structural changes in the economy’s production network,
the distribution of supplier centrality will adjust and affect the overall labor-intensiveness
of the economy, increasing the equilibrium wage rate. I show this effect creates a tension
between the price and growth channels of aggregate energy savings.
4.4 Propagation
Structural changes in the production network affect optimal energy savings both directly
and indirectly. The indirect effects come from the re-allocation of resources in upstream
and downstream industries in the energy supply chain. This re-allocation process can be ex-
plicitly studied through changes in the multiplier matrix M following an efficiency shock.
In the input-output analysis literature, the structural path analysis (SPA) methodology of
Defourny and Thorbecke [168] has been widely-deployed to study the transmission of
shocks throughout the economy’s production network. In this section, I show the method-
ology can be applied to study the transmission of energy efficiency shocks in a general
equilibrium setting.
3Alternatively, wages can also be expressed as a function of consumer centralities. In particular, the









The following definition will be useful for studying the transmission of efficiency shocks
through the economy’s production network.
Definition 5 (Power Series Expansion) Given Assumption 1 holds, the power series ex-











where the exponent k represents a matrix power.
Definition 5 decomposes the multiplier matrix into the contributions made by the un-
derlying supply chains of the economy. The concept is similar to counting the number
of walks between two nodes in a network [169, 170] in that the i, j-th entry in Ω∗k mea-
sures the contribution of supply chains of length k connecting the two sectors to sector i’s
multiplier. For instance, holding all else constant, consider a stimulus of dC to household
income. Households will spend a fraction of the stimulus αjdC on purchasing products
from sector j. Consequently, sector j’s will expand production to meet the increased final
goods demand. To produce more output, sector j will need to source more intermediate
inputs from it’s direct suppliers. These direct suppliers will, however, require more inter-
mediate inputs from their direct suppliers, and so forth. This cascading process is captured
by the orders of the input-output matrix Ω∗k. Generally, supply chains of length k connect-
ing i to j would contribute an increase of Ω∗kij αjdC to sector i’s overall change in output
from a dC stimulus to household income.
I represent energy efficiency improvements as technological shocks to the economy. In
the model, efficiency improvements manifest as changes in the input-output architecture
of the economy. These changes then transmit through the economy’s multiplier matrix.


















Figure 4.1: An example of an N sector production network without intermediate trade










Equation (4.21) shows how technological change creates a ripple effect throughout the
economy. In the case of energy efficiency improvements, the cascading effect occurs along
the energy sector’s upstream and downstream supply chains.
Consider the first-order effect of the energy efficiency improvement
∂Ω∗
∂φei




The first-order effect measures the direct impact of an energy efficiency improvement on
the economy’s multiplier matrix. In this case, the only multiplier affected will be the energy
sector’s multiplier, captured by the row vector Me in the multiplier matrix, because I are
ignoring other sectors in the production chain. Analysis using only these direct effects is
equivalent to assuming the economy’s production network follows the structure in Figure
4.1.
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Equation (4.23) illustrates the propagation of the efficiency shock through the economy’s
production network. The terms in parentheses show how the efficiency shock affects the
energy sector’s multiplier and the energy sector’s upstream suppliers’ multipliers. The term
Ω∗ ∂φ
∂φei
measures the change in the multipliers of upstream suppliers to the energy sector,
and the term ∂φ
∂φei
Ω∗ measures the impact on the energy sector’s multiplier. In the case of
k = 2, the derivative measures the impact of the efficiency shock on the multipliers of the
energy sector’s direct suppliers, and the multiplier for the energy sector is affected by direct
purchasers of the more efficient sector’s product.
The derivative of higher-order matrices accounts for additional impacts throughout the
energy sector’s supply chains. Unlike the previous two examples, the derivative of Ω∗k for
k > 2 yields the impacts of the energy efficiency shock on the multipliers of the energy
sector, the indirect suppliers that are k − 1 steps upstream from the energy sector, and the
indirect purchasers that are k − 2 steps downstream from the source sector. The follow-
ing proposition will prove useful in quantifying the total effects of the energy efficiency
improvement on the economy’s multiplier matrix
Proposition 2 For k > 2, the derivative of the k-th term of the power series expansion of
















To show this expression is general, I use proof by induction. Assume Equation (4.24) holds
for some k > 2. Next, I illustrate that Equation (4.24) holds for k + 1 instead. Using


























































The last statement shows the general form of the k − th order derivative also holds for the
derivative of the k + 1 matrix power and thus completes the proof.
Proposition 2 decomposes the change in the multiplier matrix into direct and upstream
impacts. The matrix ∂Ω
∗
∂φei
is the direct effect from equation (4.22) and appears in each term
of equation (4.24). The direct effect constrains the transmission of the efficiency shock
to only along the energy supply chain. The term ∂Ω
∗
∂φei
Ω∗k measures the impact on the
energy sector’s multiplier, while the term Ω∗k ∂Ω
∗
∂φei
measures the impact on the multipliers




Ω∗l account for total supply chain effects in the upstream sectors’ multipliers.
After combining (4.22) and (4.24) with (4.21), the change in the multiplier matrix with
respect to a 1% energy efficiency shock becomes
dM
dφei
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Figure 4.2: Example of a linear economy
verges to 0 given Assumption 1 holds.4 Equation (4.25) separates the direct and supply
chain effects following a productivity shock. Recall, the direct effect ∂φ
∂φei
is consistent
with the network structure in Figure 4.1 and does not consider higher-order linkages be-
tween sectors. Hence, this term does not capture supply chain impacts from the energy
efficiency improvement. In contrast, the matrix Πφei measures the supply chain impacts
of the energy efficiency improvement because these higher-order linkages are embedded in
the economy’s production network.
Example 1 (Upstream Transmission) Consider the linear economy given in Figure 4.2.
In this example, the efficiency shock occurs in sector 4 and impacts the multipliers of the
energy sector’s upstream suppliers. Let Ikji be the measure of influence that i has on j’s




only affects the energy sector’s multiplier. The energy sector’s multiplier changes by an
amount I1e4 = (σ − 1)ω∗e4 due to the efficiency shock.
Next, consider the second-order impacts ∂Ω
∗2
∂φe4
of the efficiency shock provided by equa-
tion (4.23). The term Ω∗ ∂φ
φe2
measures the impact on the energy sector’s direct suppliers.
In the scenario represented by Figure 4.2, the only direct supplier to the energy sector is
sector 3. Sector 3’s multiplier is changed by an amount I234 = (σ − 1)ω3eω∗e4 in this pro-
duction stage. The term ∂φ
φe4
Ω∗ measures the change in the energy sector’s multiplier in the
second production stage. In this production stage, the energy sector’s multiplier changes by
an amount I2e5 = (σ − 1)ω∗e4ω45, reflecting the influence of indirect downstream industries















on the energy sector.
Lastly, consider the changes induced by the third stage of production. Similar to be-
fore, the term Ω∗2 ∂φ
φe2
is the effect on the energy sector’s upstream suppliers, but these
suppliers do not interact directly with the energy sector, i.e. these sectors are k − 1 steps
upstream from the energy sector. In the example, these suppliers are represented by sector
2. Sector 2’s multiplier changes by an amount I324 = (σ − 1)ω23ω3eω∗e4 in the third-stage
of production. The term ∂φ
φe2
Ω∗2 will account for changes in the energy sector’s multiplier.
The energy’s sector multiplier changes by an amount I3e6 = (σ − 1)ω∗e4ω45ω56 in the third
production stage.
The linear example economy provides useful insights for evaluating the transmission
of energy efficiency shocks in the economy. First, an energy efficiency shock will induce
changes along the energy sector’s upstream supply chain. The magnitude of these changes
will depend on the direct and indirect roles of other sector’s in the upstream energy supply
chain. Second, the energy sector is directly affected by the efficiency shock. The size of the
effect on the energy sector will depend on the role of energy as an intermediate supplier in
the source sector’s distribution chains. Third, the energy intensiveness of the source sector
plays a role in both of these effects. For the remainder of the paper, I will refer to the sector
experiencing the efficiency improvement as the source sector.
Before turning to the main results, I will briefly highlight the interpretation of changes
in M′ from the energy efficiency improvement. Given Assumption 1 is true and using the
relation Ω∗′ . . .Ω∗′Ω∗′ = (Ω∗...Ω∗Ω∗)
′





′)k by taking the











, the derivative of the k-th term of
the power series expansion is the transpose of equation (4.24). Hence, the change in the











Example 2 (Downstream Transmission) Again, consider the linear economy represented
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in Figure 4.2. I previously illustrated how energy efficiency shocks translate into upstream
impacts. However, energy efficiency changes will also influence downstream sectors. Equa-





, the direction of influence reverses directions. For instance, the direct effect of the
efficiency shock in (4.26) will affect sector 4’s multiplier rather than the energy sector’s
multiplier. Sector 4’s multiplier will change by an amount I14e = (σ − 1)ω∗e4 following the
efficiency improvement.





change in the multipliers of sector 4’s downstream purchasers. Specifically, this cap-
ture the impact on direct purchasers of sector 4’s output. In the linear economy exam-
ple, this impacts sector 5’s multiplier. In particular, sector 5’s multiplier changes by






pact on the source sector’s multiplier. In this case, sector 4’s multiplier will adjust by
I243 = (σ − 1)ω3eω∗e4 from the energy efficiency improvement.





will capture the downstream, indirect impacts of the efficiency shock. Sector’s that indi-
rectly rely on output from sector 4 will be affected at this production stage. In the example,
this is sector 6, and sector 6’s multiplier will change by I36e = (σ − 1)ω∗e4ω45ω56 in this
stage. Lastly, sector 4’s multiplier will adjust in this stage too. In particular, sector 4’s mul-
tiplier will adjust by I342 = (σ − 1)ω23ω3eω∗e4, reflecting the influence of upstream suppliers
of the energy sector.
The preceding example provides the final insight needed to understand how efficiency
shocks propagate in the economy. First, energy efficiency shocks will initiate downstream
adjustments starting from the source sector. Any sectors directly or indirectly reliant on the
source sector’s product are exposed to the productivity shock. The magnitude of exposure
will depend on the energy sector’s indirect role as a supplier of products to these sectors.
Second, the source sector will also be impacted by the efficiency shock. As illustrated, the
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size of the effect will ultimately depend on the role of upstream suppliers in the energy
supply chain.
Taken together, the results in this section provide a formal method for decomposing the
transmission of energy efficiency shocks in the economy. Specifically, energy efficiency
shocks transmit to upstream suppliers of the energy sector and to downstream consumers of
the source sector. Even more, the direction of transmission is associated with the changes in
the economy’s multiplier matrix induced by the productivity shock. These characterizations
will play an important role for understanding how the economy’s production network affect
aggregate energy savings.
The examples in this section set the stage for evaluating how changes in the energy sec-
tor’s multiplier directly influence energy production in the economy. The examples provide
two explanations for the magnitude of these changes. First, in both the upstream and down-
stream transmission examples, the change in the energy sector’s multiplier is proportional
to the energy intensiveness ωe4 of the source sector’s production technology. Second, the
source sector’s downstream supply chains will also affect the magnitude of changes in the
energy sector’s multiplier. In each example, the direct and indirect downstream relation-
ships with the source sector, e.g. ω45 and ω45ω56, are components of the changes in the
energy sector’s multiplier. Therefore, I hypothesize the systemic importance of the source
sector as a supplier in the economy is a crucial determinant of aggregate energy savings
following an efficiency improvement.
4.5 Energy Savings
In this section, I evaluate the effect of an exogenous, zero-cost energy productivity shock
on the equilibrium quantity of energy produced. I start the analysis by briefly introducing
the results for partial equilibrium energy savings. The partial equilibrium analysis does not
consider price adjustments in other factor and commodity markets. Under this scenario,
aggregate energy savings is proportional to the elasticity of substitution and the share of
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total resource consumption by the more efficient sector.
After presenting the partial equilibrium analysis, I conduct the general equilibrium anal-
ysis. I show aggregate energy savings in general equilibrium are determined by a price,
growth, and composition channel, and the magnitude of savings created by these chan-
nels will depend on structural features of the economy’s production network. Moreover,
I demonstrate the underlying mechanics of these channels to elucidate the economic intu-
ition behind the mathematical results. After presenting the decomposition results, I show
aggregate energy savings can be decomposed into direct and network-driven components.
Using these results, I derive the energy savings multiplier and relay the intuition behind the
measure.
4.5.1 Partial Equilibrium Analysis
While holding output prices constant, variations in the productivity parameter φei will di-
rectly impact intermediate energy demand in two ways. First, energy efficiency improve-
ments make sectors less energy intensive, as captured by the ωei/φei term in equation (4.6a),
and thus reduce the quantity of energy produced in the economy. Second, energy produc-
tion will increase through a reduction in the energy service price.5 Holding output prices
constant, energy savings with respect to a 1% efficiency improvement is expressed as
−dxei
dφei
φei = (1− σ)xei (4.27)
Equation (4.27) is the familiar expression for partial equilibrium energy savings [171, 144,
146]. This result implies that aggregate energy savings are higher when sectors with a
5The price psi = pe/φei is the implicit energy service price given the productivity of sector i’s conversion
technology. To understand this, consider a scenario where a sector requires processing heating to manufacture
its products. The energy productivity parameter φei summarizes the productivity of the energy conversion
technology used to transform raw energy inputs, e.g. kilograms of coal, into useful heat. The parameter φei
is measured in units of BTU/kg of coal, and, consequently, the energy service is measured in BTUs. Combining
this parameter with the price of coal pe, the price of the energy service psi is expressed in units of $/BTU.
Hence, while holding constant coal prices, as the productivity of the conversion technology improves, the
energy service price declines and the sector increases consumption of the energy intermediate.
91
larger share of resources are targeted with energy efficiency policy. Further, the elasticity
of substitution determines the sign of energy savings. When the production technology
approaches the Leontief limit (σ → 0), energy savings from the efficiency improvement
increase. In contrast, when input substitution becomes sufficiently flexible (σ > 1), energy
efficiency improvements increase energy consumption in the economy.
4.5.2 General Equilibrium Analysis
With reference to equation (4.6a), it is clear the partial equilibrium setting, i.e. holding out-
put prices constant in the wake of efficiency improvements, does not permit price adjust-
ments in other factor and commodity markets to affect aggregate energy savings. In more
general settings, industrial energy efficiency policy may induce price adjustments through-
out the economy as markets reach a new equilibrium following the efficiency shock. From
the expression in (4.17a), I decompose the change in economy-wide energy consumption
from a 1% energy efficiency improvement in sector i into a (i) price effect, (ii) a growth
effect, and (iii) a composition effect. Formally, the change in energy production from a 1%






















Based on this characterization, aggregate energy savings S = − dye
dφei
φei are determined
through changes in the market price of the energy commodity, labor income, or the struc-
tural role of energy in the economy. As illustrated in Section 3, commodity and factor
prices are determined through the structural properties of the economy’s production net-
work. Moreover, the structural role of energy is determined by the supplier centrality
measure, a variant of Bonacich [166] centrality. Hence, variations in the topology of the
production network will directly affect these quantities both directly and indirectly.
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The Price Channel
The price channel gives the portion of aggregate energy savings created by a change in the
equilibrium energy price while holding household income and the structural role of energy







Differentiating this expression with respect to a 1% efficiency improvement and substitut-

















To simplify notation, I will drop the φei subscript from the supply chain matrix and assume
the efficiency shock occurs in sector i for the rest of the paper. Instead, I will use the
subscript to denote row vectors. Hence, the object Πi is the ith row of the supply chain
matrix Πφei from (4.25).
The price channel is driven by two counteracting forces: (i) an intensive margin ef-






is driven by a reduction in the energy service price for the source sector, which
reduces the source sector’s marginal cost. With marginal cost pricing, the lower marginal
cost from the negative price shock is reflected in the market price for the source sector’s
output, thus reducing relative input prices for downstream sectors. As the negative price
shock transmits throughout the economy, changes in relative input prices cause a substi-
tution and output effect in downstream industries, spurring an expansionary process in the
economy.







































(c) Energy Savings from the Price Channel
Figure 4.3: Energy savings from the price channel decomposed into downstream and up-
stream effects.
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ing the energy-service price shock. The reduction in the energy-service price is reflected in
the source sector’s output price. For downstream industries, the drop in the source sector’s
output price makes the source sector’s product relatively cheaper than labor or other inter-
mediates. Holding output constant in downstream industries, the reduction in relative input
prices induces firms in downstream industries to substitute production processes toward
those that favor the cheaper intermediate, depicted as a movement from A to B in 4.3a. At
the same time, downstream industries also experience a reduction in the marginal cost of
production, which is passed on to purchaser’s of their output. Lower market prices trigger
a similar substitution effect in other downstream sectors and increases output from B to C.
To the extent the energy sector is downstream from the source sector, input prices for





measures the extent to which the energy prices adjust from this process. If the
energy sector is a direct or indirect source of demand for the source sector, equation (4.29)
stipulates the transmission of the negative price shock through the economy causes energy
prices to fall, energy production to expand, and aggregate energy savings to decrease. The
intensive margin effect’s impact on aggregate energy savings is graphically represented in
Figure 4.3c.
Aggregate energy savings are also determined by a wage effect. The wage effect is
driven by the upstream transmission of the energy-service price shock. As downstream
industries expand, more intermediates must be sourced from the energy sector and the
energy sector’s suppliers. However, because labor resources are fully employed, labor
inputs are relatively scarcer and wages increase. The effect of the efficiency shock on wages







θj > 0 in (4.29), where θi = LiL̄ =
Υiγi
Υ′γ
represent employment shares of industries. The upward pressure on wages causes relative
factor prices to adjust because wages and the market price of upstream intermediates will
increase. As the labor market re-calibrates from the demand shock, higher wage rates cause
production in upstream industries to scale back.
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Figure 4.3b depicts the impacts of rising wage rates on intermediate and labor demand.
Higher wages are passed on as higher prices to downstream industries. Holding output
constant, the adjustment in relative input prices induces a movement from A to B for
downstream industries. Higher input costs are passed on to other downstream industries,
reducing the quantity of output demanded in these industries. The net effect is a scaling
back of production in upstream sectors, depicted as a movement from xAei to x
C
ei in 4.3b.
Because the wage effect is positive, energy prices are predicted to increase through the
wage mechanism. The higher energy price reduces the quantity of energy demanded in
the economy. Hence, aggregate energy savings increase because of higher energy prices.
Graphically, the wage effect is represented by an increase in the energy price from p0e to
pwe in Figure 4.3c. Because income and the structural role of energy are held constant,
aggregate demand for energy remains unchanged. Instead, the higher energy price reduces
the quantity of energy demanded in the economy, leading to aggregate energy savings.
The Growth Channel
The growth channel measures the amount of aggregate energy savings created by an ex-
pansion in household income, holding commodity prices and the structural role of energy
constant. Substituting the expression for the growth channel with C = wL̄ and setting













where θi = LiL̄ represents the employment share of a sector.
Equation (4.30) stipulates that aggregate energy savings unambiguously declines from
the growth channel. Figure 4.4 graphically depicts the growth channel and the impact on
aggregate energy savings. Holding commodity prices constant and output constant, the pro-


















Figure 4.4: Aggregate Energy Savings from the Growth Channel
of industry. Households benefit from this growth through an increase in disposable income
and subsequently increase consumption of final goods. In Figure 4.4, this is represented
by a shift of the production possibilities frontier outward, where energy consumption shifts




The composition channel measures the change in aggregate energy consumption caused by
a change in the structural role of energy in the economy, holding commodity prices and
household income fixed. In this context, the structural role of energy refers to the amount
of energy embodied in final goods and services in the economy. When the amount of
energy embodied in goods and services increases, the structural importance of the energy
sector increases, and vice versa. In the model, economy-wide energy savings from the
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composition channel is given by









The composition channel is driven by two components. The first component (1−σ)ω∗ei αiΥeye
measures the change in embodied energy in the source sector’s final product sold to the
representative household. More importantly, this component of the composition channel
is the partial equilibrium energy savings derived in equation (4.27). Partial equilibrium
energy savings can be written as
(1− σ)xei = (1− σ)ω∗eip−σe pσi yi
Partial equilibrium energy savings do not account for the impact of the source sector’s
efficiency improvement on intermediate production. Because of this, the source sector’s
total output yi can be replaced with ci above. Hence, partial equilibrium energy savings
become
(1− σ)xei = (1− σ)ω∗eip−σe pσi ci





















This expression measures the energy embodied in the source sector’s final product, thus
connecting the first component of the composition channel with the concept of embodied
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of this increase will go to satisfying final demand in the source sector. A
larger fraction implies more energy is embodied in this final product.
The second component of the composition channel (1 − σ)ω∗eiΠeαΥe ye measures the
amount of energy embodied within the source sector’s downstream supply chains. To illus-
trate this, I will use the linear economy given in Figure 4.2 as an example. In this example,























This example illustrates how the second component of the composition channel measures
the embodied energy of the source sector’s downstream supply chains. When downstream
supply chains are more energy intensive, the embodied energy requirements are larger, and
the model predicts energy savings from the composition channel will be larger when there
is less scope for input substitution.
I graphically represent the mechanics of the composition channel in Figure 4.5 for two
separate cases. The cases correspond to different assumptions regarding the scope for input
substitution in the source sector. Figure 4.5a corresponds to a case where input substitution
is more flexible, i.e. σ > 1, and Figure 4.5b corresponds to a case with minimal opportuni-
ties for input substitution, i.e. σ < 1. The figures plot the equilibrium input bundles before
and after the efficiency shock, while holding factor and commodity prices constant.
Figure 4.5a shows the mechanics of the composition channel when producers can sub-
stitute inputs with minimal frictions. The efficiency shock has the effect of changing the
technical rate of substitution between inputs for producers in the source sector. In this case,
this changes the shape of the isoquant from y0 to y1. At the initial equilibrium input bundle
(x0ei, x
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(b) σ < 1
Figure 4.5: The composition channel
ducing y0(x0ei, x
0
ji). However, if the source sector producers were to re-allocate their input
selection from Point 0 to Point 1, they are able produce more output for the same cost,
increasing profits in the sector. When σ > 1, the figure illustrates the source sector will
re-allocate the input selection to favor the energy intermediate. After re-allocating inputs in
favor of the energy intermediate, production in the source sector becomes more energy in-
tensive, and, consequently, this re-allocation increases the embodied energy of the sector’s
downstream supply chains. When this happens, energy savings from the efficiency shock
are offset, and economy-wide energy consumption increases.
Figure 4.5b illustrates the economic intuition for the opposite scenario. When there is
little opportunity for input substitution, the efficiency shock creates an incentive for produc-
ers to re-allocate input bundles in favor of non-energy intermediates. The logic is similar
for the flexible substitution case. The efficiency shock alters the source sector’s produc-
tion technology, changing the technical rate of substitution between inputs. The isoquant
changes from y0 to y2. If producers consume the initial input bundle (x0ei, x
0
ji), they are
not utilizing resources efficiently. In particular, if source sector producers re-allocate input
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selections to favor the non-energy intermediate, i.e. (x2ei, x
2
ji), they can increase production
while maintaining the same cost. In this scenario, the embodied energy within the source
sector’s supply chains declines because producers have become less energy intensive. Con-
sequently, energy savings from the efficiency shock will increase.
4.5.3 The Energy Savings Multiplier
The previous section decomposed aggregate energy savings into three channels and pro-
vided the economic intuition behind the results. Even more, I illustrated the magnitude
of these channels are determined by the structure of the economy’s production network.
In this section, I introduce a simple measure for quantifying the importance of production
networks for aggregate energy savings following an efficiency shock. Specifically, the en-
ergy savings multiplier (ESM) measures the additional gains (or losses) from an efficiency
shock caused by re-allocation within the production network.
The ESM is computed by decomposing aggregate energy savings into direct and network-
driven energy savings. Consider the expressions for energy savings from the price, growth,
and composition channels in (4.29), (4.30), and (4.31), respectively. Direct energy savings




θeye, Sdirectgrowth = −ω∗ei
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Υe




Direct energy savings do not account for the higher-order impacts of the production net-
work. Instead, direct energy savings only accounts for the role of the energy sector as a
direct supplier to the source sector, e.g. see Figure 4.1. Combining these expressions shows
direct energy savings will be proportional to to the share of resource consumption of the
source sector. Total direct energy savings is given by
Sdirect = (1− σ) (1− θe) ηi (4.32)
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where ηi = xeiye represents the source sector’s share of energy consumption. Direct energy
savings are larger when the sector targeted with the energy efficiency policy represent a
higher share of total energy consumption. Even more, direct energy savings are higher
when the elasticity of substitution between inputs is smaller. If σ > 1, then energy con-
sumption in the economy will increase following the efficiency shock. Lastly, if the energy
sector is a major source of employment in the economy, energy savings will be lower,
regardless of the characteristics of the source sector.
The remaining terms from each of these channels reveal the impacts of the produc-
tion network on aggregate energy savings. Let υi = ω∗ei
Πiα
Υi






the network-driven components of general equilibrium energy savings. Then, the network







ye, Snetworkgrowth = −
N∑
j=e
υjθjye, Snetworkcomposition = (1− σ) υeye
Combining these expressions implies the amount of general equilibrium energy savings
driven by the economy’s production network is
Snetwork =
[






The first term in the brackets has a similar interpretation to the total direct energy savings.
Comparing the two expressions, it is straightforward to see the share of resource consump-
tion ηi of the source sector in (4.32) is replaced with υe in (4.33). The value of υe measures
the amount of energy embodied in the final goods produced by industries located down-
stream from the source sector. If the source sector does not supply inputs to downstream
industries (as in Figure 4.1), then this term would be equivalent to direct energy savings.
The additional terms in the expression for network-driven energy savings capture the addi-
tional supply chain impacts that manifest through the intensive margin effect, wage effect,
and growth channel.
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Using the expressions for direct and network-driven energy savings in (4.32) and (4.33),
I can decompose the general equilibrium component of aggregate energy into direct and
network-driven components. Specifically, aggregate energy savings can be written as
S = Sdirect + Snetwork (4.34)
With aggregate energy savings decomposed into direct and network-driven components, I
can construct the ESM that captures the additional gains or losses caused by the economy’s
production network. The ESM is constructed as
ESM =
S
Sdirect = 1 +
Snetwork
Sdirect (4.35)
The ESM can be positive or negative depending on the elasticity of substitution and the
size of energy savings caused by the network. Table 4.1 summarizes the interpretation of
the ESM for different values of the elasticity of substitution. Direct energy savings given
by (4.32) will be positive or negative depending on whether the elasticity of substitution is
below or above unity. When σ > 1, direct energy savings are negative, and this information
can be utilized to infer the impact of the production network on energy savings. The first
column of Table 4.1 summarizes the impact of the production network on energy savings
when the elasticity of substitution exceeds unity. When ESM < 1, re-allocation within the
network increases general equilibrium energy savings, but, when ESM > 1, network-driven
energy savings are negative and reduce the gains from the efficiency improvement. Only in
the case of σ > 1 and ESM < 0 are network-driven energy savings large enough to offset
the increase in energy consumption from the direct effect, making general equilibrium
energy savings positive.
The second column of Table 4.1 summarizes the implications for network-driven energy
savings when σ < 1 and direct energy savings are positive. In this scenario, network-
driven energy savings are negative if ESM < 1, but direct energy savings offset the losses
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Table 4.1: Value of the Energy Savings Multiplier and Network-Driven Energy Savings
σ > 1 σ < 1
ESM < 0 Snetwork > 0, S > 0 Snetwork < 0, S < 0
0 < ESM < 1 Snetwork > 0, S < 0 Snetwork < 0, S > 0
ESM > 1 Snetwork < 0, S < 0 Snetwork > 0, S > 0
introduced by the network when 0 < ESM < 1; otherwise, the network creates a negative
multiplier effect and reduces the effectiveness of energy efficiency improvements. When
ESM > 1, network-driven energy savings are positive and greater than the direct energy
savings, creating a positive multiplier effect for the original energy efficiency improvement.
4.6 Application
In this section, I simulate the impact of exogenous, industrial energy efficiency shocks to
provide initial estimates of the energy savings multiplier and connect the magnitude of the
multiplier to the Bonacich centrality of the source sector. To this end, I collect proprietary
data on input-output networks for the 50 states in the United States for the year 2015 from
the IMPLAN Group (IMPLAN). The IMPLAN datasets cover more than 500 sectors for
each state, thus providing a rich disaggregation to investigate the impact of input-output
networks on aggregate energy savings.
4.6.1 Calibration
The production system is characterized by exogenously given input-output relationships
between sectors Ω, the share of labor in each sector γ, and the share of each sector’s output
in final consumption α. To calibrate these parameters of the model using the IMPLAN
data, I normalize industry prices P, the economy’s wage rate w, the economy’s labor force
L̄, and the consumer price index Pc to be equal to 1. Additionally, I take the across industry
elasticity of substitution σ to be a known constant. Given this normalization, the model can
be calibrated using the available input-output data for each state.
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The Input-Output Network
Perhaps the most important component of the model is the input-output matrix Ω and cal-
ibrating the paramaters in this matrix requires sector prices are equal to their steady-state
values. In other words, the steady-state condition P = 1 ensures the input-output matrix
can be calibrated using the IMPLAN data. Specifically, under this steady-state condition, I
have Ω = D.
To see this, consider the equation for intermediate demand given in equation (4.6a).
Assume φei = 1 and re-arrange this equation to solve for the input-output coefficient ωei.
Under the steady-state condition P = 1, I have the following identity that is used to cali-


















Hence, I can use the direct requirements matrix D calculated from the IMPLAN data to
calibrate the input-output coefficient matrix Ω in the model. Importantly, in the simulation,
energy efficiency shocks will be applied to the direct requirements matrix D to simulate
changes in energy production for each state.
Labor Shares
I also use the IMPLAN data to calibrate the labor share parameters γ in the model. The
approach is similar to the method for calibrating the input-output matrix. Equilibrium in
the model implies the conditional factor demand for labor in sector i is given by equation
105
(4.18). Given w = 1 and P = 1 in the steady-state, re-arranging the expression for


















Thus, assuming wages and sector prices are equivalent to their steady-state values, I can
use the labor expenditure shares for the sectors, denoted as an N × 1 vector g, to calibrate
the labor intensity parameters γ in the model.
Consumption Shares
The final set of model parameters, consumption shares α, are calibrated using a similar
approach as above. Consider the expression for final consumption in equation (4.3). Re-
arranging this equation to solve for the consumption share of sector i and incorporating the















Given the steady-state conditions, I can use the household’s budget shares, denoted as the
N × 1 vector a, to calibrate the household preferences parameters in the model.
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4.6.2 Simulation
Once the model is calibrated to data, I can compute the multiplier matrix of the economy
and simulate the effects from an energy efficiency shock. For the simulation, I consider effi-
ciency improvements that affect production in three energy-related sectors: (i) Coal Mining
(NAICS 212111-212113), (ii) Petroleum Refineries (NAICS 324110), and (iii) Natural gas
distribution (NAICS 221210). For the sake of policy relevance and parsimony, I restrict the
simulation to efficiency shocks that reduce the direct input requirements of the following
highly, energy-intensive industries: (i) Coal Mining → Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroal-
loy Manufacturing (NAICS 331110), (ii) Petroleum Refineries → Truck Transportation
(NAICS 484110-484230), and (iii) Natural gas distribution→ Nitrogenous fertilizer man-
ufacturing (NAICS 325311).
Energy production is computed using the calibrated model parameters. Given the un-
derlying data is in steady-state, baseline energy production levels are computed as
ỹ0e = [I−D]−1e a = Υ̃e (4.36)
where ỹ0e is the simulated, baseline production for each energy sector e, and Υ̃e is the en-
ergy sector’s simulated supplier centrality measure. In the simulation, I apply a 10% energy
efficiency improvement to each sector by shocking the direct requirements matrix. Impor-
tantly, I only consider one shock at a time. The productivity-adjusted direct requirements
matrix φσ−1 D = D∗ accounts for the 10% energy efficiency improvement through the
multiplication of φσ−1 and D. Specifically, the e, i-th entry in D∗ becomes (1.1)σ−1ωei for
a given value of σ after the efficiency shock is applied
Energy production after the shock is computed by replacing the direct requirements
matrix D in equation (4.36) with the productivity-adjusted version. However, the efficiency
shock will have the effect of shocking prices and household income from their steady-state









where ỹ1e is the simulated energy production after the shock, ∆̃
∗
e is the energy sector’s
simulated consumer centrality after the shock, and Υ̃∗ is the simulated vector of supplier
centrality in the economy. After new energy production is computed, energy savings in the
model can be calculated by taking the difference in energy production before and after the
shock. Aggregate energy savings S̃ = y0e − y1e is then computed by applying shocks to the
sectors mentioned above for each state.
To calculate direct energy savings, I simulate equation (4.32) using the calibrated model
parameters. The simulated direct energy savings in the model are











is the energy’s sector’s employment share
Lastly, I calculate the ESM by taking the ratio of simulated energy savings and direct






I present the main results of the simulation exercise in this section. I begin by introduc-
ing the simulated output elasticities for each major energy sector by state. There are two
important insights from these results. First, there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity
in the simulated output elasticities. Further, the highest output elasticities do not necessar-
ily correspond to major energy producing states. Second, I find the sign of the simulated
output elasticity is highly sensitive to the choice of elasticity of substitution. To determine
the cause of this sensitivity, I investigate the impact of the price, growth, and composition
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channels on the output elasticity.
I decompose energy savings into the price, growth, and composition channels. After
comparing the contribution of each channel to overall energy savings, I find the compo-
sition channel dominates the price and growth channels in each scenario. The choice of
the elasticity of substitution determines whether the composition channel increases or de-
creases energy savings, and this offers an explanation for why energy savings are sensitive
to the elasticity of substitution. The magnitude of savings from the composition channel
suggests changes in the embodied energy of the source sector’s downstream supply chains
has a non-trivial effect on overall energy savings. I explore the role of the production
network for energy savings when I present the simulated energy savings multipliers.
The simulated energy savings multipliers exhibit substantial heterogeneity. For some
states, the ESM exceeds unity, indicating that the economy’s production network magni-
fied the original efficiency improvement. The importance of networks for amplifying or
curtailing energy savings is investigated in this section as well. I provide some preliminary
evidence that links the size of the ESM with the supplier centrality of the source sector. I
find this relationship holds for each scenario.
Output Elasticities
I introduce a 10% efficiency improvement and report the results. Figure 4.6 shows the
simulated percentage change in production for each energy sector by state. Reductions
(positive energy savings) are colored in blue, and increases (negative energy savings) are
colored in orange. For comparison, I include two scenarios that correspond to cases where
input substitution is rigid (σ = 0.25) or flexible (σ = 1.75). The results are presented in
percentage change format to facilitate interpretation of the results as output elasticities. I
also present the results for the highest and lowest output elasticities for each simulation in
Table 4.2. The corresponding states are listed to facilitate comparison across scenarios, and
these states are the focus of the discussion in the following sections.
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% Change in Energy Production
(a) Change in Coal Consumption (σ = 0.25)



























% Change in Energy Production
(b) Change in Coal Consumption (σ = 1.75)










































% Change in Energy Production
(c) Change in Oil Consumption (σ = 0.25)










































% Change in Energy Production
(d) Change in Oil Consumption (σ = 1.75)






































% Change in Energy Production
(e) Change in Gas Consumption (σ = 0.25)






































% Change in Energy Production
(f) Change in Gas Consumption (σ = 1.75)
Figure 4.6: Change in Energy Consumption by State
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Table 4.2: Highest and lowest output elasticities by simulation
Rigid Scenario (σ = 0.25) Flexible Scenario (σ = 1.75)








































Notes: The table presents the top and bottom 3 output elasticities for each scenario and simulation. States without energy production data collected from the Energy
Information Administration are excluded from the rankings. In each scenario, I rank states based on the absolute value of the output elasticity.
From the coal simulation with rigid input substitution, Tennessee (-0.120%), Pennsyl-
vania (-0.091%) and Texas (-0.089%) represent the three states with the highest output
elasticities. Pennsylvania and Texas are among the top coal producing states in 2015, col-
lectively accounting for more than 10% of total U.S. coal production. However, Tennessee
ranks much lower in terms of total coal production, only accounting for around 0.1% of
total U.S. coal production in 2015 [172].6 In contrast, the nation’s largest coal producing
state, Wyoming (-0.0004%), has the lowest output elasticity in this scenario. Wyoming
accounted for 41.89% of total U.S. coal production in 2015. Total energy savings from
the efficiency improvement could have been larger by choosing an alternative policy for
Wyoming.
Coal production in the flexible input substitution scenario increases for every state,
but the ranking of output elasticities remains relatively constant. Specifically, Tennessee
(0.13%), Texas (0.10%), and Pennsylvania (0.10%) are the top three states in terms of
output elasticities. The positive sign on the output elasticity implies the efficiency im-
provement backfires and increases coal production across these states. Wyoming takes the
position with the lowest output elasticity in this scenario. In this scenario, backfire from
the efficiency improvement could be reduced by targeting different sectors for Tennessee,
6Even though it has the largest impacts, I exclude California from the top three states because coal pro-
duction data is not available for California from the Energy Information Administration. Additionally, total
U.S. coal production in 2015 was 896,941 thousand short tons.
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Texas, and Pennsylvania.
I find the top three states for output elasticities are Nebraska (-0.94%), Idaho (-0.91%),
and Tennessee (-0.89%) for the rigid substitution scenario in the oil simulation. These
states, however, account for less than 0.1% of total crude oil production in the U.S. for
2015 [173]. The states with the lowest output elasticities (in absolute value) are New York
(-0.44%), Alaska (-0.50%), and Nevada (-0.60%). Alaska accounts for around 10% of total
crude oil production in 2015; whereas, New York and Nevada combined only represent
0.02% of production. In this scenario, the distribution of output elasticities is less varied
than the coal simulation.
The ranking in the flexible substitution scenario in the oil simulation changes slightly.
The states with the highest output elasticities are Mississippi (1.06%), Nebraska (1.02%),
and Indiana (1.02%). Collectively, these states account for 0.87% of U.S. crude oil produc-
tion in 2015. However, the next highest output elasticity is for California (0.98%), which
accounted for almost 6% of U.S. crude oil production. The lowest output elasticities in this
scenario are New York (0.47%), Alaska (0.56%), and Nevada (0.66%). For this scenario,
the energy efficiency improvement backfires across all states, but the backfire could be re-
duced by choosing a policy that reduces the output elasticity in major energy producing
states.
In the natural gas scenario, Louisiana (-0.39%), Idaho (-0.24%), and Ohio (-0.24%)
round out the top three states with the largest output elasticities in the rigid scenario. These
states account for 16% of (marketed) U.S. natural gas production in 2015 [174]. The states
with the smallest output elasticities are Michigan (-0.018%), Indiana (-0.013%), and Vir-
ginia (-0.015%). These states contribute less than 1% to U.S. natural gas production in
2015. In the flexible scenario, Louisiana (0.33%), Idaho (0.26%), and Ohio (0.24%) have
the highest output elasticities, and Michigan (0.009%), Indiana (0.014%), and Virginia
(0.016%) are the states with the lowest elasticities.
Taken together, the simulated output elasticities provide two important insights for how
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micro-scale energy efficiency improvements materialize at the aggregate level. First, the
sign of the output elasticity is sensitive to the choice of elasticity of substitution. When
input substitution is rigid, energy savings are positive; however, when input substitution is
more flexible, energy efficiency policies backfire and energy consumption increases in the
economy. This holds for even a modest difference in the elasticity of substitution. Second,
output elasticities vary across states. Variations in the output elasticity are informative with
regard to the overall performance of the efficiency improvement. In some scenarios, energy
efficiency improvements within major energy producing regions do not necessarily trans-
late into the highest output elasticities. When input substitution is rigid, this suggests the
energy efficiency improvements could be adapted to target alternative sectors to raise the
overall output elasticity of the state. Alternatively, when input substitution is flexible, tar-
geting alternative sectors could reduce potential backfire from the efficiency improvement.
In the next section, I unpack these results further to demonstrate how the price, growth, and
composition channels contribute to the heterogeneity in output elasticities.
Channels
Figures 4.7-4.9 summarize the contribution of the general equilibrium channels to the es-
timated output elasticities from the previous section. In Table 4.3, I compare the results
between the highest and lowest output elasticities for each simulation. For the coal and oil
simulations, I select the states with the lowest output elasticities based on the contribution
of these regions to total energy production in the United States in 2015. For the gas simu-
lation, Louisiana is a top regional producer and the state with the largest output elasticity.
In this scenario, I choose the state with the lowest output elasticity for comparison. I re-
port the results as a share of the total output elasticity. This way the counterfactual output
elasticity for each channel can be computed by multiplying the total output elasticity by the
contribution of each particular channel.
For the sake of parsimony, I will only discuss the results for the rigid input substi-
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Table 4.3: Decomposition of the output elasticities into the price, growth, and composition
channels
Rigid Scenario (σ = 0.25) Flexible Scenario (σ = 1.75)
State Output Elasticity Price Growth Composition Output Elasticity Price Growth Composition
2*Coal Mining Tennessee -0.120% -0.002% -0.002% 100.004% 0.1294% 0.0105% 0.002% 99.987%
Wyoming -0.00038% -1.810% -2.867% 104.677% 0.0005% 10.540% 2.385% 87.076%
2*Petroleum Refineries Nebraska -0.941% -0.0643% -0.230% 100.292% 1.021% 0.446% 0.228% 99.320%
Alaska -0.498% 0.2004% -3.346% 103.129% 0.563% -1.335% 3.184% 98.141%
2*Natural Gas Distribution Louisiana -0.302% 0.0639% -0.336% 100.271% 0.325% -0.446% 0.336% 100.111%
Michigan -0.009% 0.113% -0.6609% 100.548% 0.009% -0.790% 0.658% 100.132%
Notes: This tables decomposes the output elasticity into the price, growth, and composition channels. The results are reported to contrast the highest and lowest output elasticities from each
simulation.
tution scenario, but I have included the results for the flexible scenario for comparison.
For the coal simulation, Wyoming leads with the highest impacts for each channel. How-
ever, from Section 4.6.3, I illustrated that Wyoming also has the lowest output elasticity
in this scenario. The reason for this is evident by decomposing the output elasticity into
the underlying channels. Wyoming has the largest energy savings from the composition
channel, suggesting the output elasticity would have been approximately 5% higher had
factor and commodity prices remained at baseline values. However, the energy efficiency
improvement had the effect of decreasing regional coal prices while simultaneously in-
creasing household income through labor market adjustments. These adjustments in factor
and commodity markets increased energy production overall and erased most of the energy
savings from the composition channel. In comparison with Tennessee, the price and growth
channels are particularly large and can explain why Wyoming realized very minimal ag-
gregate energy savings from the efficiency improvement.
For the oil simulation, I will focus on the results for Alaska because the state accounts
for 10% of national crude oil production and was among the lowest output elasticities in
the rigid scenario in Section 4.6.3. First, I find the wage effect dominates the intensive
margin effect and crude oil prices increase. The increase in regional oil prices, all else
constant, leads to a reduction in crude oil. Second, from the growth channel results, I
find household re-spending effects are large enough to offset the savings from the price
channel and, consequently, overall crude oil production increases. Third, the change in the
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composition of the input-output network away from energy-intensive goods is large enough
to offset the increase in production from the growth channel, but the net effect on the crude
oil output elasticity in the state is modest. This suggests targeted interventions in the state
would benefit from closer examination of how to minimize household re-spending effects.
From Section 4.6.3, the top states in terms of output elasticities for the rigid scenario
accounted for 16% of U.S. natural gas production in 2015. Of these states, the state with
the highest output elasticity, Louisiana, accounted for the bulk of this contribution, produc-
ing roughly 13% of total U.S. natural gas production in 2015. Decomposing the elasticity
reveals why the efficiency improvement was so successful for Louisiana. In terms of the
composition effect, Louisiana (100.3%) ranks among the lowest states in the simulation,
e.g. the state with the largest composition effect is Ohio (100.8%). However, the effective-
ness of the efficiency improvement is boosted by the combination of positive energy savings
from the price channel and modest reductions in savings through the growth channel. I find
the wage effect dominates the intensive margin effect, generating positive impacts through
the price channel (0.06%) in Louisiana. Furthermore, the gains from the price channel and
composition channel are only partially offset through household re-spending effects from
the growth channel (-0.3%). Hence, the combination of increased energy prices, moderate
re-spending impacts, and a structural shift of the economy to less energy-intensive products
improve the effectiveness of the efficiency improvement in Louisiana.
There are a few important insights to take away from this exercise. First, the results of
the simulation show energy savings from the price, growth, and composition channels vary
widely across regions. For example, in some states, I find fuel prices increase following
the energy efficiency shock, which improves the overall effectiveness of the efficiency im-
provement. However, I also find fuel prices may decline in some states from the efficiency
improvement, reducing the improvement’s effectiveness. Second, the reduction in energy
savings from re-spending by households via the growth channel is typically large. This
provides suggestive evidence that regional policymakers could improve the aggregate out-
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comes of energy efficiency improvements by enacting complementary programs that limit
the impacts of these re-spending effects. Third, the composition channel dominates the
other channels in each scenario. This characteristic of the results provides an explanation
for why output elasticities are sensitive to the choice of elasticity of substitution. When
input substitution is rigid, the input-output network changes in such way that the structural
importance of the energy sector and other energy-intensive sectors declines, thus creating
positive energy savings overall. However, when input substitution is flexible, the model
predicts the energy sector and energy-intensive sectors become more central producers in
the economy and energy use increases, holding prices and income fixed. When this occurs,
the embodied energy of goods and services sold in the economy increases.
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(a) Price Channel (σ = 0.25)




























(b) Price Channel (σ = 1.75)




























(c) Growth Channel (σ = 0.25)




























(d) Growth Channel (σ = 1.75)




























(e) Composition Channel (σ = 0.25)



























(f) Composition Channel (σ = 1.75)
Figure 4.7: Coal Savings from Different Channels
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(a) Price Channel (σ = 0.25)









































(b) Price Channel (σ = 1.75)










































(c) Growth Channel (σ = 0.25)










































(d) Growth Channel (σ = 1.75)









































(e) Composition Channel (σ = 0.25)









































(f) Composition Channel (σ = 1.75)
Figure 4.8: Oil Savings from Different Channels
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(a) Price Channel (σ = 0.25)






































(b) Price Channel (σ = 1.75)







































(c) Growth Channel (σ = 0.25)







































(d) Growth Channel (σ = 1.75)






































(e) Composition Channel (σ = 0.25)






































(f) Composition Channel (σ = 1.75)
Figure 4.9: Gas Savings from Different Channels
Energy Savings Multipliers
In Section 4.5.3, in the absence of a production network, I show that maximal energy sav-
ings are achieved when efficiency improvements reduce fuel consumption in sectors that
consume a large share of local energy resources. However, the impact of the composi-
tion channel on energy savings suggests the structure of industrial activity has important
implications for how energy efficiency improvements are reflected on the aggregate level.
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In this section, I explore the contribution of the production network to aggregate energy
savings. In particular, I compute the energy savings multiplier (ESM) for each state and
simulation scenario to illustrate how each economy’s production network impacts the ag-
gregate energy savings from an efficiency improvement. For the exposition, I will focus on
discussing the impact of the economy’s production network on energy savings for the rigid
substitution scenario.
Figures 4.10-4.12 present the ESM by state and simulation scenario. In each scenario,
the ESM is positive for each state but ranges between 0 and 1. Referencing Table 4.1,
the value of the ESM has different interpretations for the rigid and flexible substitution
scenarios. In the rigid substitution scenario, values greater than 1 imply network-driven
energy savings are positive and push aggregate energy savings closer to the anticipated
value. In contrast, when 0 < ESM < 1, network-driven energy savings are negative,
implying the economy’s production network curtails the effects of the efficiency improve-
ment. However, in this case, network-driven energy savings are not large enough to cause
























































































































































Figure 4.10: Energy Savings Multipliers for Coal Mining
Figure 4.10 presents the results from the coal simulation using the rigid and flexible
substitution scenarios. The simulated ESM ranges between 0 and 1, but is strictly positive
for each scenario. The states with the largest output elasticities, Tennessee, Texas, and
Pennsylvania, all have ESMs greater than 1. This implies for every unit of direct energy
savings the production network created an additional ESM > 1 units of savings. Hence,
the production networks in these states create a positive multiplier effect for energy ef-
ficiency improvement. Wyoming was the state with the least effective energy efficiency
improvement in this scenario, and I find the ESM for Wyoming is less than 1. This means
that, for the same energy efficiency improvement, Wyoming only realizes a fraction of the























































































































































































































































Figure 4.11: Energy Savings Multipliers for Petroleum Refineries
The simulated ESMs for the oil scenario are presented in Figure 4.11. Unlike the coal
scenario, the values of the simulated ESMs are below 1 for each state. This implies the
production network curtails the energy efficiency improvement at the aggregate level for
each state. Moreover, the ESMs do not exhibit the same heterogeneity found in the simu-
lated ESMs for the coal scenario. One possible explanation for this behavior may be the
consequence of the structural similarity of the Truck Transportation sector across different
states. If the systemic importance of Truck Transportation varies only slightly by state,
then this would explain the lack of substantial heterogeneity in these results. I explore this
in more detail in the next section.
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Figure 4.12: Energy Savings Multipliers for Natural Gas Distribution
Figure 4.12 displays the ESM results for gas simulation. Two of the states with the high-
est output elasticities, Louisiana and Idaho, have ESM values above 1. Ohio, the state with
the third largest output elasticity, has an ESM slightly less than 1. The three states with the
lowest output elasticities–Michigan, Indiana, and Virgina–have an ESM of less than unity.
For the states with the lowest output elasticities, the production network contributes to a
reduction in aggregate energy savings, implying the micro-scale efficiency improvement
would have resulted in a higher output elasticity in the absence of a production network.
Energy Savings Multiplier and Network Characteristics
Throughout the paper, I claim that heterogeneity in the structure of production networks
can explain differences in aggregate outcomes following micro-scale energy efficiency im-
provements. In this section, I summarize some important features of the regional input-
output networks used in the simulation to show heterogeneity exists across these production
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networks. Moreover, I illustrate the upper tail of the supplier centrality distribution exhibits
scale-free behavior [169]. The scale-free behavior in the upper tail of the distribution sug-
gests the presence of a few “hub-like” sectors in each regional production network. These
hub sectors are major suppliers, both directly and indirectly, in the economy’s production
network and are thus “systemically important” for production. Importantly, prior research
has shown that shocks occurring in these hub sectors lead to larger fluctuations in aggregate
performance [175, 176].
In the context of how energy efficiency improvements aggregate into economy-wide
energy savings, the same sector in two different regions may serve vastly different func-
tions, and thus vary in terms of systemic importance. This potential heterogeneity in the
structural importance of the source sector may factor into how production networks inter-
face with micro-scale energy efficiency improvements. I provide evidence to affirm this
hypothesis. Specifically, I illustrate the supplier centrality of the source sector correlates
with that sector’s response to the efficiency shock. Moreover, I show this correlation carries
over to explain the size of a state’s ESM from the simulation. I find source sector’s with a
higher supplier centrality are associated with higher ESM values. This finding implies effi-
ciency improvements occurring in systemically important sectors generates higher energy

















Figure 4.13: Examples of calibrated input-output networks
Figure 4.13 visualizes three production networks calibrated from the IMPLAN input-
output data. Each node in the network corresponds to a sector and the size of the edges
are proportional to the direct requirements coefficients of the industries. Energy industries
are colored-coded, while non-energy producing sectors are black. I use the Fructerman-
Reingold algorithm to visualize the production networks. The visualization helps to illus-
trate some of the structural features of production across different regions, and, particularly,
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(b) Change in Supplier Centrality
Figure 4.14: Empirical Counter Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) and Change in Supplier
Centrality
A more complete characterization of regional production structures is given by the il-
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lustrations in Figure 4.14. Figure 4.14a plots the empirical counter-cumulative distribution
function (CCDF). The empirical CCDF of supplier centralities gives the probability of
observing a supplier centrality greater than or equal to some threshold value. A notable
feature of these distributions is that the supplier centralities span several order of magni-
tude, and the distribution exhibits an approximate linear relationship observed in the upper
tail of the distribution. This linear relationship is indicative of the presence of a few “hub-
like” sectors, capturing the disproportionate role of these sectors as input suppliers in the
economy.
I plot the change in a sector’s supplier centrality as a function of the sector’s base-
line supplier centrality in Figure 4.14b. For the visualization, I plot the results from the
efficiency shock applied to coal, but the results are comparable for other shocks. The ob-
servations are plotted on a log-log scale so that the scale of the x-axis corresponds to the
same scale in 4.14a for comparison. The change in supply centrality spans several orders
of magnitude and reveals substantial disparity in a sector’s exposure to a shock. The lin-
ear relationship, in particular, reflects the notion that more central sectors, as measured by
the sector’s Bonacich centrality, are more exposed to idiosyncratic shocks in the economy.
Figure 4.14b also illustrates the heterogeneity in the role of energy as a supplier of inputs
across different regions. The supplier centrality for the Coal Mining sector, for instance,
spans several orders of magnitude; whereas, the supplier centrality of the Natural Gas Dis-
tribution sector tends to cluster relatively around a common value. Petroleum refineries
tend to occupy a more central position in regional production networks with only a few
exceptions.
Figures 4.15-4.17 plot the relationship between the simulated ESMs and the supplier
centrality of the source sector. These figures highlight how the systemic importance of the
source sector varies across states and how this systemic importance translates micro-scale
energy efficiency improvements into aggregate energy savings. Across each scenario, the
figures reveal a positive relationship between the source sector’s supplier centrality and the
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simulated ESM. When energy efficiency improvements occur in systemically important
sectors, the production network will generate additional energy savings. Because of this,
energy efficiency improvements occurring in sector’s with higher supplier centralities tend
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Figure 4.15: Coal ESM and Iron and Steel Mill Supplier Centrality
In the coal simulation, the supplier centralities of Iron and Steel Mill Manufacturing
in Texas and Pennsylvania are among the highest across all states. Figure 4.15 suggests
the structural importance of these sectors determines the magnitude of the ESM for these
states. In contrast, Wyoming, Alaska, and Missouri have the lowest output elasticities
(in absolute value) in the coal simulation. I find Iron and Steel Manufacturing in these
states plays a much more insignificant role as an intermediate input supplier to these local
economies. In particular, the supplier centrality of Iron and Steel Manufacturing in these














































































Figure 4.16: Oil ESM and Truck Transportation Supplier Centrality
suggest the structural importance of these industries can explain why these states have the
lowest output elasticities.
I find a similar relationship holds in the oil simulation. In particular, the states with the
largest output elasticities also tend to have source sector’s with larger supplier centralities.
However, the structural importance of the Truck Transportation sector does not vary sub-
stantially across states. Unlike the coal simulation, where the supplier centrality of Iron
and Steel Manufacturing span several orders of magnitude, the supplier centrality of the
Truck Transportation sector tend to cluster around a similar value. This explains why the
simulated ESM for the oil scenario does not reveal substantial heterogeneity across states.
Despite this, I find larger ESM values are associated with states where Truck Transportation
is more systemically important to the local economy. This is evident from the positive rela-
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Figure 4.17: Natural Gas ESM and Nitrogenous Fertilizer Manufacturing Supplier Central-
ity
in Figure 4.16.
Figure 4.17 illustrates the relationship between the simulated ESMs for the gas sce-
nario and the supplier centrality of the Nitrogenous Fertilizer Manufacturing sector for
each state. The supplier centrality of the Nitrogenous Fertilizer Manufacturing sector is
largest in Louisiana, the state with the largest output elasticity for the gas scenario. In con-
trast, the Nitrogeneous Fertilizer Manufacturing sector in Michigan has the lowest supplier
centrality. Michigan has the lowest output elasticity in the gas scenario. I find the posi-
tive relationship between the ESM and the source sector’s supplier centrality holds for the
gas scenario. States where the Nitrogeneous Fertilizer Manufacturing sector is more es-
sential for the supply of inputs to the local economy experience additional energy savings
generated by the existence of the local production network.
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4.7 Conclusion
Energy efficiency improvements in micro-scale energy services, such as heating, lighting,
and transportation, have enabled more productive use of available energy resources. How-
ever, over the past century, the modest reductions in global energy intensiveness indicate
the magnitude of these micro-scale energy efficiency improvements do not always bear out
on an aggregate scale. The past century has also given rise to a substantial change in the
organization of production. Production processes have become increasingly fragmented
and characterized by complex, interconnected supply chains of specialized input suppliers.
This shift to a networked organization of production may have important implications for
how micro-scale energy efficiency improvements materialize on an aggregate level.
In this paper, I investigate how industrial energy efficiency improvements interface
with production networks to determine aggregate energy savings. Energy efficiency im-
provements increase a producer’s capacity to convert energy resources into useful energy
services. As producers adjust their inputs in response to the efficiency improvement, the
efficiency shock transmits to other industries via the input-output linkages captured by
the economy’s production network. The transmission of the efficiency shock through the
production network induces other producers to adjust their input mix, causing additional
adjustments in commodity and factor markets in the economy. As a consequence, I show
the economy’s production network creates additional aggregate energy savings or losses
through a price, growth, and composition channel.
Using detailed state-level input-output tables, I simulate a 10% energy efficiency im-
provement and evaluate the contribution of production networks to overall energy savings.
My results suggest production networks can either contribute additional energy savings or
detract from overall energy savings. In some instances, I find production networks increase
aggregate energy savings by more than 60%, but in other cases, I find the production net-
work reduces energy savings by almost 100%. I show the magnitude of these contributions
131
is positively related with the structural importance of the sector experiencing the energy
efficiency improvement. Importantly, the structural importance of a sector is directly cap-
tured by the sector’s Bonacich centrality, a well-defined network centrality statistic. Effi-
ciency improvements occurring in sectors with higher Bonacich centralities translate into
higher aggregate energy savings in the presence of a production network.
My findings are important for designing effective industrial energy efficiency policy in
an interconnected world. In particular, my findings suggest a heterogeneous policy mix
could achieve better policy outcomes. By taking the model to data, I find energy efficiency
improvements are most effective when they occur in sectors of systemic importance to
the local economy. Under the right conditions, targeting systemically important industries
leads to a structural transformation of the economy toward less-energy intensive goods and
services, creating a multiplier effect for energy savings. Moreover, I show this multiplier ef-
fect correlates with a well-defined measure of network centrality. By utilizing this relation,
policymakers can improve policy outcomes by adjusting interventions to target efficiency
policy at more central sectors in the local economy.
Although the model in the paper is static, the primary results of this study provide im-
portant insights for the dynamic implications of energy efficiency policy. Specifically, I
show that energy efficiency policy can lead to adjustments in the economy’s production
network, changing the structural importance of certain industries in the economy. If sub-
stitution between energy and non-energy inputs is sufficiently flexible, the production net-
work can potentially evolve toward energy-intensive goods and services, strengthening the
systemic importance of the energy sector over time. The evolution of production systems
toward energy-intensive process may create additional inertia within already entrenched
fossil fuel based energy systems. Given modern production systems are continuing to be-
come highly fragmented and transnational, counteracting the inertia introduced by a global
production network will require a coordinated global effort to reduce global energy inten-




This dissertation reflects on strategies for utilizing networks to catalyze a low-carbon en-
ergy transition. In particular, I focus on the role of networks for two policy strategies: (i)
switching to alternative, low-carbon energy technologies, and (ii) reducing consumption of
carbon-intensive, fossil fuel energy resources. Chapter 2 of this dissertation uses historical
energy transitions to argue networks complicate prescriptive policy design. In particular,
we illustrate the nature of the underlying technologies used to covert physical fuel inputs
into energy services structures interactions between markets. The interconnections between
markets, in turn, creates complex feedback loops that lead to simultaneous changes across
the entire economy. We explore how these feedback loops impact energy efficiency policy
in more detail in chapter 4. Chapter 3 investigates the role of networks in proliferating the
diffusion of low-carbon energy technologies. We provide evidence that network formation
is critical for the early success of emerging low-carbon innovations. When networks form
at this early stage of the technology life cycle, they provide a platform for information
exchange between early and future adopters, leading to lower search, transaction, and op-
erational costs for future adopters. Lastly, in chapter 4, we develop a theoretical model that
embeds industrial, energy efficiency improvements within a network setting to understand
how interconnections between markets affects the outcomes of sector-specific low-carbon
energy policy. Energy efficiency is often touted as a cure-all policy measure to reduce
dependence on carbon intensive, fossil fuel resources. However, when markets are con-
nected by the economy’s production network, the outcome of energy efficiency policy is
highly uncertain. Using a combination of theoretical and numerical analyses, we illustrate
the structure of the economy’s production network shapes the change in aggregate energy
consumption following a sector-specific energy efficiency improvement.
133
REFERENCES
[1] C. Blackburn, A. Harding, and J. Moreno-Cruz, “Toward deep-decarbonization:
An energy-service system framework,” Current Sustainable/Renewable Energy Re-
ports, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 181–190, 2017.
[2] G. F. Nemet, V. Zipperer, and M. Kraus, “The valley of death, the technology
pork barrel, and public support for large demonstration projects,” Energy Policy,
vol. 119, pp. 154–167, 2018.
[3] IPCC, “Climate change 2014 synthesis report summary chapter for policymakers,”
in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working
Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 31.
[4] J. P. Holdren, “The energy innovation imperative: Addressing oil dependence, cli-
mate change, and other 21st century energy challenges,” innovations, vol. 1, no. 2,
pp. 3–23, 2006.
[5] M. Grubb, T. Jamasb, and M. G. Pollitt, Delivering a Low Carbon Electricity Sys-
tem: Technologies, Economics and Policy. Cambridge University Press, Jul. 17,
2008, 1 p., Google-Books-ID: 74o7pmFTgigC, ISBN: 978-0-521-88884-4.
[6] T. Foxon, J. Khler, and C. Oughton, Innovation for a low carbon economy: eco-
nomic, institutional and management approaches. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008.
[7] M. Xu, J. C. Crittenden, Y. Chen, V. M. Thomas, D. S. Noonan, R. Desroches,
M. A. Brown, and S. P. French, “Gigaton problems need gigaton solutions 1,” En-
vironmental science & technology, vol. 44, no. 11, pp. 4037–4041, 2010.
[8] M. Jaccard, “Hybrid energy-economy models and endogenous technological change,”
in Energy and Environment, R. Loulou, J.-P. Waaub, and G. Zaccour, Eds., Springer
US, 2005, pp. 81–109, ISBN: 978-0-387-25351-0 978-0-387-25352-7.
[9] L. Mundaca, L. Neij, E. Worrell, and M. McNeil, “Evaluating energy efficiency
policies with energy-economy models,” Annual Review of Environment and Re-
sources, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 305–344, 2010.
[10] A. Grbler, N. Nakienovi, and D. G. Victor, “Dynamics of energy technologies and
global change,” Energy policy, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 247–280, 1999.
134
[11] A. Grubler, “Energy transitions research: Insights and cautionary tales,” Energy
Policy, Special Section: Past and Prospective Energy Transitions - Insights from
History, vol. 50, pp. 8–16, Nov. 2012.
[12] A. Grubler, C. Wilson, and G. Nemet, “Apples, oranges, and consistent compar-
isons of the temporal dynamics of energy transitions,” Energy Research & Social
Science, vol. 22, pp. 18–25, 2016.
[13] V. Smil, “Examining energy transitions: A dozen insights based on performance,”
Energy Research & Social Science, vol. 22, pp. 194–197, 2016.
[14] F. W. Geels, “Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes:
A multi-level perspective and a case-study,” Research Policy, NELSON + WIN-
TER + 20, vol. 31, no. 8, pp. 1257–1274, Dec. 2002.
[15] G. Kallis and R. B. Norgaard, “Coevolutionary ecological economics,” Ecological
Economics, Special Section: Coevolutionary Ecological Economics: Theory and
Applications, vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 690–699, Feb. 15, 2010.
[16] T. J. Foxon, “A coevolutionary framework for analysing a transition to a sustain-
able low carbon economy,” Ecological Economics, vol. 70, no. 12, pp. 2258–2267,
Oct. 15, 2011.
[17] F. W. Geels, “The dynamics of transitions in socio-technical systems: A multi-
level analysis of the transition pathway from horse-drawn carriages to automo-
biles (18601930),” Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, vol. 17, no. 4,
pp. 445–476, 2005.
[18] G. Verbong and F. Geels, “The ongoing energy transition: Lessons from a socio-
technical, multi-level analysis of the dutch electricity system (19602004),” Energy
Policy, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 1025–1037, Feb. 2007.
[19] S. Shackley and K. Green, “A conceptual framework for exploring transitions to de-
carbonised energy systems in the united kingdom,” Energy, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 221–
236, 2007.
[20] S. J. Bennett, “Using past transitions to inform scenarios for the future of renewable
raw materials in the UK,” Energy policy, vol. 50, pp. 95–108, 2012.
[21] J. Schot, “The usefulness of evolutionary models for explaining innovation. the
case of the netherlands in the nineteenth century,” History and Technology, an In-
ternational Journal, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 173–200, 1998.
135
[22] R. Kemp, J. Schot, and R. Hoogma, “Regime shifts to sustainability through pro-
cesses of niche formation: The approach of strategic niche management,” Technol-
ogy analysis & strategic management, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 175–198, 1998.
[23] A. Smith, J.-P. Vo{\textbackslash}s s, and J. Grin, “Innovation studies and sus-
tainability transitions: The allure of the multi-level perspective and its challenges,”
Research policy, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 435–448, 2010.
[24] G. C. Unruh, “Understanding carbon lock-in,” Energy policy, vol. 28, no. 12, pp. 817–
830, 2000.
[25] ——, “Escaping carbon lock-in,” Energy policy, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 317–325, 2002.
[26] G. C. Unruh and J. Carrillo-Hermosilla, “Globalizing carbon lock-in,” Energy Pol-
icy, vol. 34, no. 10, pp. 1185–1197, 2006.
[27] B. Turnheim and F. W. Geels, “Regime destabilisation as the flipside of energy tran-
sitions: Lessons from the history of the british coal industry (19131997),” Energy
Policy, vol. 50, pp. 35–49, 2012.
[28] F. W. Geels and J. Schot, “Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways,” Re-
search policy, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 399–417, 2007.
[29] A. Smith, A. Stirling, and F. Berkhout, “The governance of sustainable socio-
technical transitions,” Research Policy, vol. 34, no. 10, pp. 1491–1510, Dec. 2005.
[30] F. W. Geels, “Ontologies, socio-technical transitions (to sustainability), and the
multi-level perspective,” Research policy, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 495–510, 2010.
[31] ——, “The multi-level perspective on sustainability transitions: Responses to seven
criticisms,” Environmental innovation and societal transitions, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 24–
40, 2011.
[32] D. Popp, “Innovation and climate policy,” Annual Review of Resource Economics,
vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 275–298, Sep. 7, 2010.
[33] E. D. Beinhocker, The origin of wealth: Evolution, complexity, and the radical
remaking of economics. Harvard Business Press, 2006.
[34] R. Fouquet, “The slow search for solutions: Lessons from historical energy transi-
tions by sector and service,” Energy Policy, vol. 38, no. 11, pp. 6586–6596, 2010.
[35] V. Smil, Energy transitions: history, requirements, prospects. Santa Barbara, CA:
Praeger Publishers, 2010.
136
[36] J. Moreno-Cruz and M. S. Taylor, “A spatial approach to energy economics,” Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 18908, Mar. 2013.
[37] P. Rutter and J. Keirstead, “A brief history and the possible future of urban energy
systems,” Energy Policy, vol. 50, pp. 72–80, 2012.
[38] R. C. Allen, “Backward into the future: The shift to coal and implications for the
next energy transition,” Energy Policy, vol. 50, pp. 17–23, 2012.
[39] C. R. Knittel, K. Metaxoglou, and A. Trindade, “Natural gas prices and coal dis-
placement: Evidence from electricity markets,” National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Working Paper 21627, Oct. 2015.
[40] J. Moreno-Cruz and M. S. Taylor, “Back to the future of green powered economies,”
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 18236, Jul. 2012.
[41] N. Alperson-Afil, “Continual fire-making by hominins at gesher benot ya aqov,
israel,” Quaternary Science Reviews, vol. 27, no. 17, pp. 1733–1739, 2008.
[42] N. Alperson-Afil, G. Sharon, M. Kislev, Y. Melamed, I. Zohar, S. Ashkenazi, R.
Rabinovich, R. Biton, E. Werker, G. Hartman, and others, “Spatial organization
of hominin activities at gesher benot yaaqov, israel,” Science, vol. 326, no. 5960,
pp. 1677–1680, 2009.
[43] W. Liu, G. Spaargaren, N. Heerink, A. P. Mol, and C. Wang, “Energy consumption
practices of rural households in north china: Basic characteristics and potential for
low carbon development,” Energy Policy, vol. 55, pp. 128–138, 2013.
[44] E. Severnini, “The power of hydroelectric dams: Agglomeration spillovers,” 2014.
[45] G. Turnbull, “Canals, coal and regional growth during the industrial revolution,”
The Economic History Review, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 537–560, 1987.
[46] L. Gagnon, “Civilisation and energy payback,” Energy Policy, vol. 36, no. 9, pp. 3317–
3322, 2008.
[47] N. L. Madureira, “The iron industry energy transition,” Energy Policy, vol. 50,
pp. 24–34, 2012.
[48] J. U. Nef, “Early energy crisis and its consequences,” Sci. Am.;(United States),
vol. 237, 1977.
[49] R. C. Allen, The British industrial revolution in global perspective. Cambridge
University Press Cambridge, 2010.
137
[50] J. A. Galloway, D. Keene, and M. Murphy, “Fuelling the city: Production and distri-
bution of firewood and fuel in london’s region, 1290-14001,” The Economic History
Review, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 447–472, 1996.
[51] J. Rudge, “Coal fires, fresh air and the hardy british: A historical view of domestic
energy efficiency and thermal comfort in britain,” Energy Policy, vol. 49, pp. 6–11,
2012.
[52] R. Fouquet, “Divergences in long-run trends in the prices of energy and energy
services,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, rer008, 2011.
[53] ——, “The demand for environmental quality in driving transitions to low-polluting
energy sources,” Energy policy, vol. 50, pp. 138–149, 2012.
[54] B. K. Sovacool, “Conceptualizing urban household energy use: Climbing the en-
ergy services ladderi,” Energy Policy, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 1659–1668, 2011.
[55] W. B. Arthur, “Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by histori-
cal events,” The economic journal, vol. 99, no. 394, pp. 116–131, 1989.
[56] B. K. Sovacool, “Rejecting renewables: The socio-technical impediments to renew-
able electricity in the united states,” Energy Policy, vol. 37, no. 11, pp. 4500–4513,
2009.
[57] D. Snow, “EXTRAORDINARY EFFICIENCY GROWTH IN RESPONSE TO NEW
TECHNOLOGY ENTRIES: THE CARBURETOR’s” LAST GASP”.,” in Academy
of Management Proceedings, vol. 2004, Academy of Management, 2004, K1–K6.
[58] R. Adner and D. Snow, “Old technology responses to new technology threats: De-
mand heterogeneity and technology retreats,” Industrial and Corporate Change,
vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 1655–1675, Oct. 1, 2010.
[59] D. Acemoglu, P. Aghion, L. Bursztyn, and D. Hemous, “The environment and di-
rected technical change,” The American Economic Review, vol. 102, no. 1, pp. 131–
166, 2012.
[60] M. Grubb, J. Khler, and D. Anderson, “Induced technical change in energy and en-
vironmental modeling: Analytic approaches and policy implications,” Annual Re-
view of Energy and the Environment, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 271–308, 2002.
[61] D. Acemoglu, U. Akcigit, D. Hanley, and W. Kerr, “Transition to clean technology,”
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 124, no. 1, pp. 52–104, Jan. 8, 2016.
[62] K. C. Meng, “Estimating path dependence in energy transitions,” National Bureau
of Economic Research, 2016.
138
[63] J. O. Lanjouw and A. Mody, “Innovation and the international diffusion of envi-
ronmentally responsive technology,” Research Policy, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 549–571,
1996.
[64] S. B. Brunnermeier and M. A. Cohen, “Determinants of environmental innovation
in US manufacturing industries,” Journal of environmental economics and manage-
ment, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 278–293, 2003.
[65] D. Popp, “International innovation and diffusion of air pollution control technolo-
gies: The effects of NOX and SO 2 regulation in the US, japan, and germany,”
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 46–71,
2006.
[66] N. Johnstone, I. Hai, and D. Popp, “Renewable energy policies and technological
innovation: Evidence based on patent counts,” Environmental and resource eco-
nomics, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 133–155, 2010.
[67] D. Popp, “They don’t invent them like they used to: An examination of energy
patent citations over time,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology, vol. 15,
no. 8, pp. 753–776, 2006.
[68] C. J. Blackburn, M. E. Flowers, D. Matisoff, and J. Moreno-Cruz, “Do pilot and
demonstration projects work?,” 2018.
[69] I. E. Agency, “Energy and air pollution,” Paris, France, 2016, p. 266.
[70] M. M. Rubio and M. Folchi, “Will small energy consumers be faster in transition?
evidence from the early shift from coal to oil in latin america,” Energy policy,
vol. 50, pp. 50–61, 2012.
[71] A. A. van Benthem, “Energy leapfrogging,” Journal of the Association of Environ-
mental and Resource Economists, vol. 2, no. 1, 2015.
[72] F. H. Hilton, “Later abatement, faster abatement: Evidence and explanations from
the global phaseout of leaded gasoline,” The Journal of Environment & Develop-
ment, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 246–265, 2001.
[73] P. Aghion, P. Howitt, and D. Mayer-Foulkes, “The effect of financial development
on convergence: Theory and evidence,” National Bureau of Economic Research,
2004.
[74] C. Karakosta, H. Doukas, and J. Psarras, “Technology transfer through climate
change: Setting a sustainable energy pattern,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy
Reviews, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 1546–1557, 2010.
139
[75] M. Lovely and D. Popp, “Trade, technology and the environment: Why do poorer
countries regulate sooner,” NBER Working Paper, vol. 14286, pp. 1529–1538, 2008.
[76] E. Saikawa and J. Urpelainen, “Environmental standards as a strategy of interna-
tional technology transfer,” Environmental Science & Policy, vol. 38, pp. 192–206,
2014.
[77] D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson, Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity,
and poverty. Crown Business, 2012.
[78] D. Acemoglu, P. Aghion, and F. Zilibotti, “Distance to frontier, selection, and
economic growth,” Journal of the European Economic association, vol. 4, no. 1,
pp. 37–74, 2006.
[79] A. Gerschenkron, “Economic backwardness in historical perspective,” Develop-
ment: Doctrines of development, vol. 1, p. 85, 2000.
[80] A. S. Manne, “ETA: A model for energy technology assessment,” The Bell Journal
of Economics, pp. 379–406, 1976.
[81] N. Rivers and M. Jaccard, “Combining top-down and bottom-up approaches to
energy-economy modeling using discrete choice methods,” The Energy Journal,
pp. 83–106, 2005.
[82] C. Bhringer and T. F. Rutherford, “Combining bottom-up and top-down,” Energy
Economics, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 574–596, 2008.
[83] Greening. (Sep. 30, 2009). Bottom-up models of energy: Across the spectrum :
International handbook on the economics of energy, (visited on 05/01/2017).
[84] N. Rivers and M. Jaccard, “Choice of environmental policy in the presence of learn-
ing by doing,” Energy Economics, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 223–242, 2006.
[85] A. Schfer and H. D. Jacoby, “Experiments with a hybrid CGE-MARKAL model,”
The Energy Journal, pp. 171–177, 2006.
[86] S. Fujimori, T. Masui, and Y. Matsuoka, “Development of a global computable gen-
eral equilibrium model coupled with detailed energy end-use technology,” Applied
Energy, vol. 128, pp. 296–306, Sep. 1, 2014.
[87] Y. Cai, D. Newth, J. Finnigan, and D. Gunasekera, “A hybrid energy-economy
model for global integrated assessment of climate change, carbon mitigation and
energy transformation,” Applied Energy, vol. 148, pp. 381–395, Jun. 15, 2015.
140
[88] C. Bhringer, T. F. Rutherford, and W. Wiegard, “Computable general equilibrium
analysis: Opening a black box,” 2004.
[89] Y. Qiu and L. D. Anadon, “The price of wind power in china during its expansion:
Technology adoption, learning-by-doing, economies of scale, and manufacturing
localization,” Energy Economics, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 772–785, 2012.
[90] L. Coulomb and K. Neuhoff, “Learning curves and changing product attributes:
The case of wind turbines,” 2006.
[91] P. Sderholm and G. Klaassen, “Wind power in europe: A simultaneous innovation-
diffusion model,” Environmental and resource economics, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 163–
190, 2007.
[92] S. Jacobsson and A. Bergek, “Transforming the energy sector: The evolution of
technological systems in renewable energy technology,” Industrial and Corporate
Change, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 815–849, Oct. 2004.
[93] R. Kemp, “The dutch energy transition approach,” International Economics and
Economic Policy, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 291–316, 2010.
[94] P. J. Pearson and T. J. Foxon, “A low carbon industrial revolution? insights and
challenges from past technological and economic transformations,” Energy Policy,
vol. 50, pp. 117–127, 2012.
[95] B. K. Sovacool, “How long will it take? conceptualizing the temporal dynamics of
energy transitions,” Energy Research & Social Science, vol. 13, pp. 202–215, 2016.
[96] G. Leach, “The energy transition,” Energy policy, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 116–123, 1992.
[97] N. Jagger, T. Foxon, and A. Gouldson, “Skills constraints and the low carbon tran-
sition,” Climate policy, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 43–57, 2013.
[98] F. M. Bass, “A new product growth for model consumer durables,” Management
science, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 215–227, 1969.
[99] R. Jensen, “Adoption and diffusion of an innovation of uncertain profitability,”
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 182–193, 1982.
[100] U. Doraszelski, “The net present value method versus the option value of waiting:
A note on farzin, huisman and kort (1998),” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, vol. 25, no. 8, pp. 1109–1115, 2001.
141
[101] Y. H. Farzin, K. J. Huisman, and P. M. Kort, “Optimal timing of technology adop-
tion,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 779–799,
1998.
[102] P. Stoneman and P. Diederen, “Technology diffusion and public policy,” The Eco-
nomic Journal, vol. 104, no. 425, pp. 918–930, 1994.
[103] M. J. Kotchen and C. Costello, “Maximizing the impact of climate finance: Funding
projects or pilot projects?” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
forthcoming.
[104] B. Bollinger, “Green technology adoption: An empirical study of the southern cali-
fornia garment cleaning industry,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics, vol. 13,
no. 4, pp. 319–358, 2015.
[105] D. N.-y. Mah, Y.-Y. Wu, J. C.-m. Ip, and P. R. Hills, “The role of the state in sus-
tainable energy transitions: A case study of large smart grid demonstration projects
in japan,” Energy Policy, vol. 63, pp. 726–737, 2013.
[106] C. Hendry, P. Harborne, and J. Brown, “So what do innovating companies really
get from publicly funded demonstration projects and trials? innovation lessons from
solar photovoltaics and wind,” Energy Policy, vol. 38, no. 8, pp. 4507–4519, 2010.
[107] C. Hendry and P. Harborne, “Changing the view of wind power development: More
than ‘bricolage’,” Research Policy, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 778–789, 2011.
[108] S. J. DeCanio and W. E. Watkins, “Investment in energy efficiency: Do the char-
acteristics of firms matter?” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 80, no. 1,
pp. 95–107, 1998.
[109] L. T. Bui and S. Kapon, “The impact of voluntary programs on polluting behav-
ior: Evidence from pollution prevention programs and toxic releases,” Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 31–44, 2012.
[110] I. Lange, “Evaluating voluntary measures with treatment spillovers: The case of
coal combustion products partnership,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &
Policy, vol. 9, no. 1, 2009.
[111] C. Catalini and C. Tucker, “When early adopters don’t adopt,” Science, vol. 357,
no. 6347, pp. 135–136, 2017.
[112] P. Attewell, “Technology diffusion and organizational learning: The case of busi-
ness computing,” Organization Science, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 1–19, 1992.
142
[113] S. Aral and D. Walker, “Identifying influential and susceptible members of social
networks,” Science, vol. 337, no. 6092, pp. 337–341, 2012.
[114] B. Bollinger and K. Gillingham, “Peer effects in the diffusion of solar photovoltaic
panels,” Marketing Science, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 900–912, 2012.
[115] A. De Grip and J. Sauermann, “The effects of training on own and co-worker pro-
ductivity: Evidence from a field experiment,” The Economic Journal, vol. 122,
no. 560, pp. 376–399, 2012.
[116] D. J. Zimmerman, “Peer effects in academic outcomes: Evidence from a natural
experiment,” Review of Economics and statistics, vol. 85, no. 1, pp. 9–23, 2003.
[117] O. Bandiera and I. Rasul, “Social networks and technology adoption in northern
mozambique,” The Economic Journal, vol. 116, no. 514, pp. 869–902, 2006.
[118] T. G. Conley and C. R. Udry, “Learning about a new technology: Pineapple in
ghana,” The American Economic Review, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 35–69, 2010.
[119] M. Brown, H. C. Livesay, D. S. Lux, and R. C. Wilson, “Demonstrations: The
missing link in government-sponsored energy technology deployment,” Technology
in Society, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 185–205, 1993.
[120] M. O. Jackson and L. Yariv, “Diffusion of behavior and equilibrium properties in
network games,” The American Economic Review, vol. 97, no. 2, pp. 92–98, 2007.
[121] M. Fafchamps, M. J. van der Leij, and S. Goyal, “Matching and network effects,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 203–231, 2010.
[122] L. Cassi and A. Plunket, “Proximity, network formation and inventive performance:
In search of the proximity paradox,” The Annals of Regional Science, vol. 53, no. 2,
pp. 395–422, 2014.
[123] K. J. Boudreau, T. Brady, I. Ganguli, P. Gaule, E. Guinan, A. Hollenberg, and
K. R. Lakhani, “A field experiment on search costs and the formation of scientific
collaborations,” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 99, no. 4, pp. 565–576,
2017.
[124] D. M. Reiner, “Learning through a portfolio of carbon capture and storage demon-
stration projects,” Nature Energy, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 15 011, 2016.
[125] D. S. Scharfstein and J. C. Stein, “Herd behavior and investment,” The American
Economic Review, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 465–479, 1990.
143
[126] A. V. Banerjee, “A simple model of herd behavior,” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, vol. 107, no. 3, pp. 797–817, 1992.
[127] L. M. Kamp, R. E.H. M. Smits, and C. D. Andriesse, “Notions on learning ap-
plied to wind turbine development in the netherlands and denmark,” Energy Policy,
vol. 32, no. 14, pp. 1625–1637, 2004.
[128] K. J. Arrow, “The economic implications of learning by doing,” The Review of
Economic Studies, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 155–173, 1962.
[129] E. Von Hippel, “Successful industrial products from customer ideas,” The Journal
of Marketing, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 39–49, 1978.
[130] ——, “Lead users: A source of novel product concepts,” Management Science,
vol. 32, no. 7, pp. 791–805, 1986.
[131] H. Hellsmark, J. Frishammar, P. Sderholm, and H. Ylinenp, “The role of pilot and
demonstration plants in technology development and innovation policy,” Research
Policy, vol. 45, no. 9, pp. 1743–1761, 2016.
[132] M. E. Kahn and R. K. Vaughn, “Green market geography: The spatial clustering
of hybrid vehicles and LEED registered buildings,” The B.E. Journal of Economic
Analysis & Policy, vol. 9, no. 2, 2009.
[133] J. Cidell, “Building green: The emerging geography of LEED-certified buildings
and professionals,” The Professional Geographer, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 200–215,
2009.
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